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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines, through a study of UNDP’s Small Grants Programme 
(SGP), how two different communities in the Ethiopian highlands are responding 
to the need for adaptation to climate change. Its overall aim is to use this 
example to contribute a critical analysis to studies of Community-Based 
Adaptation (CBA). The thesis analyses the politicised narratives that emerged as 
the SGP was being implemented that sought to explain why the two 
communities had different capacities to adapt. It also sets out the ways 
community members came to narrate their own experiences of the SGP. In both 
field locations, CBA has been adopted as a strategy. However, the argument of 
the thesis, based on field experience, is that this approach will have limited 
long-term success because it is conceptually under-developed and in particular 
depoliticised. To address this weakness, the thesis produces a new theoretical 
framework for the analysis of CBA that combines political ecology and resilience 
thinking. The thesis is based on significant qualitative research involving 8 
months of participant observation, 7 focus group discussions and 73 semi-
structured interviews with community leaders, peasant farmers, government 
officials and SGP management personnel carried out between September 2013 
and June 2014. The thesis demonstrates the heterogeneity of communities and 
the complexity this brings to implementing standard models of CBA in specific 
field sites. It treats CBA as a discourse by analysing the relationships of power, 
scale and knowledge thereby revealing their political nature. The thesis argues 
that the diversity of social structures and individual agents, means that 
evaluations of CBA projects need to be flexible, context-sensitive and power-
conscious. Placing politics at the centre of CBA, the thesis analyses the concept 
of ‘community’ in development practice, moving between the developmental 
viewpoint and the lived experience of Ethiopian peasant farmers. CBA is shown 
to be serving a dual purpose: it makes the socio-ecological systems of the 
communities in question more resilient to climate change, but also reinforces 
the existing socio-political structures of the communities, reproducing current 
inequalities. Lastly, the significance of CBA is analysed from the farmers’ 
perspectives, showing how Ethiopian elites have historically deployed control 
over land to steer the behaviour of the Ethiopian peasantry. This has made the 
peasant communities in Ethiopia strongly hierarchical and internally divided in 
terms of rights and resources. 
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Chapter One. Introduction  
 
Researcher: After all this time, do you think we can still call this project 
community-based? 
A former militia man: When we see it nowadays, it is not possible to say so. 
(Interview DR-13) 
 
Community-based adaptation (CBA) is a community-led intervention, which 
seeks to address climate change through participatory approaches, based on 
communities’ priorities, knowledge and capacities. Particular emphasis is placed 
both on integrated adaptation measures capable of eliciting local knowledge and 
on understanding complex socio-ecological systems (Ensor et al., 2016). CBA, in 
this thesis, is also about development processes that, over and above supporting 
particular adaptation measures, bring participatory decision-making to the 
centre of climate change adaptation. Decision-making processes likewise may be 
about governing communities as much as increasing adaptive capacity. Given 
that communities are shaped by conflicting values and contrasting aspirations, 
CBA comes to be seen as a complex, multi-voiced process which gives rise to a 
variety of outcomes. As a generalisation, the ambition of CBA, that is 
participation and empowerment, is shaped by different actors, institutions, 
environments, ideas, traditions and hopes. 
 
Power relations are inherent to the working out of Community-Based 
Adaptation (CBA) projects. The explicit goal of these projects is to help villagers 
to cope with the consequences of climate change through their own institutions 
and actions. However, this thesis argues that the CBA projects are also a crucible 
for competition over rights and the pursuit of differential access to resources in 
complex socio-ecological systems. These projects are shaped by power relations 
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on a small and a large scale – from profoundly local struggles between a wife 
and husband, through intra-community struggles between generations, and 
inter-community and inter-regional power struggles, to struggles between state 
bureaucracies and state populations. They are therefore an important 
opportunity to bring social reform to communities, but can promote inequality 
and maintain the status quo, with all its existing complexities and, some would 
say, social injustices.  
 
CBA is an intervention that forces us to question the salience of pre-
formulated understandings of community-based development as context-free 
and apolitical. Different actors and institutions shape the activities of CBA in 
different places as well as the variety of outcomes engendered by these projects. 
Power relations are seldom symmetrical and the decision-making processes of 
the projects are frequently dominated by a few patriarchal leaders. The thesis 
starts from this premise: power relations are asymmetrical and thus important 
in every community, but local context and power relations will shape both the 
way CBA is implemented and the outcomes at the end of the projects. Critical 
analysis of the power dynamics of communities is therefore necessary. In an era 
of shrinking international development budgets and rising climate change 
concerns, international donor agencies are increasingly referring to the need for 
practice to come ‘from the community’. It is the task of academic work to 
interpret community action in the light of field research. This thesis sets out to 
accomplish this by looking at the dynamics of two interrelated aspects of CBA in 
specific field sites of Ethiopia. 
 
First, it examines control of land as a central organising feature of Ethiopian 
governmentality. It shows how three successive Ethiopian regimes over two 
hundred years have deployed control over land to steer the behaviour of the 
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Ethiopian people, particularly the peasantry. It will be argued that a considerable 
number of rural communities in Ethiopia have never been internally equal or 
democratic, but instead has consistently been strongly hierarchical and 
internally divided in terms of rights and resources. Peasant farmers have not 
merely tolerated this inequality; they have given their consent and support to 
strongly hierarchical structures, in part because these connect villages to a 
distant central government. Such relationships will shape the way CBA works out 
in 21st century Ethiopia.  
 
Second, the thesis offers a political account of adaptive capacity to climate 
change during the time the CBA projects were implemented in two different 
communities in the Ethiopian highlands. Attention is given to the details of the 
ways in which different individuals and interest groups at village level articulate 
their experiences of the projects. The peasant farmers who participated in the 
research are not regarded as a homogeneous component of a single-voiced 
community, but as complex social actors with a variety of forms of social, 
ecological, cultural and political assets and aspirations. The case studies in this 
thesis reveal that the CBA projects promote conflicting values and contrasting 
aspirations in terms of access to rights and resources, which gives rise to a 
variety of outcomes, with both winners and losers. Some individuals gain 
significant political assets through their participation in the CBA projects 
because of the extent to which the structures of community are inscribed into 
the way in which the projects are implemented. 
 
Politics, in this thesis, is the (generally public) dialogue about the rules (both 
formal laws and less formal social regulations) by which a society lives and 
operates and through which scarce resources are allocated. Politics may be about 
rules within a family or within a village or within a nation-state. Government - 
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often seen as synonymous with politics - likewise may be about governing a 
village as much as governing a country. Given that these rules probably benefit 
some people more than others, politics is as much about conflict as it is about 
co-operation and as much about exclusion as inclusion. As a generalisation, the 
political debate, that is the debate about rules, is orchestrated by those who have 
authority and reflects their interests. Thus, the perpetual dialogue of politics is 
about identifying conflicting interests and seeking some kind of (often 
temporary or contingent) resolution or compromise. 
 
Through these two lines of inquiry and argument, the thesis demonstrates 
the need for a flexible, context-sensitive and power-conscious analytical 
framework to evaluate CBA. It aspires to make a distinctive contribution to the 
field of studies of community development in general, and studies of CBA in 
particular, by developing an analytical framework that foregrounds underlying 
contexts and both local and national politics. The tradition of political ecology is 
applied as an initial conceptual toolkit through which this ambition to develop 
and apply a distinctive analytical framework can be achieved. It also requires 
engaging with varied power dynamics, socio-political milieu, physical 
environments, livelihoods and motivations which are shaping individual actors 
and institutions. In promoting the concept of ‘politicised communities’, the 
thesis aims to make a contribution to the field of political ecology and uses 
empirical insights gained from the Ethiopian highlands to do so. The thesis has 
approached the research setting not as a paradigmatic site for the analysis of a 
particular process, but as a location from which to build theories that might be 
productively applied elsewhere. 
 
This thesis sets out to study two projects funded through the UNDP’s Small 
Grants Programme (SGP) in the Ethiopian highlands. In both case studies, CBA 
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has been adopted as a strategy, aiming to improve the capacity of the local 
communities to adapt to climate change through awareness raising, training and 
practice of conservation techniques. In particular, the thesis draws attention to 
the case of area closure,1 one of the core activities of the CBA projects in 
Ethiopia, as a crucible for competing over rights and resources. 
 
1.1  An Overview of Community-Based Adaptation (CBA) 
 
This section of the introduction sets out to reflect on the emergence of CBA. 
It argues that CBA has proven useful in shifting the paradigms of the orthodox 
top-down approach in development practice but will have limited long-term 
success because it is conceptually under-developed and in particular is 
depoliticised. 
 
1.1.1 Climate Change Adaptation 
 
Anthropogenic climate change refers to medium and long-term changes in 
climate patterns that are a result of man-made greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 
2014). This includes a higher intensity and frequency of extreme weather events 
such as drought, cyclone and floods and greater unpredictability and variability 
of the seasons and rainfall. This unpredictability is of particular importance to 
an area where subsistence often relies on rain-fed agriculture. 
 
The impact of climate change is likely to be distributed unequally both in 
social and spatial terms (IPCC, 2014). There is a tendency for countries close to 
the equator to be more exposed to various extreme climate events than those in 
                                                  
1 This activity closes off a certain area of land and its natural resources from human and cattle 
interference during the project period (two years) in order to prevent soil erosion from intense 
rainfall events. 
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the mid-latitudes (Leal Filho, 2011). In particular, communities in these 
countries that are heavily dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods 
(e.g. pastoralists and farmers) are identified as highly vulnerable to climate 
change (Toulmin, 2009). People living in slums and informal settlements are 
also considered as vulnerable populations as such places are often not adequately 
protected from natural disasters such as landslides (e.g. Mathare in Nairobi, 
Kenya) or floods (e.g. Dharavi in Mumbai, India) (Schipper and Burton, 2009). 
 
Vulnerability to climate change is affected by diverse factors. Adger (1999) 
disaggregates vulnerability into the two aspects of individual and collective 
vulnerability. Individual vulnerability is determined by factors such as access to 
resources, diversity of livelihoods and social status of individuals. Collective 
vulnerability is determined by factors such as market structures, social security 
and infrastructure at a larger scale. Different-level factors may interact with 
each other. For example, although Korea has better market structures than 
Ethiopia at the country level, Ethiopians can be more resilient to climate change 
than Koreans at the individual level due to their past experience of climate 
variability and consequently their built-in social infrastructures that can produce 
responses to those challenges. 
 
There is a growing sense of the urgent need to support climate change 
adaption worldwide (Pelling, 2010). Adaptation is a set of actions that aim to 
reduce the vulnerability of individuals or groups to the adverse effects of 
anticipated climate change (Satterthwaite, 2007). Unlike mitigation,2 adaptation 
was considered as beneficial only in the short term in the past (Pielke Jr., 2005). 
However, many scientists have argued that the impacts from weather events are 
                                                  
2 Interventions to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases (IPCC, 2014). 
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already substantial in every region of the world and are likely to become greater 
in future years even if anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are drastically 
reduced. Adaptation and mitigation are not mutually exclusive, but rather 
complementary. Failure to mitigate the drivers of climate change will have 
negative consequences on adaptation whilst failure to adapt will require far more 
dramatic levels of mitigation. Adaptation should not be something we only 
consider when we fail to reduce emissions; it is part of the ultimate goal of 
balancing resource use and development of socio-ecological systems, namely to 
improve or at least maintain the quality of life and the environment (Lomborg, 
2007). 
 
Adaptation takes various forms: 1) decreasing the possibility of occurrence of 
the problem by controlling relative factors (e.g. flood control systems in a river 
basin); 2) coping with the problem by reducing sensitivity to potential impacts 
and/or increasing adaptive capacity (e.g. livelihood diversification programmes 
for pastoralists); and 3) avoiding the problem by limiting its potential impacts 
(e.g. small-scale dam construction to reduce soil erosion) (Dodman and Mitlin, 
2011). The first and third options are often chosen by developed nations that can 
afford relatively high cost and high technology strategies. By contrast, in 
developing countries, there is a growing interest in the second option as a low-
cost strategy to climate change adaptation. 
 
The concept of CBA has first been suggested for communities that are 
vulnerable to climate change, but have few financial resources. The effectiveness 
of top-down approaches to development has been called into question. The 
interest in the second option has emerged out of recognition that financial aid 
channelled through governments in many developing countries often fails to 
reach its intended beneficiaries (Huq and Reid, 2007). As a result, some 
  8 
development agencies have started to work directly with local communities to 
identify the risks and factors that make them vulnerable to climate change 
(Ayers and Huq, 2009). 
 
The emphasis on community is, however, more than just recognition that 
many low-income communities bear the costs of climate change, but reflects the 
significance of CBA in terms of the ownership of their own natural resources and 
the exercise of their rights as well as issues around governance at a nation-state 
scale. Many of those communities in developing countries are heavily dependent 
on local environmental conditions. Their natural resources, such as land and 
water, tend to be commonly owned, and so decisions related to the use and 
management of these resources have to be made at the community level (Forsyth 
and Ayers, 2009). 
 
1.1.2 Definition of Community 
 
Over the last ten years, a growing number of international donor agencies 
have incorporated climate change adaptation into local development work 
through the concept of CBA. This brings together long-standing ideas from 
participatory development and more recent resilience thinking. It is argued that 
local communities have the skills, knowledge and networks to promote locally 
appropriate activities for their own livelihoods. Advocates of CBA claim that it is 
the most effective framework for identifying, assisting and implementing local 
development activities in response to climate change, particularly in regions 
where adaptive capacity is highly dependent on livelihood strategies, such as 
sub-Saharan Africa (Dodman et al., 2010). 
 
  9 
First of all, it is worthwhile reviewing the concept of ‘community’ as a 
precursor to the analysis of CBA. In the general sense, the term ‘community’ 
refers to ‘a group of people living in the same place’ (Oxford Dictionary of 
English, 2010). This taken-for-granted concept was re-examined in 
development studies following the wide scale interest in participatory 
development in the 1970s and 80s (Gregory, 2009). The difficulty of defining 
community is noted by many, but a useful starting point is that: a community is 
an entity that has geographic boundaries and a shared fate (Norris et al., 2007). 
This definition highlights two major uses of the term: 1) it is the territorial and 
geographical notion of community such as neighbourhood, town or city; and 2) it 
is relational, concerned with the qualities of human relationships and social ties 
that draw people together and hold them together over time (Gusfield, 1978). 
The focus of the second usage is on networks of individuals who interact within 
formal or informal institutions (e.g. a miners’ association or a youth group in a 
small town). Although there have been social scientists that weigh relational 
criteria against locality due to their genuine interest in the notion, the two 
usages are not necessarily exclusive of each other (McMillan and Chavis, 1986). 
 
Heller (1989) adds a third dimension: community as ‘collective political 
power’, referring to a group of people who share some similar political interests. 
He argues that organising political actions is one of the few ways left for 
individuals to develop social structures in response to their needs (Heller, 1989). 
This notion is built on the premise that aggregated constituencies are potential 
levers for social change. A system of parliamentary democracy is a good example 
that effectively exercises collective political power by institutionalising the 
process of representing geographical communities into decision-making. This 
concept of community was found applicable to this thesis, as will be detailed in 
Chapter Six. 
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The relationship between politics and community reminds us that the term 
community can be used as a concept of exclusion as well as inclusion. Carl 
Schmitt (1932) stresses that being different is sufficient to create conflicts in the 
political sphere by drawing a distinction between ‘the friend’ and ‘the enemy’ or 
in this context those who are inside the community and those who are not. It is 
frequently assumed in development practice that people living in a specific 
location all belong to one community. Internal conflicts and heterogeneity are 
brushed over. But social institutions do not always protect the rights of 
individuals or specific groups inside the community. These institutions (e.g. 
traditional rulers) can uphold and reproduce local configurations of inequality 
and exclusion. Socio-political structures are so often left untouched during 
social, ecological and economic changes (Cleaver, 2001).  
 
For instance, in a water supply development project in Machakos District, 
Kenya, that I participated in 2005, the unconditional right of access to water was 
exclusively granted to those who had assisted in the implementation of the 
project through the provision of labour or materials. In that case, village 
members who were poorer and lived further away from the project site were less 
likely to have participated in the work and were therefore denied the benefits. 
Although they could negotiate, their access to water was limited. This concept of 
community has proven to be useful in understanding conflicts over resources 
which will be detailed through the case study of area closure in Chapter Seven 
and Eight. 
 
Communities need to be understood in terms of internal power relations 
(Voydanoff, 2001). Based on field experience, a community is frequently 
presented as a unified body that speaks with a single voice in the current practice 
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of CBA. A community is however made through a continual process of fabricating 
and refabricating multiple voices ‘inside’, and it is built on its unique mix of 
customs, history and socio-ecological circumstances. Community members are 
therefore unlikely to benefit from change on equal terms. It depends, among 
other things, on where they live, what they do for a living and to which social 
networks they belong, namely their day-to-day activities. This is not only true of 
the production and reproduction of communities in general, but is also true of 
the interventions made in the name of ‘community interest’ or ‘progress’ in 
community-based development approaches (Watts and Peet, 2004). 
 
Communities, in the present thesis, are treated as collective political power 
which shares similar political interests and used as a concept of exclusion as well 
as inclusion, rather than just a group of people living in the same geographical 
space with a single voice. People belong to multiple communities defined by 
place, institution and activity. Communities are variously loci of knowledge, sites 
of regulation and management, sources of identity, repositories of tradition and 
embodiments of institutions (Norris et al., 2007; Watts and Peet, 2004). The 
term community often turns out to be a keyword whose meanings are wrapped 
up in unstable, contested and complex ways. Thus understanding communities is 
also about questioning representation, authority, governance and accountability 
among multiple and contradictory constituencies and alliances (Li, 2004). 
Communities are therefore not seen as internally harmonious and coherent; 
rather as riven by differences and competition in complex socio-ecological 
systems. 
 
  
  12 
1.1.3 Key Features of CBA 
 
The argument of the thesis, based on literature and field experience, is that 
the dearth of theoretical engagement has created two critical challenges for CBA. 
First, CBA has failed to address the multifaceted character of climate change in 
complex socio-ecological systems (Tschakert and Dietrich, 2010). Instead, it has 
only focused on one or two adaptation measures that respond to current 
predictions of climate change. Existing ideas about CBA treat climate change as a 
question of temperature and/or rainfall and fail to properly address the adaptive 
capacity of community in relation to complex multivariate climate risks (Forsyth 
and Ayers, 2009). Second, political structures within and outside CBA projects 
are frequently ignored (Dodman and Mitlin, 2011; Dumaru, 2010). Given that CBA 
approaches aim to empower a community by strengthening their participation in 
decision-making processes, an understanding the internal and external power 
relationships of communities and the human risks determined by political and 
economic factors is crucial. 
 
The analysis of CBA can identify contradictions or assumptions that explain 
the relatively limited success of CBA in the field. A commitment to CBA is often 
effectively, an act of faith – something that is believed in and rarely questioned 
(Cleaver, 2001). The concept of participation embedded in CBA is seen as an 
intrinsically ‘good thing’ for beneficiaries; knowledge management and 
disseminating best practice are considered to be the most useful academic 
contribution; considerations of power and politics are thought to divisive and so 
best ignored (Cleaver, 2001). In practice, CBA is often presented as an array of 
adaptation options in a shopping-list style in which communities are asked to 
choose among a selection of alternative policies and practices without 
consideration of the systemic implications (Thomsen et al., 2012). 
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Conceptualising CBA is therefore a necessary first step in preparing adaptation 
strategies that are cognisant of wider scalar, temporal, political and 
developmental dimensions of socio-ecological systems. 
 
In spite of the substantial public interest, there have been surprisingly few 
academic discussions on the conceptualisation of CBA. This is mainly because of 
the view that CBA only develops through practice in the field rather than through 
theoretical development in debates (Huq and Reid, 2007; Reid, 2009). For 
instance, Huq (2008:28) argues, “it is impossible to learn the theory of CBA in a 
university… learning comes from practice itself”. As a result, most academic 
studies have focused less on conceptual development but more on responding to 
projects in the field by building knowledge management systems. Yet there is 
little evidence of the long-term effectiveness of CBA in improving the conditions 
of the most vulnerable populations (Dodman and Mitlin, 2011; Tschakert and 
Dietrich, 2010). 
 
Of the academic contributions to reviewing the history of CBA and addressing 
its logistical problems, some have made more original theoretical contributions, 
particularly in terms of its socio-political implications. For example, Ensor and 
Berger (2009) interrogate the relationship between culture and adaptation from 
a political point of view in order to analyse how cultures are defined in 
adaptation processes. They show how CBA can recognise and respond to the 
different roles that culture plays, and in particular how culture appears to limit 
the freedom of individuals and groups. Dumaru (2010) also examines CBA to 
illustrate key lessons in terms of embedded power relations in a community. 
Dodman and Mitlin (2011) draw lessons from past experiences of Participatory 
Development (PD), and claim that CBA needs to engage with issues of power at 
various levels of governance, calling for attention to be paid to political 
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structures and institutions involved in adaptation policy. Forsyth (2013) analyses 
CBA as part of a trend of linking international development and climate change 
policies. Finally, at the 5th International Conference on CBA in 2011, Harjeet Singh 
argued that in order to fully address adaptive capacity in vulnerable 
communities, it is necessary to understand the current unbalanced power 
relations of the society of which communities are part since these are closely 
associated with pressing social problems such as poverty, health and education 
(Haider and Rabbani, 2011). Despite these conceptual interventions, CBA is still 
more often thought of as a strategy to be tried in the field than an idea to be 
analysed in the academy. 
 
Bearing this in mind, three conceptual areas of CBA will be interrogated to 
problematise the existing definitions of CBA and identify the requirements for 
developing a more explicit conceptual framework: 1) environmental knowledge 
and its incorporation into project planning; 2) participation and the idea of a 
social process; and 3) the relevance and conceptualisation of politics. 
 
Environmental Knowledge 
 
What distinguishes CBA from standard development projects most is the role 
and treatment of knowledge. CBA starts by recognising communities’ needs and 
perceptions in order to deliver livelihood benefits and reduce vulnerability to 
climate change. Although it may make CBA look similar to other bottom-up 
approaches, the way the intervention is developed is different. From the outset, 
it involves the valorisation of local knowledge and raises questions about how 
knowledge from inside and outside of communities is merged in the project 
process. In other words, CBA is concerned not only with what communities do, 
but with how they do it with what knowledge (Ensor and Berger, 2009). 
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Two particular forms of environmental knowledge are considered: 
indigenous knowledge of local environmental changes, on the one hand, and 
scientific information acquired from climate change modelling on the other 
(Dumaru, 2010). Whilst both sources contribute to an understanding of climate-
related risks, it is often unclear how they relate to building communities’ 
resilience. Despite the increased number of studies in climate science, the vast 
majority still focus on annual global temperature and precipitation rather than 
the timing of rain and seasonal rainfall patterns in regions, which are of much 
more use to local farming communities (McGray, 2007). Where the data is 
available, the communities are often not able to access it. In the absence of local 
climate data, the recollection of village elders or local farmers is the only source 
of information. Such sources may be unreliable, for instance, when earlier 
climatic events are overshadowed by recent ones (Warrick, 2009). There is also a 
fear that the traditional methods of forecasting such as using wind patterns, 
cloud formations or animal behaviour become less accurate due to the impacts of 
global climate change.  
 
What is more important, as Kothari (2001) argues, is that environmental 
knowledge in local communities is culturally, socially and politically produced. 
Not only is it continuously reformulated but also it is often conceived in 
normative terms. Knowledge is not treated as a fixed thing that people possess, 
rather it is an accumulation of social norms, rituals and practices that are 
embedded in people’s lives in complex socio-ecological systems. This is why 
what is known about local environments cannot be separated from local power 
relations (Kothari, 2001; Sletto, 2011). When collecting and selecting the 
information, knowledge often works as a ‘barometer’ to reveal the socio-
political dominance of locality. Information acquired from communities is still 
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valuable, but it has to be conceptualised in a different way from classical notions 
of scientific data (Berkes, 2004). This will be further discussed in Chapter Two 
and demonstrated with a case of discursively constructed understanding of 
climate change in Chapter Six.  
 
Participatory Process 
 
CBA aims to be a participatory process. Here we have two key points to 
consider: the first is that it is a ‘process’; and the second is that it is 
‘participatory’. For those such as Huq (2008) who are of the view that a 
conceptual analysis has little to offer CBA, a term like ‘process’ is treated as 
straightforward and not meriting attention. In such a view, a process happens 
independently of time, space and human subjects. In contrast, the present thesis 
claims it is a major challenge to understand what is meant when somebody 
claims that adaptation is a social process. The notion of social process refers to 
“a flow of events or actions that produces, reproduces or transforms a system or 
structure” (Gregory, 2009:586). That is to say, a social process is a mechanism 
that weaves together agency, history, space and power of socio-ecological 
systems in order to reproduce a certain set of social relations (Gregory, 2009). 
 
The credibility and efficacy of CBA is threatened when priorities are skewed 
away from long-term system viability towards short-term impacts. A social 
process has neither beginning nor end, but CBA is frequently conceived as a 
time-limited intervention. CBA workers often presume that once appropriate 
adaptation measures are identified and implemented, communities’ 
development plans and activities can be secured against adverse effects of 
climate change. Such a view treats adaptation as a self-contained series of events 
and advocates discrete actions (Tschakert and Dietrich, 2010). It contradicts the 
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conception of ‘social process’ and reflects a reductionist approach that separates 
system elements from one another and disconnects interventions from the 
systems they are intended to influence (Tschakert and Dietrich, 2010). It means 
CBA may struggle with the connections between interventions and outcomes and 
advocate narrowly defined adaptation measures such as a set of technical options 
focused on specific risks at an overly narrow spatio-temporal scale of the 
systems.  
 
CBA also claims to be a ‘participatory’ approach, enabling individuals and 
groups, who were previously excluded by top-down processes, to be included in 
decision-making processes that affect their livelihoods (Ensor et al., 2014). The 
participatory approach has flourished in the aid industry since development 
policies built on local knowledge and experience were seen to be more 
appropriate and therefore sustainable (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Hickey and 
Mohan, 2005). Its advocates believe participatory activities create a sense of 
commitment whereby community members will actively contribute their 
knowledge to decision-making processes. In practice, however, actors and 
institutions are attracted by their own self-interests. For example, in India, one 
development project was analysed to demonstrate how fundamentally different 
understandings of the project goals were clothed in a language of ‘participation’. 
In this case, regional government used the term to meet expenditure targets 
through having free labour of local farmers; public work agencies understood 
‘participation’ as an enticement for future projects; and NGOs were of the view 
that the term brought political credibility within the locality (Mosse, 2001).  
 
In conclusion, the concept of participation in CBA is problematic. On the one 
hand, it makes CBA an heir to the previous participatory development 
approaches that are familiar to development practitioners. On the other hand, it 
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exposes CBA to the extensive body of critique that previously levelled at 
participatory approaches to development. This will be further discussed in 
Chapter Two and demonstrated through the case of area closure in Chapter 
Seven. 
 
Relevance of Politics 
 
Power relations are a key lens through which to analyse CBA projects. CBA 
approaches involve a variety of agencies and different degrees of participation. 
These often lead to friction among actors and institutions. First, the interests of 
outsiders such as international donor agencies often override the priorities of 
communities. In particular, once foreign development workers are involved, local 
people’s opinions and priorities become easily undervalued. Outsiders frequently 
act as teachers or experts rather than as facilitators or coordinators. This trend 
has wide-ranging implications for professional behaviour, attitudes and 
institutional cultures and is, in fact, opposed to the principles of CBA (Ensor et 
al., 2014).  
 
Second, more importantly and yet obscurely, communities are politicised by 
participating in CBA. To seek locally identified problems and locally appropriate 
solutions, CBA builds on existing socio-cultural norms and rules. Being rooted in 
communities, the process of CBA is designed to facilitate practices from within 
communities. It means that in order to be effective, CBA approaches necessarily 
need a highly developed appreciation of local power dynamics (Ensor and Berger, 
2009). The socio-political structures of a particular community may oppress 
specific groups of people or/and disregard voices of the ‘others’ such as women 
and young adults. In particular, marginalised people can frequently be either 
‘invisible’ to outsiders or formally excluded by local customary law. CBA itself 
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may set out to avoid bias, but based on field experience it easily accepts 
dominant narratives of ‘who we are’ and ‘what we need’ that emerge from the 
established dominant groups such as community leaders and elders. Further to 
this, current trends in CBA frequently simplify the highly complicated socio-
political relations around communities by constructing dichotomies of power. 
This will be further discussed in Chapter Two and proved with the case of area 
closure in Chapter Seven and Eight. 
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, CBA has become one of the most widely used 
strategies for responding to what is, arguably, the most pressing and important 
issue facing the continent: ‘climate change’. Whilst practical field experiments in 
CBA can be crucial in finding strategies to make CBA ‘work’, there is also a role 
for theoretical analysis and critique of the ideas underpinning the approach. This 
thesis consequently aims to develop an analytical framework for the critical 
analysis of CBA that restores politics and social context to central importance. 
The framework will be constructed in Chapter Two from a series of key 
components that include community, systems resilience, environmental 
knowledge, participation, power-relations, governmentality, representation and 
scale. 
 
1.2  Theoretical Contributions  
 
By and large, communities are politicised. This thesis sets out to contribute 
to the field of community development in general, and studies of CBA in 
particular, by developing an analytical framework that foregrounds underlying 
contexts and both local and national politics. Drawing on a wide body of 
literature, it demonstrates the heterogeneity of communities and the complexity 
this brings to implementing standard models of CBA in specific field sites. The 
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diversity of social structures and individual agents, the thesis argues, means that 
evaluations of CBA projects need to be flexible, context-sensitive and power-
conscious. Framed around the evaluations of CBA projects and the challenges 
that have emerged, it illustrates this claim, placing politics at the centre of 
climate change adaptation at the local level. In so doing, it contributes a 
sympathetic critical analysis, rather than a dichotomous view of whether CBA 
works or not. 
 
By bringing together resilience thinking with a political ecology approach, 
the thesis shows that the current practice of CBA will have limited long-term 
success. This is because it is conceptually under-developed, depending on an 
unrealistically depoliticised understanding of the communities involved. The 
thesis takes a critical approach, treating CBA as a discourse and seeking to 
analyse the relationships of power, scale and knowledge that underpin the 
production and operation of that discourse, thereby revealing their political 
nature. It analyses the standard theoretical foundations of CBA, showing how the 
participatory development (PD) discourse and the concept of resilience come 
together to formulate the notion of CBA. It conceptualises CBA through the 
alternative lens of political ecology, developing the argument that this approach 
responds to the weaknesses associated with resilience thinking – that is its 
limited capacity for political analysis. In so doing, the thesis set out to intervenes 
in current conceptual debates and make three theoretical contributions to the 
field of research on CBA.  
 
The first conceptual innovation this thesis brings to the field is to understand 
participation and empowerment in specific local communities without neglecting 
the politics and socio-political structures and wider structures in which these 
local communities are embedded. The thesis takes this injunction seriously and 
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analyses the assumption that the idea of ‘the local’ has itself become hegemonic 
in some development discourses and needs to be treated more critically. At the 
same time, the role of ‘the local’ in development practice should be determined 
in relation to other scales. The thesis responds to this paradox by analysing the 
dynamics of specific CBA projects without losing sight of the dynamics of 
regional, national and global scales in terms of decentralised decision-making, 
effective knowledge management and participatory processes. Such an aspiration 
is the key, the thesis argues, to identifying appropriate solutions for Ethiopian 
peasant farmers, rather than merely stressing the physical impacts of climate 
change at the local village level. 
 
A second analytical contribution to the research field is to link CBA with the 
idea of systems resilience. This defines communities and their surrounding 
environment as complex socio-ecological systems. In such systems, all 
components of the systems are intricately interconnected (Berkes et al., 2003). 
The notion of adaptive capacity – central to resilience thinking – involves cross-
level and cross-scale activities that aim to formulate an overarching 
management system to guide climate change adaptation in a holistic sense, 
bringing together knowledge of systems, studies of institutional linkages and 
collective action in response to climate change (Folke, 2006; Walker and Salt, 
2006). Considering adaptive capacity in terms of resilience thinking also implies 
the ability to respond to change and even transform systems into more desirable 
states.  
 
The third analytical contribution of this thesis is to weave political ecology’s 
understanding of relational power into resilience thinking in order to rethink 
questions of politics in the analysis of CBA. Here politics is the (generally public) 
dialogue about the rules (both formal laws and less formal social regulations) by 
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which a society lives and operates and through which scarce resources are 
allocated. There is a growing body of scholarly work paying attention to the ways 
in which power and the politics of decision-making inform development 
thinking and practice. This movement has been academically promoted by 
research initiatives such as Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) 
and the Development Leadership Program (DLP) (Mehta and Walton, 2014; 
Menocal, 2015). In the context of CBA, this is a recognition of the need to 
improve understanding of power relations around local communities in order to 
respond flexibly and collectively to climate disturbances in complex socio-
ecological systems. Despite this growing interest, there is relatively little 
academic work addressing questions of power and politics in CBA projects that 
reveal how relations between actors and institutions affect the resilience of 
communities with regard to climate change. The thesis also draws particular 
attention to questions of authoritarian governmentality (Dean 2010), history and 
consent as a lens through which to think about how relational power operates 
through environmental interventions such as CBA.  
 
1.3  Research Questions 
 
This thesis sets out to examine, through a study of CBA, how two different 
communities in the Ethiopian highlands are responding to the need for 
adaptation to climate change. The overarching question that frames the thesis is, 
 
To what extent do socio-political structures and practices shape the building of 
adaptive capacity in Community-Based Adaptation (CBA) projects in Ethiopia? 
 
This question is built on the central hypothesis of the thesis: decision-
making processes of CBA are shaped by existing complex socio-political 
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structures within and outside communities. The overall aim of the thesis is to 
assess the significance of the socio-political factors that shape the adaptive 
capacity of the case study communities. Four such factors are identified: 1) the 
historical legacies that shape current Ethiopian politics; 2) the politics of scale 
and indigenous knowledge that shape the definition and capacity of communities 
in 21st century Ethiopia; 3) the internal politics of communities that reflect their 
heterogeneity and lack of consensus; and 4) the politics of community leadership 
in the contexts of neopatrimonialism that coexists with legal-rational 
legitimacy. Each of these is addressed in a separate empirical chapter, though 
the research questions may cut across these topics. 
 
The fieldwork was guided by a number of research questions that examine 
first where local socio-political structures come from, and second, what 
consequences they have on project outcomes, in order to address the four factors 
above:  
 
1. What processes form the political assets of actors and institutions 
in Ethiopia? 
a) How are the socio-political structures of a community 
constructed? 
b) To what extent do socio-political dynamics within and 
around a community shape the local accounts of adaptive capacity 
and with what consequences?  
 
2. To what extent does the current practice of CBA shape complex 
socio-ecological systems of a community in Ethiopia?  
a) Who participates in the decision-making processes of CBA 
and how are their identities determined?  
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b) To what extent do CBA projects change the geometry of 
power of a community? 
 
1.4  Thesis Summary 
 
Chapter Two, ‘Theoretical Context: Thinking through Power and Politics’, 
reviews the literature relevant to this thesis and outlines how the thesis contests 
and advances the work of others. This chapter sets out to further demonstrate 
the heterogeneity of communities and the complexity this brings to 
implementing standardised models of CBA in specific field sites. The diversity of 
social structures and individual agents, it argues, means that evaluations of CBA 
projects need to be flexible, context-sensitive and power-conscious. The chapter 
starts with the analysis of the orthodox theoretical foundations of CBA, showing 
how the participatory development discourse and the concept of resilience 
originally came together to formulate the notion of CBA. The chapter then 
attempts to reconceptualise CBA through the alternative lens of political ecology, 
reviewing the features of CBA through three key concepts drawn from political 
ecology: power, scale and representation. Here the chapter introduces the 
explicitly paradoxical concept of ‘authoritarian governmentality’ and argues that 
this captures the complexity of politics in Ethiopia. In so doing, the chapter 
produces a new theoretical framework for the analysis of CBA that combines 
political ecology and resilience thinking.  
 
Chapter Three, ‘Ethiopian Context’, provides a summary of the background 
information on Ethiopia. The chapter starts with a brief description of the 
country’s geography, climate change and modern history and then gives 
particular attention to the contemporary political debate on Ethiopia in the 
context of ethnic federalism and neopatrimonialism.  
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Chapter Four, ‘Methodology, Research Design and Methods’, lays out the 
methodological approaches and reflections involved in this thesis. Data 
collection, carried out between September 2013 and June 2014, is based on 
qualitative research involving 8 months of participant observation, 7 focus group 
discussions and 73 semi-structured interviews with community leaders, peasant 
farmers, government officials and management personnel of UNDP’s Small 
Grants Programme (SGP). 
 
The four empirical chapters that follow address four different factors that 
affect the adaptive capacity of the case study communities. They provide 
different ways of thinking about politics in a community that contribute to an 
overall explanation of why projects succeed or fail in delivering the goals of CBA, 
that is, improving adaptive capacity. Chapter Five argues that the political 
legacies of Ethiopian history are an important factor affecting adaptive capacity 
because they produce a specific form of political culture (authoritarian 
governmentality). Chapter Six argues that questions of scale and 
indigenous knowledge are an important factor because they shape the character 
of what constitutes a 'community' in 21st century Ethiopia. Chapter Seven focuses 
on the internal differentiation of the case study communities and the way 
different groups make decisions and allocate resources as a means of 
determining the goal of increasing adaptive capacity. Finally, Chapter Eight 
draws attention to the invisible politics of community leadership that is founded 
upon the historical neopatrimonial relationship that shapes the process through 
which adaptive capacity is built. 
 
Chapter Five. ‘Governmentality, Land and the Political Legacies of History’ 
examines empirically how three successive Ethiopian regimes have deployed 
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control over land to steer the behaviour of the Ethiopian people, particularly the 
peasantry, over the past two hundred years. It focuses on one of the key 
problems with the application of CBA in 21st century Ethiopia: that CBA makes 
assumptions about a broad level of equality in a society. In answering the 
research question, ‘how are the socio-political structures of a community 
constructed?’, the chapter argues that a considerable number of rural 
communities in Ethiopia have never been internally equal or democratic, but 
instead has consistently been strongly hierarchical and internally divided in 
terms of rights and resources. In particular, it argues that over a period of two 
millennia peasant farmers have tolerated this inequality because they have no 
choice, and, beyond this, have given their consent and support to strongly 
hierarchical structures, which connect villages to a distant central government. 
 
Chapter Six. ‘The Politics of CBA: Competing Scales and Knowledge’ explores 
how the scale of CBA is configured and how indigenous knowledge is regulated 
in Ethiopia. In answering the research question, ‘to what extent do socio-
political dynamics within and around a community shape the local accounts of 
adaptive capacity and with what consequences?’, this chapter focuses on the 
socio-political accounts of adaptive capacity which emerged during the time CBA 
projects were implemented in two villages in Ethiopia. It details the ways in 
which the village members narrate their experiences of those projects. Here 
adaptive capacity is conceptualised based on the framework of resilience 
thinking and its political accounts are analysed through the lens of political 
ecology. In so doing, it adds political perspectives to the application of CBA and 
demonstrates how the socio-political structures of community shape the 
building of adaptive capacity through CBA projects in the case study 
communities. 
 
  27 
Chapter Seven, ‘Changing Power Dynamics within the Case Study 
Communities’, draws on the finding of Chapter Six to explain how the politics 
emerged during the CBA projects in the two villages. In answering the research 
question, ‘who participates in the decision-making processes of CBA and how 
are their identities determined?’, it shows how the actors exercise various forms 
of political assets within the structures of community and to compete over 
access to resources around CBA. The chapter demonstrates the simultaneous 
decentralisation and recentralisation of power and authority, particularly 
through the case of area closure, which was one of the core activities of CBA. The 
first part of this chapter analyses a degree of local democracy in the case study 
communities in terms of socio-political components such as position, education 
level, wealth, age and gender. Based on this analysis, the second part of the 
chapter interrogates the change in power dynamics in the northern case study. 
 
Chapter Eight, ‘The Invisible Politics of Community Leadership’, examines 
the politics of leadership in communities and their underlying contexts and 
processes. It sets out to demonstrate why leadership matters in the practice of 
neopatrimonialism that coexists with legal-rational legitimacy. In answering the 
research question, ‘to what extent do CBA projects change the geometry of power 
of a community?’, this chapter shows that there are ongoing political dynamics 
in the multi-layered clientelistic networks around the case study communities. 
The first part of the chapter analyses local people’s perceptions of the politics of 
leadership, illustrated through discussions of elections and of nepotism. Based 
on this analysis, the second part of the chapter interrogates two different levels 
of neopatrimonial relationship, exemplified through the case study in southern 
Ethiopia and considers the consequences of these issues in terms of the 
community’s adaptive capacity. 
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Finally, Chapter Nine, ‘Conclusion: Towards a Recognition of Politicised 
Communities’, summarises the distinctive contribution of this thesis to the 
study of community development in general, and CBA in particular, that is to 
say, the development of an analytical framework that foregrounds politics, scale, 
context and governmentality. This chapter summarises the findings presented in 
the four empirical chapters and relates them to the research questions in order 
to demonstrate the importance of socio-political structures and practices within 
and around local communities in shaping the building of adaptive capacity in 
CBA projects. By bringing together resilience thinking with a political ecology 
approach, the limitations on the long-term success of CBA can be identified, 
notably its conceptual under-development and lack of a political dimension. The 
chapter concludes with some reflections on the limitations of the thesis and 
identifies directions for future research. 
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Chapter Two. Theoretical Context: Thinking through Power and 
Politics  
 
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework on which the rest of the 
thesis is built and introduces the key analytical concepts. Drawing on a wide 
body of literature, it demonstrates the heterogeneity of communities and the 
complexity this brings to implementing standard models of Community-Based 
Adaptation (CBA) in specific field sites. The diversity of social structures and 
individual agents, the chapter argues, means that evaluations of CBA projects 
need to be flexible, context-sensitive and power-conscious. Framed around the 
evaluations of CBA projects and the challenges that have emerged, the chapter 
illustrates this claim, placing politics at the centre of climate change adaptation 
at the local level. In so doing, it aims to contribute a sympathetic, but critical 
analysis to studies of CBA, rather than a dichotomous view of whether it works 
or not. 
 
Based on a variety of recent and canonical texts, this chapter produces a 
theoretical framework for the analysis of CBA that combines political ecology 
and resilience thinking. It takes a critical approach, which treats CBA as a 
discourse and seeks to analyse the relationships of power, scale and 
representation (knowledge) in socio-ecological systems that underpin the 
production and operation of that discourse thereby revealing their political 
nature. In so doing, the chapter addresses a series of questions: how (and to 
what extent) is the governance of CBA influenced by power and politics at 
different spatial and societal scales? How did CBA originally evolve as a set of 
ideas? How significant is resilience thinking in this narrative? What are the key 
concepts political ecology uses when approaching case studies like this? How has 
the existing political ecology literature helped our understanding of CBA? And 
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where does the political ecology literature fall short in elucidating the process of 
CBA in ways this thesis seeks to resolve? 
 
First, the chapter starts with the analysis of the standard or orthodox 
theoretical foundations of CBA. It shows how the participatory development (PD) 
discourse and the concept of resilience came together to formulate the notion of 
CBA. The discussion of participation and empowerment is relatively brief as this 
is generally well-known in development studies. The section also describes the 
key conceptual features of resilience thinking. This section goes into more detail 
as this set of debates is central to CBA. Next, the chapter conceptualises CBA 
through the alternative lens of political ecology. This section starts by assessing 
the history, definition and policy-relevance of political ecology. It then develops 
the argument that this approach can respond to some of the weaknesses often 
associated with resilience thinking - specifically its fairly limited capacity for 
political analysis. This part of the chapter critically reviews the features of CBA 
through three key concepts from political ecology - power, scale and 
representation (knowledge) – and produces the theoretical framework by 
synthesising resilience thinking and political ecology. Here the chapter also 
introduces the explicitly paradoxical concept of ‘authoritarian governmentality’ 
taken from the work of Mitchell Dean (2010), and argues that this captures the 
complexity of rural politics in Ethiopia. 
 
The chapter sets out to show where the thesis seeks to intervene in current 
conceptual debates about CBA. Explicitly it identifies three key ways in which it 
makes theoretical contributions to the field of research on CBA. The first 
conceptual innovation the thesis brings to the field is to understand participation 
and empowerment in specific local communities without neglecting the politics 
and wider structures in which these local communities are embedded. The goal is 
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to analyse the dynamics of specific CBA projects without losing sight of the 
dynamics of regional, national and global scales in terms of decentralised 
decision-making, effective knowledge management and participatory processes. 
This second analytical contribution to the research field is to link CBA with the 
idea of systems resilience by defining communities and their surrounding 
environment as complex socio-ecological systems, which recognises that 1) all 
components of the systems are intricately interconnected and that 2) systems 
change may be non-linear and shift between stable domains when thresholds 
are crossed. The third analytical innovation is to weave political ecology’s 
understandings of relational power, the politics of scale and the politics of the 
representation of indigenous knowledge into resilience thinking in order to re-
think questions of power and politics in the analysis of CBA. In particular, the 
review explores the concept of ‘authoritarian governmentality’ and its value to 
understanding questions of public consent to elite dominance in 21st century 
Ethiopia.  
 
2.1  The Theory of CBA: Participatory Development and Resilience Thinking 
 
2.1.1 Participatory Development: Participation and Empowerment 
 
CBA is one of the latest iterations that has emerged from the long history of 
participatory development (PD). It is also one of the fastest growing bodies of 
knowledge in the field of climate change adaptation (Field et al., 2014; Forsyth, 
2013; Ensor et al., 2014; Percy, 2012). CBA often appeals to development 
practitioners’ intuition, with its focus on small-scale and bottom-up practice. It 
is therefore important to understand the historical and theoretical contexts of 
these ideas in order to analyse the concept of CBA. This thesis interprets CBA as a 
recent manifestation in the long history of PD. 
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Participatory approaches have been widely studied in development studies 
though they are a more recent addition to studies of climate change adaptation. 
The concept of PD as a formal intentional development practice first emerged 
during the 1940s. It evolved as a response to peasant uprisings against the 
colonial government’s incompetent land reforms in India and from self-help 
initiatives in West Africa (Page and Mercer, 2014; Rahman, 1995; Sachs, 1992). 
However, the role of local communities in development projects was largely 
ignored by donors, governments and development agencies until the 1970s. PD 
emerged again when development theorists and practitioners acknowledged that 
their activities had failed to bring about significant improvement in people’s 
livelihoods due to the imposition of top-down nature and practices (Chambers, 
1983; Desai, 2008; Francis, 2001). At this point PD was redesigned in order to 
promote: the remaking of state-citizen relationships, the involvement of the 
beneficiaries in development projects and the cost-effectiveness in development 
practice. Over the past seven decades, the PD ideas have been variably applied to 
development projects by international aid organisations and have brought about 
some positive outcomes. They encouraged socially and economically 
marginalised communities to get involved in the development projects designed 
to assist them. Their practice has empowered the communities by strengthening 
democracy and participatory governance in committed countries (Cleaver, 2001; 
Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Hickey and Mohan, 2005). 
 
Since the 1990s, a general trend in development studies has gradually moved 
away from overarching meta-level theorisations towards more empirical and 
localised approaches (Mohan and Stokke, 2000). Development studies has 
promoted the concepts of ‘empowerment’ as a goal to be achieved through 
participation. This trend has foregrounded ‘the local’ as the key site of 
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participatory development practice. Mohan and Stokke (2000) argue that this 
theoretical move reflects the growing influence of two apparently contradictory 
schools of thought: ‘revisionist neoliberalism’ and ‘postmarxist critical 
development studies’. 
 
Civil society was first suggested as the key social sphere for participatory 
development in the context of the rise of revisionist neoliberalism. The 
neoliberal approach in the 1980s and 90s brought a dramatic shift in 
development studies, proposing that the state was a barrier rather than a driving 
force in the development process (Kamat, 2004). Neoliberals criticised the idea of 
an overly-interventionist state and instead promoted a free market economy. In 
this context civil society provided the institutions that could correct market 
failures and deliver social development where state and market did not. Civil 
society would ‘step in’ to fill the gaps left by shrinking the role of states as the 
private sector delivered more services and governments fewer. In particular, 
NGOs were seen as the key developmental vehicle for civil society (Kamat, 2004) 
and, as often as not, ‘participation’ meant engaging in NGO activities. However, 
after only a few years it was already acknowledged that much of the capital 
generated by the free market approach failed to ‘trickle down’ to the poorest in 
Third World countries (Craig and Mayo, 1995). Over time the recognition that 
there was a need to re-regulate unfettered markets in order to deliver social 
goals further elevated the theoretical significance of civil society. That is to say, 
civil society institutions, such as NGOs and CBOs, could empower citizens to get 
organised in order to impose pressure on anaesthetised states and thereby foster 
good governance (Hyden, 1997). 
 
Ironically this rise in the significance of participatory civil society was also 
supported by the ideological opponents of neoliberalism. For radical 
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development studies, the ‘empowerment’ of groups of people who were 
marginalised by the state and the market became a key goal (Craig and Mayo, 
1995). The strategy for delivering empowerment was active participation in civil 
society and social movements and then the promotion of these institutions as 
effective agents of development (Chambers, 1983). This ambition was theorised 
by poststructuralist thinkers (Escobar 1996; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) as part of 
a critique of the earlier Marxist concern with global uneven capitalist 
development and the consequent neglect of local politics and the agency of 
people in the Global South. This trend in both theory and practice has later 
provided the foundation for revaluing local knowledge and local networks with 
an emphasis on local hybrid cultures.  
 
What these two schools of thought share is that neither markets nor states 
should be solely responsible for social and economic development. In their 
rhetoric both revisionist neoliberalism and postmarxism recognise individual 
local actors and institutions as key features in the development process. The 
organised support for participation in terms of cost-saving and project efficiency 
in development practice also recognises the importance of empowerment, 
particularly with people’s collective actions. From a range of radical ideological 
positions, as well as from the mainstream, both ‘participation’ and 
‘empowerment’ are regarded as the main prerequisites of sustainable 
development. 
 
To be clear, it is important to say that a shared normative interest in 
participation and empowerment is not the basis of an attempt to argue that it is 
possible to conflate these two radically different views. There are also important 
conceptual differences between these two schools of thought about participation. 
The revisionist neoliberals conceptualise participation as a shift from a singular 
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emphasis on market deregulation to an additional emphasis on social 
development whereas the postmarxists promote a more fundamental form of 
change to society (Mohan and Stokke, 2000). The neoliberal stance pursues a 
rigid approach to institutional reforms of state agencies and NGOs that focus on 
efficiency and aim to include targeted groups in the development process at most. 
This approach implies that participation and empowerment can occur within the 
existing socio-political structures of society without any substantial challenge to 
the powerful. The fairly anodyne deployment of ‘participation’ within the 
Sustainable Development goals of the United Nations and the Participatory 
Poverty Assessments of the World Bank would be in line with this view, for 
example. However, the postmarxist notion of empowerment represents a more 
radical challenge to the dominant ideas and social relations existing in any 
particular society. Empowerment of marginalised groups means a fundamental 
transformation of the existing social, economic and political relationships of 
society (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). In this sense, bottom-up social movements 
get mobilised towards a more democratised society. The scholarly excitement 
around moves towards participatory budgeting in the city of Porto Alegre, for 
example, would illustrate this alternative view (Abers, 1998). 
 
Even though this movement towards ‘the local’ seems promising as a means 
of addressing the heterogeneity of the Global South by taking the specificities of 
particular places seriously, two key critiques have been put forward. First, the 
tendency to idealise, if not romanticise, the local may downplay socio-political 
structures that are not necessarily progressive, just or equitable (Page, 2002). 
The interest in participation and empowerment is closely associated with an 
increasing interest in the significance of the local. Cleaver (2001) points out that 
there is a strong assumption among development practitioners that it is possible 
to identify who ‘participates’ because only one community is accountable in the 
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location of a project but in fact social, ecological and administrative boundaries 
often overlap. The community committee is usually established as a 
representative of ‘the whole’. Critics argue that this simplified and uncritical 
notion of community disregards internal power relations within and between 
social groups that are to the advantage of some and discriminate against others, 
and lead to conflicts over resources such as land and water (Page, 2002). This 
ignorance of power relations in PD approaches entrenches, if not aggravates, the 
existing social injustice and marginalisation of resource distribution, and the 
socio-political structures of society that determine the allocation of rights and 
resources often remain fundamentally unchanged (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; 
Dumaru, 2010; Hickey and Mohan, 2005; Page, 2002). These structures have 
achieved a kind of ontological status that means they are taken-for-granted and 
impervious to reform. Because a thoughtful consideration of ‘dominance’ in a 
particular society is often missing, these local PD approaches have been accused 
of involving only a few privileged members of community in the project 
processes and of causing the unfair distribution of the benefits. Thinking 
critically about these internal power relations is an area where this thesis makes 
a distinctive contribution to studies of CBA.  
 
Second, the tendency to see ‘the local’ in isolation from broader social, 
ecological, economic and political scales may downplay the significance of place 
in relation to other places and other scales (Hordijk and Baud, 2011). For 
example, Mohan and Stokke (2000) argue that disconnecting the local from its 
relationship to government (at a variety of scales) is likely in many countries of 
the Global South to be misleading. Unless care is taken to draw out the 
connections between local case studies and their broader contexts, there is an 
impression given of a false autonomy, which fails to identify the constraints and 
limits placed on specific local communities by ‘outside’ forces and structures 
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(Page, 2007). Just as earlier Marxist development analyses paid little attention to 
the significance of local places and communities, there is a danger here of doing 
the reverse. 
 
In summary, many development theorists have argued that research on 
participation and empowerment at the local level should pay more attention to 
issues of politics, scale and the relations between communities and the 
structures they are embedded within. The thesis takes this injunction from the 
literature seriously and starts its analysis from the assumption that the idea of 
‘the local’ has itself become hegemonic in some elements of development 
discourse and needs to be treated more critically. At the same time, the role of 
the local in development practice should be determined in relation to other 
scales. Thus the first conceptual innovation the thesis brings to studies of CBA is 
to respond to this paradox by analysing the dynamics of specific local CBA 
projects without losing sight of the dynamics of regional, national and global 
scales in terms of decentralised decision-making, effective knowledge 
management and participatory processes. Such an aspiration is key, it is argued, 
to identifying appropriate solutions for Ethiopian peasant farmers, rather than 
merely stressing the physical impacts of climate change at the local level. This 
approach will be decisively deployed to address the political legacies of Ethiopian 
history in land tenure system, how these legacies have steered the behaviour of 
the Ethiopian people, particularly the peasantry, and how these connect rural 
villages to a distant central government, in Chapter Five.  
 
Some researchers working on CBA who share these concerns have adopted 
the concept of resilience thinking, which is scale-sensitive, and paid attention to 
the connectivity of socio-ecological systems (Dodman and Mitlin, 2011; Ensor et 
al., 2014; Reid, 2012). This will be discussed in the following sections. 
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2.1.2 CBA through the Lens of Resilience Thinking 
 
Introduction: Moving from Adaptation to Resilience  
 
Walker and Salt (2006:14) state that resilience thinking is about 
“understanding and engaging with a changing world”. Resilience is “the 
capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganise whilst undergoing 
change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and 
feedback” (Walker et al, 2004:n.p). The concept of resilience has been gaining 
popularity both in academia and in practice since its birth within ecology in the 
1960s. It has now become a central idea in various fields such as finance, 
development policy, urban planning, public health and national security 
(Chichilnisky and Heal, 2000; Lovins and Lovins, 1981; Walker and Cooper, 2011). 
In particular, the concept has been prominent in climate change studies where 
issues of shock, vulnerability and risk are critical (Forsyth and Ayers, 2009). For 
instance, the IPCC emphasises increasing resilience as one of the best ways of 
responding to the adverse impacts of climate extremes (IPCC, 2012). The growing 
reference to resilience by aid and development organisations demonstrates 
increasing interest in taking adaptation and resilience as the same, possibly 
replacing sustainability (Ayers et al., 2011). 
 
This section analyses how resilience is related to adaptation in the context of 
climate change with a particular focus on community-based approaches. 
Adaptation involves change. Berkes et al. (2003) define adaptation as the 
standard practice of individuals, groups and societies that adjust their livelihood 
activities to external changes in order to take advantage of new opportunities. 
Adaptation aims to enhance the resilience of a system against disturbances by 
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both reducing vulnerability and increasing capacity. This thesis argues that 
climate change adaptation is adequately formulated as an issue of systems 
resilience, drawing on the notion of adaptive capacity, and delivered through 
CBA. In other words, it examines whether the concept of resilience offers an 
alternative way of understanding adaptation and of identifying appropriate 
strategies in response to climate change.  
 
Adaptation refers to the set of actions undertaken to deal with both current 
and future change (Nelson et al., 2007). So far, there have been two relatively 
distinct approaches in research on adaptation: 1) Adaptation to specific 
environmental change and 2) Adaptation within systems resilience (Janssen and 
Ostrom, 2006). Each group of studies has developed somewhat in parallel from 
separate disciplinary traditions with relatively little ‘cross-fertilisation’ (Nelson 
et al., 2007). Whilst reviewing these two approaches, this section aims to address 
the reason why climate change adaptation needs to locate itself within systems 
resilience.  
 
Academic interests in adaptation to environmental variability began with 
anthropologists in the early 1900s (Janssen et al., 2006). It has then become an 
object of study in diverse fields of scholarship such as ecology, sociology and 
economics. Scholars in social science disciplines began to use the term 
adaptation in studies of human-induced climate change in the 1990s (Schipper 
and Burton, 2009). The concept focuses on human adjustments to the adverse 
effects of climate change through implementing engineering approaches such as 
building dykes along rivers. This approach is essentially reactive or responsive as 
opposed to anticipatory or pre-emptive. This backward-looking adaptation 
usually places emphasis on actors and practice, and tends to be prescriptive and 
normative (Janssen and Ostrom, 2006).  
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In contrast, research into resilience first emerged in ecology in the 1960s, led 
by C. S. Holling (Holling, 1961 in Folke, 2006). Holling demonstrated the 
existence of multiple stability domains in ecological systems and how there 
could be sudden shifts between these stable domains driven by (sometimes 
random) events and spatial heterogeneity as critical thresholds are crossed 
(Holling, 1973). Through this study, he introduced the concept of resilience as 
the capacity of a particular stable domain of a system to persist in the face of 
change. He describes, “Resilience determines the persistence of relationships 
within a system and is a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb 
changes of state variables, driving variables, and parameters, and still persist” 
(Holling, 1973: 17).  
 
The concept of resilience has become a theoretical framework that bridges 
social and physical sciences. This was a part of the movement against an 
understanding of adaptation that isolates climate change from the processes of 
social transformation that became popular in the 1990s (Folke, 2006). Much 
more recently such arguments have been central to the rise of the idea of the 
Anthropocene, which also argues that humans do not stand outside 
environments and are in fact an active agent in the production of nature (Taylor, 
2015). Key to this analysis is the idea of ‘socio-ecological systems’ which 
provides “a mechanism to integrate the social and natural” (Pelling, 2010:40). 
This is useful because it allows researchers to think through the multiple, related 
ways in which specific systems have adapted to change and to analyse the 
factors that can make specific systems more resilient. That is to say, adaptation 
can be devised through examining the system’s specific components (e.g. 
knowledge, experience and livelihoods) that are associated with adaptive 
capacity, rather than through reviewing impacts that have not yet come. This 
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approach therefore has its focus on progressive risk reduction and involves 
theoretical understandings of “what constitutes adaptive capacity” (Pelling, 
2010:7).  
 
According to the IPCC (2007), climate change tends to be non-linear and 
multidimensional. In other words, the impacts of climate change can be felt 
directly (e.g. sea level rise), indirectly (e.g. subsequent saltwater intrusion into 
coastal aquifers) and as social perturbations of the system (e.g. human migration 
caused by these events) (Taylor, 2015). In addition, climate change impacts often 
interact with other systems features in the region such as development policy, 
local livelihoods and socio-cultural norms. Overall, these aspects make it hard 
both to identify adaptation and to communicate the consequences of climate 
change in isolation from other elements of the socio-ecological system (Berkes 
and Jolly, 2001; Ebi and Semenza, 2008). However, as Tompkins and Adger 
(2004) argue, early attempts to understand adaptation tended to understand the 
impacts (e.g. cost-saving and project efficiency) of particular atomised policy 
actions on specific system components (e.g. local labour and natural resources) 
in isolation from wider changes and contexts. 
 
The shift from an exclusive focus on adaptation strategies to resilience helps 
to guard against the tendency towards a focus on isolated factors because 
resilience prioritises systems thinking. Walker and Salt (2006) argue that the 
problem with thinking solely in terms of adaptation lies in the implicit belief 
that the ways ecosystems respond to human activities are linear and 
incremental, and so foreseeable. Unfortunately, this belief is ill-founded. The 
systems in which we live are often configured and reconfigured by extreme 
events. There have been a number of catastrophic climate events such as 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 or the East African droughts in the mid-1980s that 
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shifted the region’s socio-ecological systems from one stability domain to 
another. The speed of change also fluctuates. Climate events, such as the melting 
glaciers in the Arctic, often start slow and then speed up once its threshold - a 
level of a controlling variable in which a change occurs in feedbacks to the rest of 
the system change (Folke et al., 2010) - is crossed. Because some climate 
changes start small and only later become large they are not recognised in their 
earliest stages. Even if they are recognised, their significance is often 
underestimated (Pelling, 2010). 
 
Adaptation remains a useful analytical concept. Pragmatically since it is a 
term that continues to be widely used by policy-makers (through labels such as 
Community-Based Adaptation) and is high on their agendas, it is an idea that 
cannot be ignored. However, the argument developed here is that some of its 
analytical failings (in particular its tendency to treat the elements of a locale in 
isolation and its assumptions about the linearity of change) can be addressed by 
understanding adaptation through the lens of resilience thinking. That is to say, 
climate change adaptation has to be not only climate change specific, but also 
holistic in regard to socio-ecological systems (Pelling, 2010). This thesis 
therefore sets out to make the second analytical contribution to the research 
field of CBA by embedding it within the idea of systems resilience and defining 
communities and their surrounding environment as complex socio-ecological 
systems, which recognises that 1) all components of the systems are intricately 
interconnected and 2) systems change may be non-linear and shift between 
stable domains when thresholds are crossed. 
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Resilience Thinking as an Analytical Framework 
 
As resilience thinking has evolved it has produced an increasingly elaborate 
set of concepts and terminology. Within the empirical chapters of this thesis and 
in the final discussion the following dualisms and terms are used to structure the 
analysis and so they need to be defined here: specified resilience/general 
resilience, flexibility/integrity, adaptability/transformability, adaptive capacity, 
scale, level, surprise and thresholds and adaptive governance. This next section 
of the literature review provides an explanation and evaluation of these terms 
before turning to some of the critiques and continuing gaps in resilience 
thinking. Inevitably this section of the review feels somewhat descriptive as the 
discussion works through the list defining a vocabulary that feels slightly 
hermetic at times. However, the key claim here is that this relatively new 
academic framework can provide a distinctive way of analysing CBA projects 
because of its central concern with treating ‘communities’ and the contexts in 
which they are embedded as complex socio-ecological systems in which all 
system components are intricately interconnected and where it is assumed that 
systems change may be non-linear and dramatic. 
 
Specified Resilience and General Resilience 
 
What confers resilience on systems? The concept of resilience is generally 
defined in relation to a socio-ecological system – this is the central unit of 
analysis. Folke (2006) defines systems resilience as the amount of change a 
system can be subjected to whilst retaining its original functions and structure. 
In this context, resilience means the ability of a system to absorb disturbances 
and is generally classified into two approaches according to its range of 
application: specified resilience and general resilience. With regard to the former, 
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resilience is applied to problems related to particular aspects of a system that 
arise from a specific set of circumstances (Folke et al., 2010). In socio-ecological 
systems, this usage commonly appears in response to the questions such as 
‘resilience of what to what’ (e.g. the resilience of pasture to salty groundwater 
levels) (Walker et al., 2006). However, focusing on a specified aspect of resilience 
may increase resilience of certain parts of a system but may diminish resilience 
of other parts of the same system at the same time. For example, in the 
Goulburn-Broken Catchment, Australia, local farming communities have 
pumped out salty groundwater to the Murray River since its rising levels started 
affecting dairy farming in the area, but this activity eventually increased the 
salinity of the river, which brought about the catastrophic consequences for 
agriculture on a wider scale (Walker and Salt, 2006).  
 
In contrast, general resilience refers to the capacity of the whole system to 
respond to all kinds of shocks including unusual ones (Folke et al., 2010). It does 
not define either specific parts of a system or certain kinds of shocks but aims to 
deal with all kinds of uncertainty. This distinction is important because research 
on local communities often tends to focus on specified resilience and thereby 
limits the capacity and options of conclusions for coping with new or different 
shocks. In this thesis, the term ‘systems resilience’ refers to the idea of general 
resilience. 
 
Flexibility and Integrity  
 
Resilience has been founded on two main concepts: flexibility and integrity. 
Flexibility is situated at the heart of resilience as a simple tenet - things change 
(Walker and Salt, 2006). The state of systems is one of change rather than of 
equilibrium, and the type and magnitude of change are unpredictable. That is, if 
  45 
we resist that change, our vulnerability will increase and so limit available 
options to respond. Socio-ecological systems therefore need to be managed for 
malleability and uncertainty rather than stability and specificity in respect of 
future events (Christopherson et al., 2010). Here, socio-ecological systems are 
characterised by the complex ways in which people shape their environment 
whilst the environment shapes the way that people live (Ensor, 2015). In terms 
of integrity, social systems and ecological systems cannot be understood in 
absence of one another, but as related (Nelson et al., 2007). A society has to 
consider the adaptation process as perpetual, from both social and ecological 
perspectives, when reviewing available options. For instance, when improving 
local irrigation systems, a village should take into consideration not only the 
impact of the project on the ecological environment such as groundwater levels 
and biodiversity, but also the socio-economic impact on people such as 
ownership schemes and sub-group dynamics.  
 
In order to adapt to new circumstances, there may be a need for change, yet 
some systems are resistant to change. The concept of resilience emphasises the 
capacity of a system that absorbs change without losing its system functions. 
However, this characteristic can also refer to the undesirable states of the 
systems, for example, a heavily wooded hill may be undesirable for pastoralist 
communities. Some systems are often highly resistant to change, or withstand 
efforts to change, and so described in the resilience literature as being 
‘pathologically’ resilient (Nelson et al., 2007). Adaptation therefore needs to 
consider both the capacity to respond to change and ability to overcome 
resilience in a system. For this reason, resilience thinking was conceptualised as a 
framework to address both the dynamics and emergence of complex socio-
ecological systems (Deppisch and Hasibovic, 2011). 
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Adaptability and Transformability 
 
In resilience thinking, adaptation refers not only to adaptability, but also to 
transformability, and these two aspects interrelate across multiple scales. First, 
adaptability represents the capacity to adjust responses to internal and external 
processes of change in order to maintain the current trajectories of development 
(Folke et al., 2010). It is based on past experiences and accumulated knowledge 
and tends to continue developing processes in operation. This type of adaptation 
can be applied to cases such as improving agricultural systems, redesigning the 
built environment or implementing a new management decision in order to 
reduce risks and improve the level of adaptability of a system.  
 
Second, transformability refers to the capacity to cross thresholds of a 
system and to adapt to new development trajectories when the existing system 
becomes untenable (Berkes et al., 2003). In particular, not only ecological 
conditions but also social, political and economic features - such as social 
networks, governance structures, the global economy and regional politics - can 
affect the level of transformability of a system. For example, over the past three 
years, unusually heavy rains have created deep gullies in villages around Lake 
Awassa in Ethiopia, making some of them uninhabitable (SGP Ethiopia, 2011). 
Populations from those villages have abandoned their existing livelihood 
systems and moved to the other side of the lake where they have had to find new 
ways of living. This migration, namely the transformation to the new socio-
ecological systems, was the outcome of not only the physical soil erosion, but 
also the political economic decision in regional development planning. The 
migration was the most cost-effective option for the villagers and local 
governments to choose. In this instance, we can see how the villagers have 
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adapted in the context of the crossing of a threshold and the move to a new 
stability domain, demonstrating transformability. 
 
Both adaptability and transformability are essential to promote systems 
resilience at local levels. Making use of a crisis as a ‘window of opportunity’ for 
innovation, a local community can start to foster resilience at a smaller, and so 
more manageable, scale in order to explore novel options for deliberate 
transformation at larger scales (Folke et al., 2010) (e.g. the promotion of tourism 
industry in local communities where farming is not viable anymore in the 
region). Reflecting on empirical examples of CBA through the terms flexibility, 
integrity, adaptability and transformability will recognise resilience both as the 
ability to respond to typical small-scale change and as the means to take 
advantage of opportunities that arise during atypical dramatic changes in 
complex socio-ecological systems. In this context, even though climate change is 
generally portrayed in a negative light, it might provide opportunities for 
development and innovation in society. In particular, from a socio-political 
perspective, climate change adaptation could involve processes that stimulate 
social reform by calling into question those values in a society that promote 
inequalities in development practice and unsustainable relationships with the 
environment (Pelling, 2010; Smit and Wandel, 2006). This is proposed as an idea 
to be considered through this framework and the empirical chapters and 
particularly exemplified through the transformation of community leadership in 
Chapter Eight. However, in any case adaptation is seldom permanent (Janssen 
and Ostrom, 2006) as the level of adaptation actively changes on the basis of the 
type, frequency and intensity of systems disturbance. A system may be highly 
adapted to the current environment, but may become incapable of responding to 
new variables in the future. 
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Adaptive Capacity, Scale, Level, Surprise and Threshold 
 
Adaptive capacity is the ability for a system to employ resources to adapt to 
disturbances (Smit and Wandel, 2006). This section considers adaptive capacity 
in the light of its relationship to scale, level, surprise and thresholds, which are 
the key analytical features of complex adaptive systems.  
 
Scale as deployed in resilience thinking is defined as the spatial, temporal and 
quantitative dimensions used to examine any phenomenon (Adger et al., 2005a). 
Level refers to the unit of analysis that is located at different positions on a 
spatial scale (e.g. micro or macro levels of analysis) (Gibson et al., 2000). For 
example, the inshore tropical fisheries in island nations of the Caribbean are 
operated by small-scale fishing units that do not range far from a seaport 
(McConney et el., 2006). Fishers follow community norms, and these fisheries 
are community-based. However, many fishing areas are shared by different 
communities around the island and should be managed at a higher level, 
covering the whole island or several islands. Moreover, some of the fish travel 
across borders of these island nations which require management agreements at 
the bilateral or multilateral levels (McConney et el., 2006).  
 
Scalar issues have become much more common subjects of research on 
resilience as adaptation to climate change is increasingly being observed at 
different scales and levels of socio-ecological systems (Adger et al., 2005a; 
Campbell, 2007; Folke, 2006; Lovell, 2002). In such research, analysis of 
adaptive capacity confronts questions of how to translate knowledge and data 
between scales/levels and how to portray the relationships of different 
components and domains across time and space (Cash et al., 2006). The ability 
of a system to adapt to disturbance, namely adaptive capacity, is specific not 
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only to the spatial scale at which changes occur, but also to the institutional 
scale, because the scale at which adaptive capacity is analysed has implications 
for building resilience. In particular, the dynamics of cross-scale and cross-level 
interactions on climate change adaptation are critical in determining adaptive 
capacity (e.g. the relationship between local and central governments) (Cash et 
al., 2006).  
 
Whilst the advocates of resilience are generally aware of the concept of scale, 
there has been relatively little attention given to how scale is defined and 
determined in the resilience literature (Béné et al., 2012). This is one area where 
the thesis hopes to show the value of integrating a political ecology approach 
with resilience thinking, since political ecology has considered scale in rather 
more depth. We return to the question of scale later in this review when we 
consider political ecology’s encounters with the politics of scale, which, it is 
argued, provide a livelier account than the version used in resilience thinking, 
and this question will be exemplified through the difference in scale of 
community between government and citizens in the context of CBA in Chapter 
Six. This political ecology framework recognises that there is nothing inherently 
‘natural’ about scale, but that these dimensions are social products that emerge 
through the choices made by human actors. 
 
Surprise means any discontinuity between a socio-ecological process and the 
process that was expected to occur (Nelson et al., 2007). For example, drought is 
generally perceived as an expected event in many parts of the world with 
reference to the historical climate cycles in the region, but may happen at 
unforeseen scales and/or at unexpected points in time. According to the IPCC 
(2007), climate change is projected to increase the variability of events in an 
irregular manner, increasing the possibility of future surprises. This is because 
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whilst climate changes slowly and incrementally it has cross-scale effects that 
may cause other catastrophic anomalies at a different pace like increasing 
hurricanes and typhoons (Gunderson, 2003). Of course, future climate change is 
unknown. Although some climatic events have become, to some extent, 
predictable, or at least imaginable, trends in climate change processes still make 
socio-ecological systems vulnerable to surprise. This is a result of not only the 
difficulty in predicting climate change, but also the institutional and ideological 
blockages to identifying certain risks associated with such change (Adger, 2006). 
For example, the risk of drought increased by high water-consuming cash crop 
farming in Ethiopia, such as coffee and khat,3 is frequently ignored in the name 
of economic development.4 In other words, even if climate change starts 
surprises that take a similar form to previous events, and a system has learnt 
how to cope with those earlier events, the capacity of a system can be stretched 
by the political and economic forces (Miller et al., 2010).  
 
The concept of threshold is central to resilience thinking. This is because the 
concept recognises a number of possible states (stable domains) in which the 
same socio-ecological systems can stabilise, albeit temporarily. It makes a case 
for moving beyond thinking in terms of climate change adaptation as reactions 
or adjustments along a linear continuum. This effectively increases the range of 
adaptation options rather than simply responding to disturbances because the 
framework can envisage the possibility of changing the system state itself. 
However, from a purely ecological point of view, no state is more desirable than 
another (Nelson et al., 2007). Instead, the desirability of a given state is usually 
measured by socially produced guidelines (Redman and Kinzig, 2003). For 
                                                  
3 Khat, or qat, is a plant native to the Horn of Africa causing excitement and loss of appetite in 
people. Its fresh leaves are chewed as stimulant. As a cash crop, it is widely planted in Ethiopia and 
exported to Somalia and Yemen. 
4 For more details, please see these articles (Kirby, 2007; Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2010). 
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example, pastoralist communities may prefer lands with plenty of grass and few 
shrubs for their cattle whilst communities depending on the forest have very 
different priorities for the same space. This human negotiation process, namely 
politics, is never complete as an array of socio-ecological variables changes all 
the time following the needs of a community at the time. 
 
Thresholds are the boundaries where a system flips from one stable domain 
to another (Berkes et al., 1998). In other words, they are the points at which the 
“feedbacks to the rest of the system change - crossing points that have the 
potential to alter the future of many of the systems that we depend upon” 
(Walker and Salt, 2006:53). The notion is therefore closely related to the concept 
of transformability - the likelihood of a system crossing a threshold and moving 
into another domain. Easter Island is often cited as an example. It was covered 
by tropical forest around 800 A.D. when humans started to settle, but since then 
the trees had been felled for various uses such as firewood and canoes. The speed 
of tree felling exceeded the rate of regeneration, and the nitrogen-rich earth was 
washed away by rain. By the 17th century, the socio-ecological systems in the 
island were totally transformed into an eroded landscape, and today it is hard to 
see any signs of its original cover (Walker and Salt, 2006).  
 
Thresholds can be addressed through the systematic monitoring of key 
socio-ecological variables and through the development of indicators of change 
(Robinson and Berkes, 2010). For resilience thinking, however, it is axiomatic 
that socio-ecological systems are characterised by non-linear and complex 
feedbacks, and so it is difficult to identify the precise location of thresholds. 
They may become evident only after the system transformation has started in 
the physical environment. The systems are also vulnerable to change in the 
social environment produced through system feedbacks such as policy, 
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development programmes and institution-building. In the context of CBA, 
communities are theoretically the main actor that defines the thresholds with 
their local knowledge and needs and tend to experience the current and next 
regimes of the systems most. However, the desired state of the systems is 
usually socially produced and guided by the geometry of power dynamics around 
a community. A critical challenge is therefore to understand how these 
institutions are influenced by, and in turn influence, climate change adaptation 
discourses (Nelson et al., 2007), and this process will be further investigated 
through the lens of political ecology later in this chapter and illustrated through 
local understandings of climate change in the case study communities in Chapter 
Six. 
 
The terms scale, level, surprise and threshold set up a way of analysing how 
the socio-ecological systems of which the Ethiopian CBA projects are part adapt 
to change (adaptive capacity). Such an analysis pays particular attention to 
thinking about questions of where the boundaries of such systems lie (scale) and 
how they relate to other systems in which they are embedded (level). It also 
directs our attention to examining how these systems respond to unexpected 
change (surprise) and the points (thresholds) at which they flip to entirely new, 
relatively steady states (stable domains). Up to this point in the whole discussion 
of resilience the concepts discussed describe either what socio-ecological 
systems are like, what socio-ecological change is like or how systems react to 
change. In other words, they are, broadly speaking, concepts that this framework 
provides to enable the thesis to make ontological claims about the world - 
specifically about CBA projects in Ethiopia. However, at this point in this 
presentation of the framework there is a move in a more normative policy-
relevant direction, with the introduction of ideas about adaptive governance. 
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Adaptive Governance 
 
In addition to the analytical features discussed above, resilience thinking also 
addresses the practical challenge of climate change adaptation. The practical 
issues of resilience relate to the process of how human actors can steer or govern 
adaptation towards what are perceived to be socially desirable goals in response 
to a variety of socio-ecological disturbances. Resilience thinking raises questions 
of defining appropriate governance structures that connect actors and 
institutions at multiple levels, exploring options for renewal and the 
reorganisation of socio-ecological systems. 
 
Adaptive governance refers to a governance system that organises adaptation 
by drawing on various knowledge systems and experiences for the development 
of effective policies (Folke et al., 2005). Governance systems are composed of 
multiple actors such as individuals, groups, state agencies and non-
governmental organisations that engage each other through formal and informal 
arrangements (Pelling, 2010). Governance usually operates at multiple levels; for 
example, a local water management regime operated by communities is 
responsible for decisions made about water resources on a day-to-day basis, but 
they are often accountable to state-level regulators and international funding 
organisations. This nested quality of governance provides opportunities for the 
analysis of adaptation to capture the dynamics of institutional linkages across 
different scales.  
 
Resilience thinking offers a set of criteria for assessing the success of 
adaptive governance. Folke et al. (2005) introduce four key steps to support 
complex socio-ecological systems that are resilient to disturbances:  
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1) Building knowledge of socio-ecological systems: responding to change 
requires knowledge of systems processes and functions. Governance of complex 
adaptive systems benefits from the combination of divergent knowledge systems 
in society. 
2) Feeding knowledge into adaptive management practices: successful 
adaptation is characterised by continuous monitoring and evaluation that 
enhance adaptive capacity. Generating knowledge of systems should contribute 
to the development of adaptive management practices and be continuously 
updated through the processes of knowledge management (e.g. sharing best 
practices). 
3) Supporting institutions for flexible and multi-level governance systems: the 
sharing of management and responsibility within adaptive governance involves 
multiple institutional linkages among individuals, groups, state agencies and 
non-governmental organisations. Comprehensive management initiatives rely 
on the collaboration of a diverse set of stakeholders operating at different levels 
through social and political networks.  
4) Coping with external surprise: well-functioning adaptive governance is able 
to deal with dramatic external changes (such as hurricanes, disease outbreaks, 
global economic crisis or governmental policy changes). Resilient systems may 
even make use of disturbances as opportunities to transform into more desirable 
states (stable domains). 
 
These principles summarise the process of adaptive governance in a holistic 
sense within the terms of this framework. They are also effectively compatible 
with the current trends in managing CBA projects such as ‘learning from 
experience’. They necessitate linking a broad range of actors and institutions at 
multiple scales to manage the interrelated systems in the context of uncertainty. 
Analytically these principles of adaptive governance raise empirical questions 
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that can be addressed to the case studies of the thesis: to what extent can we see 
the elements of an adaptive governance system operating in the CBA projects 
under examination? How is knowledge of systems being accumulated? How is 
knowledge of systems being deployed? Are management roles being effectively 
shared among relative institutions? How well are projects helping communities 
to cope with surprises?  
 
The argument of the thesis, however, is that there are also calls for scholarly 
research on how the climate change risks at local levels are amplified by specific 
socio-political relations and how the adaptive capacity of communities is 
addressed by these processes. Thinking about adaptive governance through the 
lens of resilience thinking implies the ability to respond to change and even 
transform systems into more desirable states. This notion involves cross-scale 
and cross-level activities that aim to formulate an overarching management 
system to guide climate change adaptation in a holistic sense. In contrast to the 
reactive backward-looking approaches, adaptive governance focuses on bringing 
together divergent knowledge of systems, studies of institutional linkages and 
collective action of a range of stakeholders in response to climate change (Folke 
et al., 2005). Adaptive governance, in this sense, is also about how the political 
assets of actors and institutions are secured and exercised in socio-ecological 
systems not only through complex forms of social hierarchy but also through a 
normative set of ideas (Peet et al., 2011). In the context of CBA, for instance, the 
role and responsibilities of communities among various stakeholders across scale 
need to be rigorously defined and examined in a specific place in the broader 
social contexts in order to devise flexible governance systems that are capable of 
adapting. However, it is still unclear how adaptive governance ‘deals with’ these 
socio-political relationships. It may reinforce existing inequalities and 
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perpetuate the interests of specific actors (Adger et al., 2005b; Armitage, 2007) 
but perhaps it will redistribute socio-political assets at the same time.  
 
2.1.3 Critiques of Resilience Thinking 
 
This review has argued that resilience thinking can add greatly to an analysis 
of CBA projects by providing a set of relevant concepts. However, it also argues 
that resilience thinking alone is not sufficient to develop our understanding of 
the empirical material collected during fieldwork in the Ethiopian highlands. 
This section of the review considers the two most prominent critiques that have 
been made of resilience thinking. The first part discusses the claim that 
resilience thinking is unable to capture socio-political dynamics. The second part 
interrogates the suggestion that resilience goes hand in hand with neoliberalism. 
The two issues are connected through the way in which the political assets of 
actors and institutions are perceived, but at different scales. 
 
Whilst this thesis has found resilience thinking to be a very fruitful 
framework for interpreting the empirical data, it is not without flaws. Chief 
amongst these is the claim that socio-political dynamics in systems are not 
adequately addressed in these principles, a point that stands out particularly 
starkly in accounts of adaptive governance. Adaptive governance in complex 
systems is composed of actors and institutions with divergent degrees of socio-
political legitimacy, who undertake at least some limited form of negotiation 
with each other. The outcome of negotiations is a product of the relative power 
relations between actors and institutions during the implementation of agreed 
rules. That is to say, the scope for aspects of governance to enable progressive 
adaptation to climate change is determined by the relationships between actors 
and institutions. In this context, actors refer to individuals, groups and 
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organisations with stakes in a policy domain, and institutions refer to formal 
(laws) and informal (cultural norms) rules that indicate how actors relate to each 
other (Pelling, 2010).  
 
Here institutions may not only constrain the behaviour of actors, but also 
facilitate change by legitimating processes of critique and reform. In other 
words, institutions, rather than actors, often determine decision-making 
procedures and therefore the scope for reform. This is an important distinction 
for CBA because the overarching regime of norms and principles at local levels is 
deeply rooted in social hierarchies and historically-embedded institutions 
without often being challenged. Menocal (2015) argues that these structural and 
institutional factors extensively determine the social distribution of rights and 
responsibilities in a society. Such as historical legacies of state formation and 
patterns of state-society relations (which will be illustrated in Chapter Five 
through the case of land tenure system in Ethiopia) frequently regulate decision-
making procedures of CBA and a degree of systems transformation whilst 
engaging with the wider dynamics of systems at different scales. Yet existing 
accounts within the resilience school tend to underplay the significance of these 
institutional dynamics.  
 
Governance systems tend to be caught between pressures for change and 
desires to remain the same. The inertia within governance systems can be 
interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, a certain degree of institutional inertia 
in the face of demands for adaptation is of benefit because it maintains stability 
and provides predictable policy environments. On the other hand, adaptation 
might also need transformative change, and institutional resistance in such a 
context is problematic because it is an obstacle to the necessary change (Pelling, 
2010). The concept of resilience that emphasises the capacity of a system that 
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absorbs change without losing systems functions and structures can also refer to 
the undesirable states of the systems, described as being ‘pathologically’ 
resilient. Thus the focus of adaptation on transformative change - a transition 
between different socio-ecological states – need to draw attention to the balance 
between stability and reform in the institutional structures. This then 
necessarily becomes an empirical problem: how and why do governance systems 
change in the face of environmental perturbations? This perspective stresses the 
normative issues such as the social distribution of rights and responsibilities 
that are imposed by socio-ecological disturbances.  
 
Successful adaptive governance involves steering processes of institutional 
changes. In promoting resilience, the notion of shared rights among institutions, 
mostly entailed by decentralisation, is considered a key issue. Berkes (2002) 
suggests that neither purely local-level management nor entirely national-level 
governance works impeccably itself, but community-based approaches with 
cross-scale institutional supports tend to be more sustainable. Here, the 
definition of community is a group of people who share similar socio-political 
interests that are shaped by conflicting values and contrasting aspirations in 
terms of access to rights and resources. The community-based approach is more 
likely to involve citizens who represent divergent interests but who also interact 
directly in the promotion of adaptive solutions within the communities where 
they live (Nelson et al., 2007). In this context, resilience thinking is a useful 
framework and provides foundational principles for CBA concerning the scale of 
systems in identifying the roles of each level of institutions. 
 
At the same time, Ostrom (1990 in Berkes, 2002) urges the recognition of the 
rights of communities to devise their own institutions without being challenged 
by higher-level authorities. Resilience-oriented adaptive governance may create 
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the possibilities of enhanced efficiency of decision-making and recognition of 
diverse knowledge networks. However, without acknowledging the complex 
‘relationships’ between each level of institutions, it might not achieve better 
trust in government, greater participation of marginalised stakeholders and 
ultimately improved adaptive capacity of local communities. Governance systems 
can be resilient and therefore adaptable only by means of institutional 
arrangements and diversely sourced knowledge that are tested and revised in a 
dynamic and ongoing process of trial and error, particularly in the context of 
high levels of local autonomy and devolution (Ensor et al., 2016). 
 
This complaint is not limited to discussions of adaptive governance, but to 
resilience thinking in totality (Béné et al., 2012; Leach, 2008). When adaptation 
is conceptualised through resilience thinking, the tendency is to focus on the 
social and ecological assets of the systems as indicators, not on the issues of 
agency and power. There are two principal reasons for this shortcoming: one is 
its inability to capture socio-political dynamics, and the other is its relevance to 
neoliberalism. The two reasons are connected through the way in which the 
political assets of actors and institutions are understood. 
 
First, this inability to capture socio-political dynamics, it is argued, is 
inherent because the concept of resilience, from its ecological origin, focuses on 
the physical ability of the systems rather than human agencies within the 
systems (Davidson, 2010). Resilience thinking has been developed through 
attempts to incorporate ideas of complex systems and functions of actors ‘as a 
whole’. The focus is on the interdependence between the systems actors, not on 
the individual agencies (Béné et al., 2012). Here, agency refers to the capacity of 
a human actor to mobilise and reproduce an array of resources (Sewell, 1992).  
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Human agency determines the essential character of socio-ecological 
systems (Blaikie, 1985). Adaptive capacity rests on people to make their own 
choices and develop their own plans. In resilience thinking, however, socio-
political characteristics of individual human agency are frequently veiled since 
resilience-oriented strategies usually focus on improving the adaptive capacity 
of the whole systems rather than the choices exercised by individuals or groups 
of the systems. As a result of this relegation of human agency, resilience 
thinking pays less attention to power, justice and democracy (Duit et al., 2010). 
 
Increasing resilience is frequently presented as a normative goal although 
the concept itself is actually neutral, neither good nor bad (Béné et al., 2012). In 
other words, resilience thinking is not necessarily concerned with interests of a 
specific group of people but simply observes systems as a whole over time to see 
its adaptability and transformability (Leach, 2008). For many theorists and 
practitioners, this unconscious normative assumption about systems integrity is 
central to the concept of resilience, and systems are simply “the heuristic device 
through which to model social and ecological dynamics” (Taylor, 2015:76). For 
instance, climate change adaptation projects require resolutions to questions 
such as ‘what constitutes vulnerability?’, ‘whose vulnerability?’ and ‘who 
mobilises actions?’, but resilience thinking does not automatically ask such 
questions. Instead, it is generally carried out a series of value assessment about, 
for example, ‘where the socio-ecological boundaries of systems lie?’, ‘what 
counts as systems dynamics?’ and ‘what kinds of systems elements mobilise 
systems adaptability and transformability?’. As a result, adaptive governance 
often ends up reducing the vulnerability of people who are already best placed to 
cope with change by taking advantage of existing governance institutions rather 
than addressing the vulnerability of the socio-politically marginalised or the 
underrepresented, namely those most at risk (Nelson et al., 2007).  
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Yet it is also true that the complaint that resilience thinking is apolitical is 
easily overstated. Resilience thinking does explicitly work with ideas of social 
vulnerability and brings into focus vulnerable groups thereby implicitly 
addressing political questions (Adger, 2000; Fabinyi, 2009; Miller et al., 2010; 
Smith and Stirling, 2010). The concept of resilience has been theorised as a 
framework that bridges social and physical sciences, not isolating climate 
change adaptation from the processes of social transformation (Folke, 2006). 
According to resilience thinking, development practitioners recognise that the 
outcome of interventions is determined by human actions based on self-interest 
and by how power is exercised in socio-ecological systems (e.g. Africa Climate 
Change Resilience Alliance (ACCRA)) (Ludi et al., 2011). In the context of CBA, for 
instance, it is stated that people’s social and political positions in a community 
could determine their experience of climate change adaptation (Ensor et al., 
2016). Yet vulnerability is frequently conceptualised as inherent to certain 
groups, and power is treated as a quantifiable thing or resource held by certain 
groups (Cote and Nightingale, 2012). It is treated as fixed and unchanging. 
Women will always be more vulnerable than men, for example, because they 
have less power. There is little sense of vulnerability and power as dynamic, 
relational or networked. This preference towards static conceptions of 
vulnerability reflects the widely held belief among development practitioners 
that analysing power in a relational way does not always result in managerial 
solutions that can be developed into a policy (Taylor, 2015). As a result, there is a 
tendency in development practice to produce detailed but static descriptions of 
vulnerability. The concern here is that, resilience thinking is not oblivious to 
politics but has a rather unconvincing account of politics as expressed through 
fixed categories of vulnerability. 
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There have also been a few efforts to institutionally integrate socio-political 
dimensions into resilience thinking and to foreground agency (Brown and 
Westaway, 2011). These approaches involve cultural (Manyena, 2006), economic 
(Adger, 2000), social (Bahadur et al., 2010) and political aspects (Peterson, 2000) 
in configuring systems thresholds. Yet these papers are often composed without 
any explicit attention to politics – the dynamic dialogue about the rules – by 
which a society operates and through which scarce resources are allocated. 
Questions of power, contested interests and social struggles, which may benefit 
some people more than others, are merely given the status of externalities. In 
configuring systems thresholds, development practitioners tend to relegate the 
political dimensions that cannot be statically described and easily incorporated 
by the normative assumptions that more resilience is better for all (Béné et al., 
2012; Taylor, 2015). Here resilience refers to general resilience that is the 
capacity of the whole socio-ecological system to respond to all kinds of shocks 
(Folke et al., 2010). 
 
Paradoxically, what such accounts effectively show is that the configuration 
processes are inherently political. The concept of resilience itself is neutral, 
neither good nor bad, yet the boundaries of socio-ecological systems are socially 
produced (Redman and Kinzig, 2003). It is the reluctance to ask questions about 
power, justice and democracy that make resilience thinking capable of 
maintaining the political status quo, rather than promoting institutional changes 
when necessary, in the name of ‘project efficiency’. Being ‘pathologically’ 
resilient, socio-ecological systems modelled according to this framework can be 
highly unjust, concealing the issues of equity, because the attributes of a 
‘resilient’ system are the products of relationships that institutionalise the 
displacement of socio-political conflicts in the systems (Taylor, 2015).  
 
  63 
Next, the major line of critique that is relevant to this thesis is that resilience 
thinking sits very comfortably with neoliberal political economy. Resilience has 
flourished as a key response to environmental risk management over the same 
period as neoliberalism has held sway over policy-makers (Leach, 2008). As an 
operational strategy, resilience is now found in a wide range of settings, 
reflecting a general consensus on the necessity of adaptation (Walker and 
Cooper, 2011). In particular, the science of resilience thinking has become a 
common theoretical reference point in the full spectrum of contemporary risk 
interventions by suggesting that we can improve our preparedness for surprise 
and thereby reduce potential exposure and vulnerability through scenario-based 
techniques and hazard modelling tools (Aradau and Munster, 2012). 
 
Yet there have been a few academics claiming that the success of resilience 
thinking in colonising diverse realms of governance is due to its intuitive 
ideological fit with a neoliberal philosophy of complex adaptive systems derived 
from the legacy of the Austrian philosopher, Friedrich Hayek (Cooper, 2008; 
Duffield, 2011; Klein, 2007; Walker and Cooper, 2011). Duffield (2011) argues that 
taking its analytical starting point from complexity science and ecology, rather 
than statistics, ethnography and demography, the concept of resilience is 
concerned with promoting adaptation to life’s uncertainties and surprises by 
associating itself with Hayek’s unified theory of spontaneous order and social 
evolution (Hayek, 1988 in Walker and Cooper, 2011). In other words, instead of 
providing a modernist guideline for environmental management (e.g. the 
Brundtland Report’s definition of sustainable development) which emphasises 
planned and state-led interventions, the concept of resilience is attached to a 
neoliberal belief in the freedom to embrace contingency which may justify 
manipulation and exploitation of environment (O’Malley, 2009). The command-
and-control managerialism of sustainable development, it is argued, has given 
  64 
way to ‘neoliberalised ecological modernisation’ that values life in terms of its 
resilience to the ‘insatiable capitalist process of accumulation’ (Cooper, 2008; 
Keil and Bourdreau, 2006). In short, the concept of resilience may condone 
capitalism’s constant transgressions of human-driven transformation of socio-
ecological systems (Duffield, 2011).  
 
This critical perspective points to the reluctance in resilience thinking to 
engage with the wider dynamics of systems at different scales. Menocal (2015) 
argues that a society that is underpinned by more broadly inclusive institutions 
are more resilient and better at promoting prosperity, particularly over the long 
term. In a number of case studies, however, resilience appears deep-seated at a 
particular local scale in a way to isolate the level from other spatial and temporal 
dimensions inherent to the production of nature (Walker et al., 2006). It 
acknowledges other systems dynamics operating at different scales but often 
does not integrate them into formal analysis. In the context of CBA, the focus on 
social, economic and political spatiality and temporality at national and 
international levels is frequently dismissed whilst the attention to the ecological 
aspects at higher scales is adequately incorporated. Resilience thinking, for 
example, is more frequently used at considering the impact of global 
environmental change than at considering the impact of globalisation - that is 
the uneven geographical development that results from neoliberalism at a world 
scale (Taylor, 2015). 
 
The concept of resilience provides a rich and distinctive language with which 
to think about CBA projects, yet it lacks political traction when it comes to 
questions about power, justice and democracy. In the context of the social 
distribution of rights and responsibilities, for instance, resilience thinking only 
partially understands the way in which power is expressed through actors and 
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institutions in complex socio-ecological systems. This discussion of power raises 
questions for researchers that resilience thinking seems disinclined to address: 
‘how and to what extent are citizens’ rights being affected by a drive to adapt?’, 
‘who are those most likely to be affected by this drive?’, ‘who wins and who 
loses when a socio-ecological system changes?’ and ‘who causes systems change 
(for good or ill)?’. Political ecologists argue that adaptation is necessarily a 
matter of power and politics (Neumann, 2005; Paulson et al., 2005; Watts and 
Peet, 2004; Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). Given that these questions have been 
at the core of political ecology from its outset, it explains why this thesis sets out 
to try and meld these two approaches together in order to generate a synthesis - 
one which takes a lot from resilience thinking, but adds these more explicitly 
political questions to it by also deploying the critical toolkit of political ecology. 
 
2.2  Conceptualising CBA through the Lens of Political Ecology 
 
2.2.1 A Field of Political Ecology  
 
The Origins and History of Political Ecology 
 
Political ecology first emerged in the 1970s in the work of anthropologists 
and geographers such as Eric Wolf (1972) and Grahame Beakhurst (1979) (Watts 
and Peet, 2004). They coined the term as a way of approaching questions of 
access and control over natural resources within a political economy framework, 
building on neomarxist critiques of conventional theories of development in the 
context of the marginalised Third World (Peet and Thrift, 1989). David Harvey 
(1974) also made a case for considering nature along with political economy by 
reviewing the scientific relationship between population and resources. His study 
became the foundation for the ideas of the Production of Nature (Smith, 1984) and 
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Social Nature (Castree and Braun, 2001), which sought to identify how ‘nature’ is 
reshaped by market capitalism as part of a social transformation. This approach 
rested on explaining the environmental crisis of the 1980s as a capitalist crisis. 
Overall, it was an attempt to subsume concerns of ecology within the context of 
the broader political economy (Turshen, 1977; Watts and Peet, 2004).  
 
From the mid-1980s, scholars interested in political ecology began to shift 
their focus away from the neomarxian analysis, which underlined the structural 
links between capitalism and ecological crisis, by recognising the environment 
as an independent variable (McLaughlin and Dietz, 2008). They started to 
acknowledge causal forces moving between the environment and society whilst 
retaining the concern of general principles of political economy. Blaikie (1985), 
for instance, illustrated this idea through an analysis of soil erosion: 
  
“When the physical phenomenon of soil erosion affects people so that they have to 
respond and adapt their mode of life… it becomes also a social phenomenon. When this 
response affects others and brings about a clash of interests … it becomes a political 
phenomenon as well” (89).  
 
He claimed that the major determinant of this response is “the degree of 
political power” of individuals, groups and institutions involved (Blaikie, 
1985:89). The implication is that adaptation is primarily about social processes, 
and so socio-political barriers need to be weighed against technical constraints 
(Blaikie, 1985).  
 
In the 1990s, the concept of political ecology started to incorporate 
poststructuralist analyses (Braun and Wainwright, 2001; Watts and Peet, 2004). 
A more nuanced account of political ecology “under the rubrics of liberation 
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ecology” (Escobar, 1999:2) highlighted the interwoven character of the 
discursive, material, social and cultural dimensions of nature-society relations 
(Bryant, 2001; Watts and Peet, 2004). In particular, this started to analyse the 
relationship between ecological change and identity politics. Against the liberal 
idea of the bounded, autonomous and rational ‘self’, the field promoted the idea 
of a collectively produced ‘subject’ who was the product of historical discourses 
and social practices. These “anti-essentialist conceptions of identity” emphasise 
a process of a continually changing ‘subjectivity’ rather than a ‘self’ who 
emerges from a pre-existing core (Escobar, 1999:3). In relation to debates about 
environmental change, explanations sought to explain human actions and 
politics in these terms of identity, self and subjectivity alongside the categories 
of political economy. 
 
Furthermore, a number of edited volumes and journals made important 
contributions to the evolution of political ecology by collecting scholarship from 
a wide variety of disciplines. They are often revealed as the result of either 
cross-disciplinary work or co-authorship: for example, the much-needed 
attention to ecology (Jacques, 2010; Vayda and Walter, 1999), the feminist 
insights and inspiration (Elmhirst, 2011; Rocheleau et al., 1996), the more 
fundamental break with conventional neomarxian assumptions (Escobar, 1999), 
the focus on urban landscapes (Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003), and the 
analytical and practical association of civil society institutions (Batterbury et al., 
2001). These works transcend the boundaries of disciplines and create more 
holistic approaches to political ecology that provide novel perspectives on 
complex environmental problems.  
 
In conclusion, political ecology’s originality resided in its efforts to integrate 
social, cultural, ecological and political approaches to the analysis of the 
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environmental crisis. Specific examples are such as the analysis of land 
degradation (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987) and famine (Watts, 1983) and by 
deploying a set of theoretical procedures that address diverse circumstances and 
accommodate both local knowledge and general principles that operate at higher 
spatial scales (Watts and Peet, 2004). It retains the sense of a ‘dialectic between 
society and nature’ throughout but increasingly also derives ideas from 
poststructuralism that acknowledge cultural diversity and historical relativism 
(Blaikie, 1989; Braun and Wainwright, 2001; Bryant, 2001). The advocates of 
political ecology all share the hope that this approach may have the potential to 
identify pathways to achieve social justice (Hornborg, 2007; Watts and Peet, 
2004). More systematic reconstructions of the history of political ecology have 
been undertaken by Peet and Watts (2004), Neumann (2005), Robbins (2006) 
and Peet et al. (2011).  
 
Defining Political Ecology 
 
The economist Juan Martínez-Alier (2003:70) defines political ecology as the 
study of “ecological distribution conflicts”. Escobar (2006:8) elaborates on this 
definition by treating ‘distribution’ as “a political issue and related to social 
power” and ‘conflicts’ as disputes “over access to, and control over, natural 
resources, particularly as a source of livelihoods, including the costs of 
environmental destruction”. In this perspective, political ecologists understand 
power as “a social relation built on an asymmetrical distribution of resources 
and risks” (Hornborg, 2001:1) and locate politics in the practices and 
mechanisms through which that power is expressed (Paulson et al., 2003). Such 
a conceptualisation of power reflects the influence of Foucault and sits 
comfortably with the approach taken in this thesis. To apply these notions, the 
field of political ecology generally uses multi-scale research models that 
  69 
articulate ecological phenomena and local social processes through the lens of 
forces at different levels (Paulson et al., 2003).  
 
From its inception, despite there being a variety of political ecology 
approaches, there has been a shared set of ideas. The first is an emphasis on 
marginality, a precariousness which social, ecological and economic aspects may 
mutually reinforce (Watts and Peet, 2004:10). For example, Ravnborg (2003) 
argues that, with a case of the Nicaraguan hillsides, landscape is shaped not only 
by (not necessarily poor) individual farmer’s resource endowments but also by 
social norms and relationships that govern access to and control over resources. 
The concept differs from the orthodox assumption of a vicious circle relationship 
between economic marginalisation, namely poverty, and environmental 
degradation.  
 
The second shared idea is pressure of production on resources (Watts and Peet, 
2004:10). What is different from the past fields of nature-society inquiry is that 
it argues that resource use is organised and transmitted through social networks 
and social relations that may impose excessive demands on the environment 
capability and sustainability. The legacy of political economy is clear here, and in 
many cases the social relations that place pressure on resources are 
characterised as ‘capitalism’.  
 
The third shared idea is the recognition of a plurality of definitions, positions, 
perceptions, interests and rationalities in relations to the environment (Paulson et 
al., 2003:206), for instance, a sense that one person’s profit can be another’s 
toxic dump (Blaikie, 1985). In other words, political ecology, whilst studied by a 
number of academics, opens discussion of how environmental problems are 
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represented from different positions and how policy and practice are devised in 
light of that representation (Watts and Peet, 2004).  
 
The fourth shared element is that political ecology seeks ways to study 
phenomena across scales (Paulson and Gezon, 2005). For instance, it criticises 
the tendency among governments and development agencies to address 
environmental problems only at local levels and to disregard ways in which non-
local policy interventions and capital flows influence local resource-use patterns.  
 
Lastly, political ecology foregrounds a broadly defined concept of justice along 
with the politics of the environment. As opposed to the geographically narrowly 
focused and theoretically driven concept of environmental justice, it appeals to 
the centrality of political economic power relations in shaping processes of 
uneven socio-ecological conditions (Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003).  
 
In this frame of reference, the concept of political ecology aims to be both 
analytical and normative. It questions existing socio-political relationships in 
efforts to understand forms of environmental disturbance and degradation and 
to develop models for environmental rehabilitation, conservation and sustainable 
alternatives (Paulson et al., 2003). In other words, whilst retaining its focus on 
political economic systems, political ecologists have initiated the possibility of 
incorporating the analysis of social relations that may not be necessarily related 
to the physical conditions of the local environment directly. It was a move on 
from the conventional approaches, which seeks causes and solutions of 
environmental crises from locally based obstacles such as overpopulation and 
poor land management, because political ecology connects local stories to wider 
political-economic processes (Paulson et al., 2003).  
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Translating Academic Political Ecology into Policy and Practice  
 
Political ecology has become an established academic tradition, but can it 
contribute to practical policy-making? The challenge is that political ecology 
tends to advocate structural changes in the relations of production, which are 
both profound and radical and (as such) alien to the more modest ambitions of 
policy-makers. Political ecologists believe that the sources of environmental 
changes, particularly in the Third World, are rooted in the political and economic 
dimensions of society. Accordingly, they argue for the need of “the far-reaching 
changes to local, regional and global political-economic processes” (Bryant and 
Bailey, 1997:3; Watts and Peet, 2004). These changes, however, require a 
substantial amount of political effort because they inevitably involve the 
transformation of highly unequal power relationships upon which the present 
system is based. This is why political ecologists have been highly sceptical about 
the concept of sustainable development, which is built on the ‘business-as-
usual’ agenda (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). In other words, the field of political 
ecology sees resolving environmental problems as a basis for radical change in 
the context of the developmentalist onslaught (Escobar, 1996). Such a position 
would seem easier to sustain at an academic conference than at an NGO 
workshop. 
 
There are two main ways of thinking about the practical value of political 
ecology. On the one hand, political ecologists as individuals have always crossed 
the boundaries between academic and policy/activist work, and on the other, it is 
the necessity of a practical framework that makes the political ecology 
framework more applicable to environmental problems. First, political ecology 
has never been merely scholarly. Whilst most academic work suffers from the 
ivory tower syndrome, political ecologists have made a number of efforts to 
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escape the academy (Blaikie, 2012). This approach provides a sharp critique and a 
powerful methodological approach for analysing actual socio-ecological 
phenomenon that affect people’s livelihoods in terms of history, geography and 
justice (Mann, 2009). Political ecology’s accounts of the production of nature 
concern not only the political economic relations of production but also the moral 
field of social justice (Ekers and Loftus, 2013; Mann, 2009). In contrast, the 
concept of resilience aspires to neutrality - particular stable domains are neither 
good nor bad. It does not necessarily prioritise the needs of a specific group of 
people (e.g. the poor or marginalised). It means resilience is less willing to take a 
normative position and support specific social groups. But in climate change 
adaptation, enquiries into vulnerability (e.g. what constitutes vulnerability and 
whose vulnerability) are critical, particularly in the process of identifying victims. 
This is where political ecology falls into place in this thesis. Whilst resilience has 
its cornerstones in adaptability and transformability in the context of surprise, 
more sophisticated notions of vulnerability and marginalisation are drawn from 
political ecology (Watts and Peet, 2004). In other words, whereas resilience 
provides a framework for analysing community based adaptation by defining 
communities and their surrounding environment as complex interconnected 
socio-ecological systems, political ecology concerns social justice in ‘ecological 
distribution conflicts’ through identifying ‘who loses and who gains’.  
 
Second, there have been calls for the development of a conceptual framework 
that makes political ecology more applicable to practical policy problems 
(McLaughlin and Dietz, 2008; Tschakert and Dietrich, 2010). This is the time for 
political ecology to evolve again through the collaboration with the concept of 
resilience, continuing its openness to trans-disciplinary analysis. In climate 
change studies, the ‘centre of gravity’ is located between environmental and 
social sciences since both areas of scholarship consider transformation to be a 
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critical part of adaptation. Both resilience and political ecology advocate radical 
change, where necessary, but they locate the site of change in different parts of 
socio-ecological systems. Whilst resilience thinking examines the 
transformability of physical conditions of the systems, political ecology 
scrutinises the discursive dimensions of nature-society relations. Integrating the 
concept of political ecology into resilience thinking therefore would (a) extend 
the practical applicability of political ecology whilst retaining its internal 
political vitality, and (b) fill the political gaps of resilience thinking.  
 
What is the ‘Political’ in Political Ecology? 
 
How do we conceptualise the ‘political’ in political ecology? Among both its 
advocates and critics, significant debates have been around methods and 
concepts used in addressing the political (Paulson et al., 2005). This question has 
been the central issue in political ecology from the first movement that replaced 
the ‘human’ in human ecology with neomarxian political economy, to the recent 
activities seeking social justice in the context of environmental change. Here, the 
political refers to “the practices and processes through which power, in its 
multiple forms, is wielded and negotiated” (Paulson et al., 2005:28), which is in 
alignment with the definition of politics of this thesis5. Political ecologists focus 
on the ways power circulates among and between different social groups, 
resources and places (Paulson et al., 2005). This involves the analysis of diverse 
manifestations of power such as the ability of an actor to impose their language 
on another, the capacity to control settings or domains in which people act and 
interact, and the capability to construct these settings and specify the direction 
                                                  
5 Politics, in this thesis, is the (generally public) dialogue about the rules (both formal laws and 
less formal social regulations) by which a society lives and operates and through which scarce 
resources are allocated. Politics may be about rules within a family or within a village or within a 
nation-state. Given that these rules probably benefit some people more than others, politics is as 
much about conflict as it is about co-operation and as much about exclusion as inclusion. 
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of socialisation/discipline within them (Wolf, 2001). In other words, in order to 
understand environmental conflicts, it is essential to understand the processes 
through which power is expressed, that is to say, ‘the political’. 
 
If ‘the political’ is any field where power relations are important, it exists in 
everyday practices (like eating) and structures (like families) as much as in 
parliaments, states and classes. Paulson et al. (2005:28) argue that, “All kinds of 
human relationships have political elements, often manifest in the strategic use 
of position, knowledge, or representations to gain differential access to 
resources”. So, as Foucault (2009[1977]) insists, power is embedded in everyday 
human interactions. If the political encompasses not only the formal sense of 
politics but also people’s day-to-day activities, power is not simply something 
we live with but also something we depend on for everyday life to function 
(Butler, 1997). Power relations are characterised by daily challenges and 
negotiations and are infused with historic and discursive meanings (Paulson et 
al., 2005). Developing a political understanding of environmental problems is 
about building theoretical methods for examining the political in those everyday 
phenomena (Kottak, 1999). In recent years, as a result of this perception, the 
recognition of how power relations embedded in everyday human interactions 
shape the environment have encouraged political ecologists to employ the 
methodological approaches of applied anthropology for collecting, analysing and 
using data (Paulson et al., 2005).  
 
In terms of political proposals and policies, political ecology has a tendency 
to advocate actions that move towards a more equal distribution of ecological 
resources and risks (Martínez-Alier, 2003). This ‘red-green alliance’ often 
requires political ecologists to announce their own political positions in the 
analysis (Paulson et al., 2005). Particularly, in climate change adaptation, 
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scholars often have significant influence on the processes of policy-making by 
producing discourses. Thus it becomes increasingly important for political 
ecologists to be aware of the power relationships embedded in the process of 
obtaining and interpreting social and physical resources. This movement 
emphasises the role of political ecology that translates “the knowledge of 
marginal or subaltern people into power, respect, and right” (Paulson et al., 
2005:31) and provides the political understanding of socio-ecological systems 
that is absent in resilience thinking. In so doing, there is possibility for climate 
change adaptation to be the second opportunity (Pelling, 2010), after the 
movement towards sustainable development in the 1980s, to question the 
dominant form of development, particularly at the local level. That is to say, the 
concept of CBA is entitled to involve responses not only to the impacts of climate 
change in the biophysical spheres but also to the highly unequal power 
relationships of society. 
 
2.2.2 Synthesising Resilience Thinking and Political Ecology: Power, 
Scale and Representation 
 
Resilience thinking provides the analytical starting point for this thesis. 
Adaptation in resilience thinking is about the ability to adapt to current socio-
ecological systems. In this sense, adaptation is formulated through relationships 
with other social actors who “strive to defend and create their own 
environments in a context of class, ethnic, racial and/or gender conflicts and 
power struggles” (Swyngedouw, 2006:106 in Taylor, 2015:83). Hidden beneath 
resilience thinking, ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ in CBA might become 
vehicles that increase inequalities and shape CBA according to the self-interest 
of a few actors. In contrast, political ecology engages normatively with the 
socio-political causes of vulnerability and struggles over assets. 
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Whilst resilience thinking provides a useful entry point in investigating how 
vulnerability is expressed, political ecology contributes a toolkit for 
understanding how power relations make and remake vulnerability over time. In 
particular, political ecology adds politics to resilience thinking in three distinct 
ways: 1) by explicitly conceptualising power in nature-society relations; 2) by 
politicising scale; and 3) by politicising representation, specifically 
representations of indigenous knowledge. The first of these is the most 
significant and receives the most extensive treatment here. The argument is that 
whilst it is important to question the unfair distribution of natural resources and 
the differentiated experience of climate change, what is even more critical is to 
reveal what kinds of socio-political practice determine the political assets of 
actors and institutions that shape their behaviour and willingness to give 
consent to those actions. Political ecologists have theorised power in multiple 
ways but in recent years have drawn extensively on the ideas of Michel Foucault. 
 
Power 
 
Within social science, there are at least two distinct traditions for 
understanding power: a conventional view concerned with the exercise of power 
and an alternative approach that understands power as relational (Scott, 2001). 
First, the conventional approach describes power as ‘power over’, 
conceptualising it as a quantifiable thing that can be possessed by individuals 
(e.g. x has more power than y). In this tradition power struggles are always a 
zero-sum game (Göhler, 2009). According to this view, power is stratified and 
hierarchical, often leading to the concentration of power in the hands of a few 
elites (Scott, 2001). This approach was, for instance, widely discussed in 
understanding patron-client networks based around a powerful individual or 
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party in contemporary African politics (Boas, 2001). Critics of such views set up 
an alternative way of understanding power in more subtle forms, such as 
coercion and manipulation, that do not necessarily involve conflicts or power 
struggles (Haugaard, 2002). Most contemporary political ecology draws on this 
alternative conception. 
 
The alternative approach describes power as ‘power to make something 
happen’, rather than ‘power over’, perceiving it as a capacity that is socially 
produced. It is the effect of social networks, it is distributed across society and it 
is therefore relational (Haugaard, 1997). In particular, through a number of 
essays, lectures and books between the 1960s and the 1980s, the French social 
theorist Michel Foucault transformed the conceptualisation of power (Hannigan, 
2006). He dismissed the previous conventional approaches that attempt to build 
“a general theory of what power is”, and instead sought “where and how, 
between whom, between what points, according to what processes, and with 
what effects, power is applied” (Foucault, 2009[1977]:2). Power ceases to be a 
thing and starts to be understood as an effect or relationship. Foucault conceives 
power as something embedded in social relationships, the fundamental feature 
of everyday human interactions, rather than as a device permanently residing 
with institutions for the use of a certain group of people. He then conceptualises 
government in terms of the set of procedures of securing particular effects 
(Foucault, 2009[1977]). 
 
Foucault argues that social relationships are seldom symmetrical (Lemke, 
2002). In particular, where the effect of power is structured by formal 
institutions such as states and corporations, the relationships often appear in the 
form of domination - the unequal relations in which the subordinated party has 
little chance of exercising its will (Hannigan, 2006). In modern European 
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societies, Foucault argues, power is usually achieved through a life-long process 
of socialisation, which he calls discipline, which may reduce the resistance of the 
other interest groups whilst internalising social consent (Lemke, 2002). Power is 
often expressed through the production of knowledge which builds up certain 
ideas that are internalised and then embodied by individuals through their 
behaviour. By steering the behaviour of populations, this is a very efficient form 
of social control and government. Next, Foucault suggests the notion of discourse 
as a means of shaping discipline through the circulation of ideas that persuade 
individuals to give their consent to relations of domination (Hannigan, 2006). In 
climate change adaptation, for example, discipline is often practised under the 
supervision of ‘experts’ who are empowered by their scientific and technical 
forms of discourse to promote forms of behaviour - such as willingness to 
conserve water through changing everyday domestic practices (Mitchell, 2002). 
As individuals we are expected to internalise responsibility (discipline), express 
our consent (through behaviour) and are persuaded to do so by expertise 
(discourse). Overall the networks of the state/water company/scientists have had 
an effect on our behaviour - an expression of power. This exercise of 
socialisation/discipline is relevant to Foucault’s concern over the extendability of 
scientific expertise to determining environmental risks, particularly at local 
levels, since control over discourse production can demarcate not only the 
participation of actors but also the issues that are subject to debate (Davidson 
and Frickel, 2004). We will return to this part of the argument when discussing 
the politics of representation. 
 
This thesis defines power as the ability of actors and institutions to effect 
desired outcomes in competition with others (who pursue their own goals). 
Running through social networks of socio-ecological systems, power may affect 
people’s values through processes of internalisation and subsequently represent 
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forms of domination (Scott, 2001). This perception of power is a key element of 
the thesis as it attempts to understand the socio-political relations through 
which CBA is implemented and how actors and institutions constitute complex 
socio-ecological systems for their own self-interest. The thesis explicitly 
explores the axes of power represented around CBA projects and examines the 
internalisation of values that validates and authorises the systems by indirect 
means such as information control and socialisation – particularly through, the 
voluntary participation of the peasantry in land management in Chapter Five, 
the discursively constructed artefacts of community and climate change in 
Chapter Six, different understandings of the area closure in Chapter Seven and 
the politics of local leadership in Chapter Eight. In so doing, this thesis aims to 
reveal the socio-political institutions of society that control the exploitation of 
the environment and steer the behaviour of people. 
 
Much of the writing in this tradition has focused on the relationships 
between populations, elites and government and how compliance to a regime is 
accomplished. In this context, Foucault introduced the concept of governmentality 
(Hauggard, 1997). Governmentality describes how relations between elites and 
people take place both in and beyond the modern state. Foucault defines 
governmentality as the “conduct of conduct”, that is how the behaviour of a 
particular population is orchestrated. Governmentality is about producing a 
certain kind of citizen, whose ideas and actions suit the ambitions of the 
government. Governmentality is a mechanism of administrative power “that has 
the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, 
and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument” (Foucault, 
2009[1977]:108). Foucault’s own empirical work often relates quite tightly to 
Western Europe or even France. He was analysing modern liberal democracies 
and was particularly interested in how elites still tried to steer the behaviour of 
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the people even in those realms of their life which were judged to be ‘private’ 
and therefore (in terms of liberal political philosophy) beyond the reach of the 
state, for example, in relation to how many children they had.  
 
There has been an increasing interest in how governmentality might be a 
useful concept when applied outside the European and American heartlands of 
liberal democracy (see, for example, Legg, 2007). Such ideas are sometimes 
explored under the concept of authoritarian governmentality, a term introduced by 
Mitchell Dean (2010:133-135). Dean was interested in the forms of 
governmentality in the colonies created by Europeans in the early part of the 20th 
century. He argues that authoritarian governmentality differed from 
governmentality within Europe in that it denied almost all individuals the rights 
of citizens and expected unquestioned obedience. Authoritarian governmentality 
used “sovereign instruments of repression” (Dean 2010:209), such as the 
security apparatus (police, army and prisons), which have a much more direct 
impact on individual behaviour than European forms of discipline to achieve 
social control. Applying authoritarian governmentality thus needs to be 
differentiated from its more familiar European formulation and be understood as 
a more-or-less directive form of political practice. In many ways, authoritarian 
governmentality is a deliberate contradiction in so far as it contains both the idea 
of direct control through force (authoritarian) as well as the idea of self-
government and the population’s consent for this form of government 
(governmentality). The thesis argues that this concept, though intended for 
historical use, seems intuitively relevant to contemporary Ethiopia. Another 
conceptual contribution this thesis wants to make is to interpret the political 
dimensions of CBA through the lens of authoritarian governmentality.  
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Authoritarian governmentality in Ethiopia is delivered through government 
laws and policies and is performed by implementation of these directives in 
order to shape, regulate and manage the conduct of individuals and groups for 
specific goals. Just as Foucault argues, modern forms of power come into effect 
not only by forcing people to act in certain ways but by turning them into 
accomplices of the process, a form of self-government that is in the interest of 
certain groups in society. In other words, whilst certain logics spread throughout 
a network of power relations, actors and institutions within that network come 
to naturalise and accept these logics as their own and in their own interest 
(Robbins, 2006). Through this lens of authoritarian governmentality, how ideas 
from Imperial and two post-revolution regimes of Ethiopia have all tried to 
devise the voluntary participation of the peasantry in land management that best 
suit the elite ruling class will be demonstrated in Chapter Five. The chapter will 
argue that although this control over land has been an intentional plan by the 
elites to serve their own interest, it was also a strategy to receive people’s willing 
consent, a strategy based on cultural understanding. In so doing, it will consider 
how the land tenure system has been a central organising feature of Ethiopian 
governmentality and explain the rationales behind the introduction of CBA in the 
country.  
 
Foucault (1991) also argues that governmentality provides the conceptual 
apparatus through which to analyse how the state configures its relationships 
with citizens of various types. Here this apparatus is one of the missing parts of 
resilience thinking that analyses the social distribution of rights and 
responsibilities in a society through such as historical legacies of state formation 
and patterns of state-society relations. The concept of governmentality 
continually redefines what is and what is not within the competence of the state 
as a government strategy in order to convince people to do what the state wants 
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them to do (Hammond, 2011). This is particularly important in countries like 
Ethiopia where the central government still remains a key player because its 
citizens can become easily instrumentalised in the interests of the elites. Cadres 
of the ruling party for example have a different relationship to the state than 
opposition party members; their experience of citizenship is different. Seen 
through this Foucauldian lens, these instrumentalised citizens cannot see the 
power relations in action because they have been normalised and accepted as 
legitimate even in conditions of extreme domination (Hauggard, 2002).  
 
In the context of natural resource management, governmentality describes a 
process of how some people come to internalise the environmental mandates of 
the state as ‘right’, possibly at the price of their own interests. The relevant 
activities become normalised within actors and institutions through the process 
of socialisation (Lemke, 2002), that is to say, a series of attempts by government 
to guide, educate and control human activities relating to natural resources, 
which will be demonstrated through the case of discursively constructed 
knowledge of climate change in Chapter Six. As the political ecologist Paul 
Robbins (2006:75) puts it natural resource management becomes the “product of 
ritualised embodiment of environmental practice”. Discipline is achieved 
through a combination of force and habit. Agrawal (2005) calls this application 
of governmentality environmentality - a set of practices and ideas instilled in the 
citizen-subject through participation in institutionalised environmental 
activities.  
 
Agrawal (2005) described a process of decentralising the regulation of 
forestry to local communities with an example of community-based forest 
management in India. The political problem from the perspective of those in the 
state is that decentralisation appears to be involved in reducing their central 
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control over what happens at a local level in provincial areas. The question 
becomes how to retain a capacity to steer behaviour in the periphery in the 
context of a policy that is specifically designed to reduce central bureaucratic 
control over the periphery. Agrawal argues that in his case studies relations 
between the state and society, whilst dynamically changing, produced new 
governmentalised localities by building a new decision-making process for 
environmental problems and new political structures called ‘regulatory 
communities’ (Agrawal, 2005). It means that, instead of coercing people, a 
process of devolving responsibility is done in a secretive manner through 
inducing them to do what the elites want but doing it by their own volition. Local 
communities also notice the changing whims or fancies of national or 
international actors and change themselves to garner more favour under this 
new regime (Sletto, 2005). Such a conceptualisation of how governments can 
organise practices in a way that continues to produce governable subjects, this 
thesis argues, is plausible in the Ethiopian context. This is because Ethiopia has 
frequently lacked the capacity to assert its authoritarianism across such a vast 
space with so few resources and thus has relied on its citizens obeying the 
country through their own volition. 
 
This is where the critical toolkit of political ecology that adopts this way of 
thinking about how power works helps resilience thinking when it comes to 
analysing empirical material that covers both social and physical sciences. 
Agrawal (2005:318) points out that, “An analysis of governmentality orients 
attention toward the concrete strategies to shape conduct that are adopted by a 
wide range of social actors… questions about the nature of the state and about 
the extent to which states shape social processes”. What are the strategies and 
technologies used in Ethiopia to turn its rural peasants into environmental 
subjects? They often become part of a network of power relations through 
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natural resource management and are easily made to be instruments of 
government even though they appear to decide and act on their own free will 
(Robbins, 2006). Through a process of turning them into environmental 
subjects, the Ethiopian state gets opportunities to extend its capacity to local 
communities and to increase its ubiquity and influence over their everyday life, 
despite claiming it is pursuing a policy of decentralisation. In other words, 
processes such as decentralisation or community-based management can be 
easily hijacked by the political desires of government through turning 
constituents into accomplices. Political ecology works as an approach precisely 
because it is specifically concerned with revealing the complexities of power 
relations, it sets out to elucidate whose interests are being served by particular 
ecological transformations of the environment and of the institutions used to 
govern natural resources (Page and Tanyi, 2015). Yet, whilst this political 
ecological approach is penetrating, most studies in the field focus on the 
power/knowledge issues at the site where a farmer’s behaviour is assessed. 
Rather less attention has been given to the hidden rationales of government.  
 
My analysis (in Chapter Five) casts the state (that is the bureaucracies and 
politicians that make up the central government of Ethiopia) as a central player 
facilitating governmentality through manipulation of the land tenure system on 
behalf of a series of governing regimes and in support of wider existing social 
and political structures (that is the elites that exist beyond and above the state). 
Addressing this particular country’s practice of land tenure adds to the study of 
governmentality in a context of where most people’s livelihoods are dependent 
on agriculture under an authoritarian regime, which is not uncommon in 
developing countries. 
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It would be wrong to suggest that these core political issues (popular 
consent, authoritarian elites, dominance and legitimacy) have not been 
addressed elsewhere in critical academic discussions of African government. For 
example, Jean-Francois Bayart (1993), covers similar topics in his well-known 
Gramsci-inspired account of African government - The Politics of the Belly. This 
text, along with others usually bracketed under the broad label of 
neopatrimonialism, has described a system in which a ruler and/or his staff use 
state resources for personal benefit and to secure the loyalty of clients as if the 
sources were his private property (Bach and Gazibo, 2012). In these accounts 
power gets centralised on a patron to whom all clients in the system owe their 
position (Thomson, 2004), yet on a national scale the patron is only as powerful 
as the network they have built up (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). 
 
It is impossible to do justice to this extensive field of critical work on African 
politics in the space available here, but drawing one point of analytical 
comparison is worthwhile. For all their value in teasing out the practices of 
African politics, these texts often seem to rely on fairly traditional conceptions of 
power relative to the Foucauldian governmentality approach. What is striking 
when reading these texts through the lens of governmentality is their fairly 
orthodox conceptions of power as hierarchy and ‘thing’. This can be illustrated 
through neopatrimonial accounts of resource politics. Authority over natural 
resources, in this literature, is seen as a significant source of power. In African 
politics, the management of natural resources frequently imply the instrumental 
use of power (Boas, 2001; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Neopatrimonialism is 
fundamentally “an exchange relationship between unequals” (Boas, 2001:700) 
which could take place at every level of governance. Whilst undertaking this 
thesis has required me to engage with this literature on African politics and it 
has informed much of my understanding of political practice, the authoritarian 
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governmentality approach is selected in preference within the analytical framing 
of the thesis because it provides a distinctive way of approaching the politics of 
CBA that puts a relational concept of power at its centre. 
 
The Politics of Scale 
 
One of the key critiques of resilience thinking is its difficulty in drawing 
scalar boundaries that enable analysis of both socio-ecological systems and 
structures in which those systems are embedded. Where are the systems 
boundaries and how are they produced? This section argues that there is a need 
to understand participation and empowerment in specific local communities 
without neglecting the politics and wider structures in which these local 
communities are embedded. This ambition is one of political ecology’s long-
standing interest in questions of scale.  
 
Political ecology has had a lot to say about how power and scale are related 
(Bryant and Bailey, 1997). By locating the ecological phenomena of interest in 
the context of specific political economic systems, political ecologists have 
opened the possibility of bringing the analysis of nested hierarchies of scale into 
environmental studies. This move is rooted in an effort to transcend the 
methodological limitations of the orthodox approaches, likewise resilience 
thinking, that situate causes of and solutions to environmental crises in local-
based problems such as overpopulation, poor land management or inappropriate 
technology (Paulson et al., 2005). In other words, inspired by neomarxism that 
offers “a means to link local social oppression and environmental degradation to 
wider political and economic concerns” (Bryant, 1998:3), political ecologists 
have worked for the wider political economy framework that analyses the local 
scale in its wider scalar context (Brown and Purcell, 2005). Hecht and Cockburn 
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(1990), for instance, examined the causal dynamics of deforestation in eastern 
Amazonia in terms of national and international factors that encouraged people 
to clear tropical rainforests for cattle ranching. They revealed that macro-level 
political economic forces created conditions of high profitability that influence 
social and economic actors (e.g. ranchers, peasants and transnational 
companies) involved in the business and their decision-making processes. 
 
In this context, the case of Ethiopia may provide a great insight into how this 
aid-addicted nation is actively engaged with global environmental discourses 
through adjusting its policy narratives to the interests of international donor 
organisations without ever departing from a firm focus on elite self-interest. 
Chapter Five will demonstrate the ways in which Ethiopian governmentality 
inscribes how to govern people through the land tenure system necessarily 
involve the propagation of practices that are rooted in particular global world 
views on the environment that are prominent at any one time and which are 
propagated by global institutions concerned with environment and development 
(Hammond, 2011). This is what the resilience framework often fail to integrate 
into formal analysis and where the political ecology toolkit provides a cross-level 
and cross-scale analysis. 
 
Political ecology also recognises that diverse environmental processes 
interact with socio-political processes in creating different scales of mutual 
relations (Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). Scalar theories in human geography 
have helped develop an argument that space is socially constructed. The 
differentiation of space is inscribed by power relations and political struggles, 
and therefore space is not fixed but constantly reconstructed (Zulu, 2009). In 
this context, the thesis’s interest is to address how to apply this argument to 
interrogating the governance of CBA projects and how this process is 
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manipulated by actors and institutions in conflicts over rights and resources. 
This focus is originally built on Blaikie’s work (1985) of multi-scale political 
economic processes that affect local resource use patterns. In his study, however, 
the configuration of scale was conceptualised in a hierarchical fashion and as a 
series of geographic terminologies such as local, regional, national and 
international (Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). 
 
Key theoretical advances were made later considering scale as ‘socially 
produced’ rather than ‘ontologically given’ (Marston, 2000; Smith, 1995; 
Swyngedouw, 1997). These studies explored how political ecological processes 
generate scaled spaces of interaction and incorporated a variety of scalar 
configurations that portray the relationships of different actors and institutions 
across time and space (Brown and Purcell, 2005; Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). 
Processes of environmental change produce new socio-ecological settings with 
temporally and spatially distinct characteristics (Brown and Purcell, 2005; 
Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003). This ongoing process is tied to the social, 
cultural, political and economic conditions and formal and informal institutions 
of governance in specific moments of time and space. By extension, Swyngedouw 
and Heynen (2003) argue that there is nothing inherent in any scale, and there is 
no particular scale more desirable than others; instead, the priority resides in 
identifying the process by which particular socio-ecological scales are “disputed, 
redefined, reconstituted and restructured in terms of their extent, content, 
relative importance and interrelations” (913).  
 
In this sense, the socio-spatial scales are inherently relational. In this more 
recent perspective, the continuous restructuring of scales is an integral part of 
social strategies to secure control over natural resources or to struggle for 
empowerment (Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003). This restructuring is described 
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as the ‘politics of scales’ which actors and institutions attempt to shift the level 
of implementation processes and decision-making authority to the level which 
they can influence governance most effectively (Lebel et al., 2008). Adaptation to 
climate change is, for instance, increasingly observed at different scales of 
socio-ecological systems, yet these scales are not naturally given but socially 
constructed and therefore fluid. Conflicts over the appropriate scale for 
organising adaptation strategies involve different power geometries and often 
lead to radically altered socio-ecological conditions, in particular when a 
successful adaptive action for one agency is not classed as successful by another 
(Adger et al., 2005a). Success in climate change adaptation therefore depends on 
the scale of implementation and the criteria for evaluation at each scale. In 
addition, these socio-spatial processes change the importance of specific 
geographical scales, and these redefinitions in turn alter the geometry of social 
power by strengthening the control of some whilst disempowering others 
(Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003). For example, the concept of CBA was not 
initially welcomed by local and regional governments in Ethiopia, compared to 
top-down and government-led projects, due to the struggle over control of 
finance. However, once the projects were carried out and local communities held 
the control, it was observed that the role of the communities becomes reinforced 
even in other local dialogues. This empirical point illustrates the challenge here 
by slipping back into apparently fixed scales (national, regional, local 
government) that seem intuitive and natural because of their familiarity. The 
politics of scale is as much about the contest to create these scales as it is about a 
contest between them - it is about the strategic reorganisation of scale.  
 
Political struggles over scale are unavoidable as scale is socially produced and 
inevitably associated with power relations. Whilst resilience thinking provides a 
scale-sensitive, policy-relevant framework, the power dynamics and political 
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economic struggles are better addressed through the lens of political ecology. In 
this frame of reference, it is evident that these two schools of thought are 
complementary to each other, particularly in the context of addressing “the 
mechanisms of scale transformation through social conflict and political 
struggle” (Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003:913). This collaboration will be 
deployed in Chapter Six to critically analyse the scale of ‘community’, 
understanding the processes and consequences of the continuous restructuring 
of this specific socio-spatial scale in Ethiopia that may strengthen the control of 
some whilst disempowering others.  
 
The Politics of Representation: (Indigenous) Knowledge and Discourse 
 
A growing focus on the politics of knowledge and discourse has raised 
fundamental questions about the way in which nature is represented (Watts and 
Peet, 2004). Essentialist conceptualisations of nature were challenged by a 
number of first generation political ecologists who insisted that the idea of what 
nature is has shifted throughout history according to cultural, social, economic 
and political factors (Escobar, 1999; Hornborg, 2007; Robbins, 2006). As a result, 
critical debates have emerged between “collecting biophysical data” and “the 
examination of pertinent environmental discourses” (Paulson et al., 2005:29). 
Attempting to bridge these counterintuitive projects requires finding a balance 
between the biophysical aspect of nature and the historical contexts of nature 
(Escobar, 1999). That is to say, political ecology is required to acknowledge the 
materiality of nature whilst holding fast to the idea of a discursively constructed 
representation of nature too (Neumann, 2005). This concept of bridging and 
balancing physical and social sciences shows a better fit between resilience 
thinking and political ecology, than just ‘politics’, since both seek to cross the 
boundary. 
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Discourses are inherently about representations. Poststructural political 
ecology generally have adopted Foucault’s idea that knowledge and power are 
inseparable (Haugaard, 1997; Sletto, 2011). Foucault argues that any discourse 
formation is the consequence of power struggles as “it is not possible for power 
to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to 
engender power” (Foucault, 1980:52 in Haugaard, 1997:66). In particular, 
political ecology started to acknowledge indigenous knowledge - what ‘local’ 
people know about and do to their environments (Watts and Peet, 2004). As a 
result, knowledge from locals has become better respected alongside the upsurge 
of community-based development approaches. Yet political ecologists have 
subsequently identified a few critical issues by problematising the concept of 
indigenous environmental knowledge (Watts and Peet, 2004). Three points 
appear to be vital in the context of CBA because they show how indigenous 
knowledge can actually entrench and even worsen current environmental 
problems.  
 
First, there is no such thing as purely indigenous knowledge. Indigenous 
knowledge often exists as a relatively recent invention. It may not be indigenous 
as such, but instead is hybrid (Rocheleau, 2008). Most knowledge is not just 
local, but is a complex hybrid derived from all kinds of knowledge from different 
sources over a long period of time (Rocheleau, 2008). Instead, what matters in 
political ecology is why indigenous knowledge is difficult to legitimate and how 
local practice can be institutionalised into development discourses (Watts and 
Peet, 2004).  
 
Second, indigenous knowledge is not necessarily right or best (Watts and 
Peet, 2004). Whilst it is true in many cases that local communities know their 
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own environment better than external scientists, incorporating indigenous 
knowledge into practice does not guarantee effective projects in the field. This is 
because, first, as illustrated earlier, knowledge in local communities is 
formulated in the context of social norms and hierarchies and often 
misrepresents the needs of individuals and/or certain groups (Kothari, 2001), 
and second, indigenous knowledge can be simply wrong (Blaikie, 1985). 
 
Last, indigenous knowledge is often unevenly distributed within local 
communities (Watts and Peet, 2004). This is mainly due to the unequal power 
relationships between different social groups characterised by such as gender, 
age, class or ethnicity. Knowledge reflects the political capacity, rather than the 
legal entitlement, of individuals and groups. This is where political ecologists 
call for increased concern with social justice and democracy in the analysis of 
environmental change. When analysing the political context, political ecologists 
tend to prioritise the rights of people who experience the negative effects of 
environmental change regardless of whether those people are the custodians of 
indigenous knowledge or not. The ambition of political ecology is to enhance the 
democratic content of a society being studied by “identifying the strategies 
through which a more equitable distribution of social power and a more inclusive 
mode of environmental production” can be achieved (Swyngedouw et al., 
2002:125).  
 
It is not science itself as a form of knowledge that is questioned in political 
ecology, but “it is the way (ecological) knowledge is selected and validated, the 
way environmental problems are narrated and structured, and what assumptions 
and practices become normal and internalised for people” (Peet et al., 2011:40). 
That is to say, the way climate change is recognised in local communities, 
depends on knowing how people understand, narrate and explain their society. 
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This politics of representation will be demonstrated through the case of 
discursively constructed knowledge of climate change in the case study 
communities of Ethiopia in Chapter Six. In this example, a form of knowledge is 
found neither entirely indigenous, nor quite right, nor just. 
 
In summary, political ecology claims to be an alternative to ‘apolitical’ 
ecology (Robbins, 2006). The concept of political ecology is a set of critical tools 
to analyse environmental conflicts in terms of struggles over “knowledge, power 
and practice” in wider scalar contexts (Watts, 2000:257). It is concerned with the 
way ecological knowledge is mobilised in exploring the origins and implications 
of environmental degradation in the context of uneven power relations. In 
climate change adaptation, there is a growing body of scholarly work paying 
attention to the ways in which the politics of decision-making inform 
community-based approaches. This is mainly due to the necessity of improving 
our understanding of power relations in society in order to respond flexibly and 
collectively to climate disturbances in complex socio-ecological systems, that is 
to say, increasing systems resilience. This section also draws particular attention 
to questions of authoritarian governmentality, history and consent as a lens 
through which to think about how relational power operates through 
environmental interventions, particularly in the field of multi-scale research. 
 
2.3  Conclusion  
 
The chapter sets out to cover three distinct literatures: participatory 
development, resilience thinking and political ecology. The first of these plays an 
important role in the history of CBA and remains central to it. The second and 
third literatures, which both bridge social and physical sciences and seek to cross 
this boundary, form the basis of the analytical framework of this thesis. The 
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overall goal is to synthesise resilience thinking and political ecology to produce a 
conceptual hybrid that strengthens the socio-political dimensions of the former 
and the policy-relevant dimensions of the latter. Through analysing these 
literatures, the thesis aims to bring three conceptual innovations to analysis of 
CBA. First, it understands participation and empowerment in specific local 
communities without neglecting the politics and wider structures in which these 
local communities are embedded. Second, it links CBA to the idea of systems 
resilience by defining communities and their surrounding environment as 
complex interconnected socio-ecological systems. Third, it weaves political 
ecology’s Foucauldian understandings of relational power and authoritarian 
governmentality into resilience thinking in order to rethink questions of politics 
in the analysis of CBA.  
 
The argument of the thesis, based on field experience, is that CBA will have 
limited long-term success because it is conceptually under-developed and in 
particular is depoliticised. Given the role in setting scales and knowledge and 
determining the distribution of rights and resources, CBA is political by 
definition and does not present a neutral conceptual framework. It is rather a 
discourse that is “embedded in, and reproductive of, material forces, 
institutionalised practices and political claims that are closely geared towards 
the preservation of existing” socio-political structures of a community (Taylor, 
2015:19). This chapter therefore draws attention to the socio-political interests, 
agendas and actions which are always present around communities and brought 
up the question of ‘why’ a community-based approach is deemed appropriate in 
development practice, rather than simply assumes that the community level is 
where to enhance systems resilience most effectively. In so doing, it 
demonstrates the heterogeneity of communities and the complexity this brings 
to implementing standard models of CBA in specific field sites. 
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In conclusion, the chapter demonstrates that it is insufficient to involve 
communities in participatory approaches without a detailed understanding of 
power relations in society. The analysis of socio-political dynamics in nature-
society discourses is the keystone to achieving social justice in climate change 
adaptation. There is a widely accepted false assumption that if the spaces for 
decision-making are local and rules for access and distribution fair, all parties 
will be able to participate and benefit (Cleaver, 2009). This is where to bring the 
synthesised framework into analysis of CBA. The diversity of social structures 
and individual agents means that evaluations of CBA projects need to be flexible, 
context-sensitive and power-conscious.  
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Chapter Three. Ethiopian Context  
 
This chapter sets out to provide a summary of the relevant background 
information on Ethiopia. It begins with a brief description of the country’s 
geography and modern history and then particular attention will be given to the 
contemporary political debate in Ethiopia in the context of ethnic federalism and 
neopatrimonialism. 
 
3.1  Geography 
 
At an altitude of 2,000 – 4,500m, the Ethiopian highlands, the so-called 
‘Roof of Africa’, cover more than half of the country (Henze, 2000). The flat-
topped hills of the highlands, known as amba, have been historically important 
places as the site of churches, prisons and battles (Bahru Zewde, 2001). Major 
rivers originate from different watersheds. The notable ones are the Awash River 
in the Rift Valley; the Wabi Shebelle River in the Somali region; the Omo River in 
the south; and the Blue Nile, or Abbay, which arises near Lake Tana in the 
highlands and later flows to Sudan and Egypt (see Map 1) (Boudreau, 2010). 
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Map 1. Topography and drainage of Ethiopia (source: Boudreau, 2010) 
 
Due to the wide range of altitudes (-197 m to 4,550 m), topography, habitat, 
climate, population distribution and livelihood are all closely linked in Ethiopia 
(see Map 2). The highlands accommodate the majority of the country’s 
population who rely on rain-fed small-scale farming. The highlands also include 
most of the cropping areas with a tropical monsoon climate, which makes the 
plateaux extraordinarily green. Lower elevations, which are much less densely 
populated, receive less rainfall. Where rivers and seasonal watercourses permit, 
people in the lowlands can grow cash crops such as coffee and khat, but the 
major part of the lowland economy depends on herding – pastoralism. Most of 
the lowest lying areas in the east, northeast and far south of the country receive 
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very little rainfall and are mainly used for pastoralism under these semi-arid 
climatic conditions (see Map 3) (Boudreau, 2010). 
 
 
Map 2. Population density of Ethiopia (source: Boudreau, 2010) 
 
Altitude is the most important factor determining rainfall, but spatial 
variability of rainfall events means that the correlation is not always exact. The 
season, period and frequency of rain vary by longitude and latitude. For instance, 
the eastern side of the Rift Valley and the northern Tigray region receive less 
rainfall than the mid-highlands or even than the lowlands in the Benishangul 
and Gumuz region (see Map 4). Although the rainy season is different by region, 
it is generally considered that the main rainy season, known as kremt, is from 
June to October, and the short rainy season, known as belg, is from March to 
May. The belg rains are often unreliable, but they are a critical factor in 
agriculture as many kinds of grain are either harvested or planted during this 
period (Boudreau, 2010). 
  99 
 
 
Map 3. Dominant type of livelihoods in Ethiopia (source: Boudreau, 2010) 
 
Another key physical geographical feature is the Great Rift Valley, a vast 
geological crack cutting through Ethiopia in a south-westerly direction (see Map 
5). It starts in Syria in the Middle East, goes through the Red Sea and East Africa 
and then finishes at Mozambique in southern Africa. This is where the hominid 
ancestors of human beings such as Australopithecus lived several million years 
ago and their skeletons were excavated.6 The area is still reasonably populated 
since numerous lakes are found within it. The southern Rift Valley in Ethiopia 
has been an important cradle for endemic biodiversity and for the local economy 
                                                  
6 The 20-year-old female hominid skeleton, named Lucy (Australopithecus afarensis), was 
unearthed in the Danakil region of northern Ethiopia in 1974. She was revealed as a 3.5-million-
year-old ancestor of humankind, and it was followed by more palaeontological discoveries in the 
Great Rift Valley region (Kimbel, Johanson and Rak, 1994). 
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with businesses such as floriculture and fisheries taking advantage of the 
conditions.  
 
 
Map 4. Rainfall of Ethiopia (source: Boudreau, 2010) 
 
In conclusion, in relation to the physical geographical stereotype, it is 
important to recognise that agriculture in Ethiopia is a risky business. This is 
because, first, it is dependent on rainfall and that rainfall can be unreliable, and 
second, land is scarce due to the rapid population growth in some parts of the 
country. It is perverse to pretend that droughts and famines have not happened 
in the past. However, to think of Ethiopia as perpetually drought-ridden or as 
devoid of rivers is factually inaccurate. Equally to explain famines purely in 
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terms of physical geographical conditions (e.g. droughts) is to ignore the 
extensive literature that shows how famines are caused by human actions such 
as war, insurgency, poverty or malfunctioning markets (Devereux, 1994; de 
Waal, 1991; Sen, 1981). Instead, it is important to recognise that over a long 
history Ethiopian communities have developed multiple forms of agriculture 
(e.g. sedentary cropping, pastoralism and agro-pastoralism), which reflect the 
specific local resources of rain, rivers, soil, slopes and people. The result is 
significant agricultural diversity and a degree of resilience. 
 
 
Map 5. Map of the Ethiopian Rift Valley (source: Bahru Zewde, 2001) 
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3.1.1 Climate Change  
 
A warmer future is projected in Ethiopia according to the CMIP57 ensemble 
climate model simulation (See Figure 1) (KNMI, 2017). Based on the RCP 4.5, the 
average annual temperature in Ethiopia is projected to be beyond 24°C by 2100, 
compared to 22.3°C in 2016 and 21.4°C in 1900. Here the Representative 
Concentration Pathway (RCP) refers to the latest generation of scenario that 
provides input to climate models. RCP 4.5 is a scenario developed by the Pacific 
Northwest National Laboratory in the United States that outlines a future with 
relatively ambitious greenhouse gas emissions reductions, stabilising radiative 
forcing at 4.5 watts per meter squared shortly after 2100 (Thomson et al., 2011). 
This future is consistent with stringent climate policies, strong reforestation 
programmes and the commencement of CO2 decline around 2040.  
 
This climate trend would benefit crops with higher temperature thresholds 
(e.g. cassava and pigeon pea), but those with cooler optimal thresholds (e.g. teff, 
maize and potato), mostly major staple foods of a large number of Ethiopians, 
would be detrimentally affected by higher temperatures (Washington and Pearce, 
2012). 
 
                                                  
7 CMIP5 is the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (2010-2014) developed by World 
Climate Research Programme (WCRP). It is a standard experimental protocol for studying the output 
of coupled atmosphere-ocean general circulation models that provides climate model diagnosis, 
validation, documentation and data access (Taylor et al., 2009).  
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Figure 1. The CMIP5 ensemble climate model simulation Ethiopia8 (source: KNMI, 2017) 
 
Ethiopia experiences a series of climate-induced droughts that cause stress 
on crop and livestock productivity and eventually contribute to widespread food 
insecurity. In particular, there have been serious reductions in March-June 
rainfall in the north and south in eastern highlands of Ethiopia, where the 
fieldwork of this thesis was conducted, with declines ranging from -0.4 to -0.6 
SPI9 (See Figure 2a), whilst northern Ethiopia has seen recent rainfall increases 
from 0.2 to 0.6 during June-September (See Figure 2b) (Brown et al., 2017). There 
is generally more uncertainty in the projection of precipitation than of 
temperature, and considerable regional variations exist. These declines appear to 
be related to warming in the Indian Ocean combined with a warming dipole in 
the western equatorial Pacific (Funk et al., 2012).  
 
                                                  
8 Each line shows one scenario. The whiskers are from 5% to 95% and the horizontal line 
denotes the median. 
9 Standardised Seasonal Precipitation (SPI). 
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These areas of the highlands are the most productive and populated regions 
in Ethiopia, and more than 17 million people in these areas are projected to 
experience declining rainfall if current trends continue (Brown et al., 2017). Crop 
model simulations indicate that the eastern highlands experienced serious water 
deficits during belg (March to May), when is sowing, flowering and ripening 
periods of crop growth, between 1982 and 2014 (Brown et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, changes in the severity and frequency of extreme weather events 
could have more substantial impacts on crop yields and food production than 
changes in mean conditions (Washington and Pearce, 2012). Kharin et al. (2007) 
argue that the impact of climate change is felt most strongly through changes to 
intensity and frequency of extreme weather events such as floods, droughts and 
heatwaves.  
 
 
Figure 2. a (March-June) and b (June-September) 1999-2014 changes in SPI in Ethiopia 
(source: Brown et al., 2017) 
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3.2  The Current Debate on Ethiopia 
 
“At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. 
 For it is no historical part of the world,  
it has no movement or development to exhibit.”  
(Hegel, 1956[1827]:99) 
  
A common view of Africa in general is that it is a land without history, yet 
here too Ethiopia provides a good example of the inaccuracy of this Eurocentric 
claim. Some people believe that recorded Ethiopian history began when the 
Queen of Sheba made the biblical visit to Solomon, King of ancient Israel, whilst 
others regard the emergence of the Aksumite kingdom in the first century AD as 
its inception (Bahru Zewde, 2001). In either case, Ethiopia is apparently the 
oldest independent nation and has the longest recorded history in Africa, with 
the early adoption of Orthodox Christianity, an indigenous alphabet and a 
sustainable and efficient economy based on plough-based agriculture (Clapham, 
1990; Henze, 2000; Pankhurst, 2001; Bahru Zewde, 2001). This extended political 
narrative has proven to be rich terrain for historians who have done much to 
illuminate the story of Ethiopia and to categorise it into different characteristic 
eras. Of course, such work has to be treated critically and the idea that there is a 
singular account of the history of Ethiopia has in recent years become 
profoundly political, with the very notion of a single Amharic-speaking 
Abyssinian state stretching back into the mists of time becoming contested. 
 
Although the Italians occupied Ethiopia from 1936-1941, the country claims 
never to have been colonised. However, despite this long and autonomous 
history, Ethiopia’s modern chronicles are not so different from other African 
states, which were formally colonised by the European powers. Like many such 
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countries, a transfer of power in 1974 (in this case from Emperor Haile Selassie I 
to the Derg, an explicitly Marxist-Leninist inspired regime) became effectively 
an authoritarian dictatorship in which rule was concentrated on a single figure, 
Mengistu Haile Mariam, who then retained power over an extended period until 
the era of second wave democratisation in the early 1990s when a new 
generation of rulers emerged in Africa, including Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia 
(Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). 
 
Ethiopian politics and political history in the second half of the 20th century 
is profoundly marked by the same external forces that determined so much of 
sub-Saharan African history: the Cold War, uneven terms of global trade, 
economic dependency, sovereign debt crises, structural adjustment and its 
subsequent variants (1991-), aid conditionality and dependency and, now, in the 
21st century, international concerns about good governance and the construction 
of civil society as well as geopolitical debates about global security. It is in this 
context that stunted socio-economic development, civil war and ethnic 
competition in Ethiopia in the late 20th century has to be understood. As such, 
understanding the character of the administrative system in Ethiopia can be best 
interrogated from two particular perspectives: ethnic federalism and 
neopatrimonialism. 
 
Ethnic Federalism and Neopatrimonialism 
 
In much of Africa the nation-state is seen as an inappropriate, externally 
imposed structure, or as “the Black Man’s burden” (Davidson, 1992). Not only 
were the boundaries of nation-states often arbitrary colonial lines (e.g. the 
borderline between Ethiopia and Somalia), but also the political institutions such 
as parliaments, elections and bureaucracies were unfamiliar or even ‘unnatural’. 
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Nation-building policies in the 1960s and 70s often had limited impact, and 
crucially in many places ethnic identity still remains as or more important to 
many individuals than national identity. In this context of ethnic competition 
within nations, federalism is seen as a potential constitutional compromise that 
allows different ethnic groups a degree of political autonomy and territorial self-
determination. Ethnic federalism then is a means of accommodating the colonial 
legacy of nation-states in the context of the continuing importance of ethnic 
identity. 
 
 
Map 6. Regions of Ethiopia (source: Boudreau, 2010)  
 
During the second wave of democratisation in Africa in the early 1990s, 
Ethiopia saw significant political and constitutional changes. In 1994, aiming for 
political decentralisation, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) 
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approved a charter assuring the right of self-determination for nations, 
nationalities and peoples and introduced the new constitution with ethnic 
federalism (Aalen, 2002). Reflecting different multicultural elements, the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia comprises nine states and two city 
administrations (see Map 6). The regional states are given a semi-sovereign 
status with self-governance and are authorised to have their own constitutions, 
languages and courts. However, despite the intention to devolve power from the 
centre to local governments, Ethiopia has failed to make a complete transition 
and only achieved limited political reform. Instead, the country has effectively 
reverted to a central authoritarian regime with a one-party monopoly in the 
parliament.  
 
The result of the most recent federal and regional elections held in May 2015 
shows that true democracy had yet to take root in Ethiopia. The ruling party, the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), obtained 500 seats 
with a further 47 seats for its affiliate parties, out of a total of 547 seats in the 
central national parliament (NEBE, 2015). All the 9 regional state councils also 
went to either the EPRDF or its affiliate parties (NEBE, 2015). That is to say, the 
two chambers of the Ethiopian political system, the House of People’s 
Representatives and the House of Federation, are fully under the control of the 
EPRDF. Given that Ethiopia is ethnically and culturally diverse, the fact that all 
the seats went to the EPRDF and its affiliate parties cannot intuitively be 
accepted as the outcome of an effective or lively democratic electoral process and 
debate.  
 
Hagmann (2010:5) argues that, “In Ethiopia, democracy is not about people’s 
rule, but about ruling people”. The outcome of the 2015 election was already 
expected even before Ethiopians went to the polls (Mosley, 2015). Since the 
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current regime came to power in 1991, except for the 2005 election, the EPRDF 
has had an absolute majority in the parliament.10 Few observers doubted that the 
ruling EPRDF remains in power as the regime had clamped down on opposition 
supporters with anti-terrorism laws during the election campaign. Moreover, 
Ethiopia only invited observers from African Union, not the EU and Carter 
Center, who were present for the 2010 election. Both the EU and the United 
States announced that they remain deeply concerned by continued restrictions 
on media and opposition parties in the country (AFP, 2015).  
 
After toppling the Derg in 1991, the political priority of the new Ethiopian 
government, led by the EPRDF, was initially to establish ‘democracy’ before 
being changed to ‘development’ and then to ‘stability’ in the wake of the 2005 
election. This evolution not only gives an indication of the trajectory of 
democratisation in Ethiopia, but also shows a certain degree of continuity from 
its predecessors’ strategies to control this vast, ethnically diverse and unstable 
territory. 
 
Historically, one of the most critical issues in Ethiopia is the struggle 
between central and regional forces. This was a key theme between the Emperor 
and the regional lords (or princes) during the imperial era, and became 
dominant in terms of competition between the central elites and the ethnic-
based regional movements shortly after the Marxist-Leninist revolution in 1974 
(Bahru Zewde, 2001). The other cleavages in Ethiopian politics are also often 
interpreted in this light, for example the conflict between the highlanders and 
the lowlanders, or between Abyssinians11 and non-Abyssinians. 
                                                  
10 Number of the seats of the EPRDF in the Ethiopian Parliament: 483 out of 548 seats in 1995, 
481 out of 547 seats in 2000, 327 out of 547 seats in 2005, 499 out of 547 seats in 2010 (African 
Elections Database, 2011). 
11 Abyssinian, also known as Habesha, originally refers to the people from northern and central 
Ethiopian highlands including Amhara and Tigray regions (Henze, 2000). 
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The first modern centralised government in the Abyssinian highlands was 
established by Emperor Tewodros II in the mid-19th century (see Figure 3). He 
founded a national army and restored the imperial throne from the regional 
princes. Extensive territorial expansion, especially to the south and east, was 
achieved later by Emperor Menelik II in the late 19th century. He almost drew 
the border of the modern Ethiopia by conquering the traditional kingdoms in the 
south such as the Oromo, Sidama and Gurage. Some of them had never 
previously been under the authority of the highlanders (Aalen, 2002).  
 
 
Figure 3. Brief chronology of Ethiopia 
 
The Ethiopian elite has traditionally been dependent on surplus extraction 
through extracting rents from the agricultural sector in which the majority of 
the population earn their livelihoods. The expansion, therefore, intrinsically 
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entailed a spread of the northern taxation system to the newly incorporated 
areas (Mosley, 2012). The annual tribute was introduced and enforced by soldiers 
from the north and the local elites appointed by the central government. To 
facilitate the collection process and to control the new territory, Menelik II even 
moved the capital from Gondar, the former political centre, to Addis Ababa in 
1886 (Aalen, 2002). That is to say, the Abyssinian expansion was accompanied by 
the exploitation and subjugation of the southerners, which echoed European 
colonialism elsewhere on the continent. As a result, this Abyssinian 
‘imperialism’ provoked a series of violent resistance struggles and the 
emergence of ethnic liberation movements in many regions. In the mid 20th 
century the last Emperor, Haile Selassie I, implemented a modernisation process 
including the introduction of modern cash crops and a new education system, 
but despite these achievements he was unable and unwilling to respond 
appropriately to the new social movements and inter-regional tensions due to 
the centralised administrative bureaucracy (Marcus, 1994). 
 
Finally, the downfall of the Emperor and his regime was made by the 
‘creeping coup’ in 1974 (Bahru Zewde, 2001). It was organised by two Marxist-
Leninist parties, the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON) and the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP),12 and some breakaway military 
forces. Thereafter, a committee, called the Derg, was formed by different army 
units which then commanded the imperial government to resign. Mengistu Haile 
Mariam emerged as the leader of the Derg and became an unchallengeable power 
in the country by purging his political rivals in MEISON and EPRP in a bloodbath, 
called the Red Terror.13 Although the committee was later renamed as the 
                                                  
12 Both MEISON and EPRP were mainly organised by exiled students from the United States and 
Europe. 
13 The Red Terror was a violent political campaign in Ethiopia from 1977 to 1978, conducted by 
Mengistu Haile Mariam to gain full control over the country. It was estimated that over half a million 
people were killed during this time. 
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Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), the Derg remained as the 
title of the era.  
 
The Derg perceived the problems of Ethiopia as being the result of class 
conflict, rather than the legacies of internal colonialism and struggles between 
ethnic groups, and so carried out comprehensive land reform, which in effect 
aimed to nationalise all land (Aalen, 2002). In other words, land reform was used 
as a means to exert control over regional forces and to squeeze more surpluses 
from peasants. This plan also included the creation of the Ministry of Public and 
National Security as well as mass organisations such as women’s and peasant’s 
associations, in order to tighten its control over people. In short, Mengistu 
replaced monarchical absolutism with Marxism-Leninism, but retained the 
extreme centralisation. During the Derg, the regional ethnic-based resistance 
movements resumed their struggles and defined the government as just another 
Amhara oppressor, even though its ideology was non-ethnic. From their 
perspective, the change was perceived as a transformation rather than a 
revolution (Aalen, 2002; Harbeson, 1988). 
 
During the late imperial era and the Derg, Tigray people were relatively 
marginalised both socially and economically. In the mid-1980s, Meles Zenawi 
and his Marxist-Leninist party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), 
reached out beyond their immediate region aiming to build a national multi-
ethnic party to oppose the Derg. Finally, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) was founded by the TPLF and its allies from the 
Oromo, Amhara and Eritrean regions. Following the military struggle, they 
subsequently toppled Mengistu and formed the Transitional Government of 
Ethiopia (TGE) in 1991 (Tibetu, 1995).  
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Despite the historic hostility of the non-Abyssinians to the Abyssinians, the 
TGE initially comprised of a wide range of ethnic groups, including even the 
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). However, when the process fully materialised, the 
new Tigrayan-born highland rulers tried to get the other groups under their 
control. When they succeeded, the TPLF/EPRDF started to create their own 
satellite parties in other regions. After all, the resistance movements 
recommenced from the point forwards. Thousands of people suspected of being 
the members of such opposition groups were imprisoned, and political party 
activities were suppressed and restricted. Finally, most of the opposition parties 
boycotted the election in 1995 and 2000 as the harassment became unbearable 
during the campaigns (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2008).  
 
Abbink (2006) claims that the current Ethiopian government has remained 
an authoritarian regime despite the constitutional reforms and apparent desire 
for decentralisation. Although Ethiopia is formed of regional states, their 
authority is conferred by the centre through proxy rule. The policy-making 
process is also dominated by the central government and is designed as a top-
down approach, especially where it engages with the development programmes 
that are supported by the assistance of international donors. Furthermore, one of 
the most important indicators of ‘authoritarian ethnic federalism’ (Ayenew, 
2002) in Ethiopia is the heavy financial dependency of the regional states on the 
central government. In reality, the strongest regional state is only able to cover 
about 20 percent of its spending budget by itself. And this is because the central 
government has monopolised most of the profit-making revenue sources as well 
as taxation (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). For instance, whereas the regional 
state governments rely on direct income tax from private farmers and 
agricultural cooperatives, which accounted for less than 0.6% of Ethiopia’s total 
tax revenue in 2007/08, the federal government collects most of its revenue from 
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indirect tax, which accounted for more than 70% of the tax income of the 
country in 2007/08, on foreign and domestic trade (Abdella and Clifford, 2010; 
Lencho, 2010).  
 
Why has the political system in Ethiopia continually returned to 
authoritarianism? Abbink (2006) argues that the resurgence of the Ethiopian 
authoritarian political tradition is a result of the historic patrimonial system that 
is in place. In other words, the Ethiopian political culture is not yet free from its 
historical inheritance such as patronage and elite rule at the centre. This heritage 
restrains the democratisation process and tends to preserve a tradition in which 
the first priority of rulers is not to relinquish their power (Abbink, 2006). During 
the imperial era, the patrimonial system was authorised and legitimised by the 
Ethiopian Orthodox church as the divine omnipotence derived from the 
Solomonic dynasty. The intellectuals of the church created a social system that 
justifies exploitation and extraction, and educated the populace to accept these 
ideas from an early age (Gebru Tareke, 1996). After the revolution in 1974, 
‘divinity’ was replaced by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. The new doctrine 
was delivered to the countryside from urban areas by students who championed 
the need for land reform. That is to say, only the title of patron was changed 
from emperor to dictator whilst its role and practice remained identical.  
 
This historic commitment to a strongly centralised and hierarchical political 
culture lends itself to the emergence of neopatrimonialism. The Ethiopian 
political tradition is based on historic patrimonial systems. The patrimonial 
system here is a gradual process of scaling up local patron-client linkages that 
are based upon the extraction of surplus produced from the agricultural sector in 
return for military protection, emergency relief and a system of justice. 
Neopatrimonialism in Ethiopia has a complex relationship to postcolonial theory. 
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In the Ethiopian context, Abbink (2006) argues that Médard’s definition (1996) 
of neopatrimonialism needs to be expanded to draw more attention to domestic 
politics as an arena of contrasting aspirations, conflicting imperatives and 
practices of power. It is a definition that emphasises the link between the 
features of bureaucratic-legal state structures with personalised forms of 
domination and clientelistic networks of ethnicity, clan and kinship.  
 
Under the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie I, the ideas of neopatrimonialism 
were initiated domestically, unlike elsewhere in Africa, where they were imposed 
by European colonial powers – in the case of the British Empire via the doctrine 
of indirect rule. Although the evolution of political practice in 20th century 
Ethiopia was conducted with the help of European advisors, and thus has a few 
attributes of the European models of state (such as the parliamentary and 
constitutional systems), it successfully preserved the historic patrimonial 
features of the regime. The way neopatrimonialism was instilled in Ethiopia was 
by inscribing a new set of central institutions and practices of power upon the 
existing structures of society through modernised, European administration 
systems (Gebru Tareke, 1996).  
 
An early form of neopatrimonial governance in Ethiopia was one in which 
bureaucratic-legal state structures were governed by traditional patrimonial 
systems. Emperor Haile Selassie I used state resources to maintain his divine 
status in the Empire. He did this with total abandon whilst retaining control of 
the elite by frequently reshuffling his cabinet and overhauling the state agencies, 
ensuring potential political rivals remained impotent through in-fighting 
(Clapham, 1969). In return this clientelistic system encouraged subordinates and 
sub-subordinates in the governments to create their own networks, in which 
they would act as patrons, whilst the Emperor operated as chief patron. This 
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arrangement was sustained for two reasons. First, the state finance was at the 
Emperor’s disposal and there was no particular distinction between the 
country’s property and his private wealth. Second, his regime had a strategic 
alliance with the US which provided financial, military and technical assistance 
in exchange for political, logistical support in the region’s foreign affairs 
(Markakis and Ayele Nega, 1986). That is to say, the Emperor’s efforts gave rise 
to a distinctive shape of neopatrimonial governance in Ethiopia whilst fully 
embracing the traditional, divine status of Emperor and the long-established 
Ethiopian patriarchy.  
 
The ‘economics of scarcity’ which underlies much of Ethiopian politics is a 
significant element in the reproduction of neopatrimonialism (Abbink, 2006). 
The Emperor and elite groups have always managed to preserve their privileged 
access to resources with legal-rational legitimacy and to reject a shift towards a 
more equitable societal structure. This practice has been closely tied to material 
and economic interests in the context of land throughout Ethiopia’s modern 
history. In the imperial era, the landholding regional lords were the power basis 
of the Empire. The Derg regime nationalised all land whilst abolishing the 
imperial system and pursued a socialist development model, albeit not one 
which succeeded in achieving political stability and economic growth. The 
current EPRDF has fundamentally restructured the state whilst keeping the 
Derg’s land policy and bringing the main industries into the fold. It has also 
achieved a notable degree of national economic growth, but the problems of food 
insecurity, ethnic tensions and human rights still remain unsolved. This 
economic foundation of governance in Ethiopia has endured at its core even 
whilst power has changed hands from the Imperial, to the Marxist-Leninist 
military, and to the current regime. This trend will be further detailed in Chapter 
Five.  
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As a result, the nature of neopatrimonial governance tends to limit the 
political institutionalisation of democracy, particularly at the local level. The 
Emperor’s attempt to concentrate and fortify the power around himself and his 
regime resulted in limited opportunity for local governments to manoeuvre with 
administrative autonomy. Subsequently, the way power is practised became 
increasingly less transparent as the dominant elite was not ready to relinquish 
power. This tendency also rendered the focus of economic activities short-
sighted; based on short-term revenue generation for the structure’s self-
preservation. This was at the expense of long-term development, since it was 
initially derived from the surplus extraction of the agricultural sector (Abbink, 
2006). Moreover, informal relationships between patrons and clients in Ethiopia 
remain prevalent and manifest themselves in notable levels of corruption, 
nepotism and patriarchy in which government officials and local leaders offer 
rent-seeking opportunities to other political elites or supporters in return for 
their support (Gray and Whitfield, 2014). In this context, the practice is based on 
the idea theorised by Weber and the prefix ‘neo’ just “serves to emphasise that 
we are no longer in a traditional context” (Blundo and Médard, 2002: 10). 
 
Needless to say, neopatrimonialism is not a sufficient framework to fully 
explain the complex Ethiopian federal political system. There are additional 
factors to consider such as a rump of the once dominant Marxist-Leninist 
vanguard party led by the elites, the extent of state responsibility and 
intervention for the common good, and the role of donor countries in the 
country’s politics and finances. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, those factors 
are subsumed under the persistence of the practice of neopatrimonial 
government in Ethiopia, where the politics are regarded as “the privileged 
domain of power holders” (Abbink, 2006:196). In other words, over the longue 
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durée, the legacy of neopatrimonialism in this landlocked country has been 
profoundly associated with the relations between the centre and periphery, 
determining the politics, economies and customs of local communities. 
 
In summary, the mode of political tradition in Ethiopia is marked by a 
neopatrimonial style of governance. It is a top-down approach based on elite 
insights into the political economic needs of the regime and the subsequent 
neglect of ordinary citizens and their views in local communities, by dominant 
groups. This has endured and evolved in the political arena of each regime with 
legal-rational legitimacy. Despite the last 25 years of government reform 
towards ethnic federalism, the Ethiopian state remains authoritarian and 
neopatrimonial, in a manner reminiscent of previous regimes. To maintain this 
trend, a practice of personalised governance systems has been continued, 
incorporating the public and private spheres into an intricate network of 
personal loyalty. In this sense, local democracy in Ethiopia may be tied up with 
its patrimonial political tradition, in which ideas of justice and fair decision-
making are not commonplace. 
 
CBA is centred on building adaptive capacity that is shaped by ‘the political’ 
surrounding local communities. It is thus important to not only analyse CBA 
with a focus on the role, capacity and aspirations of actors but also to consider a 
wider range of social institutions which are culturally and historically formulated 
and built-in at every level of society. The perspectives of ethnic federalism and 
neopatrimonialism are relevant in understanding socio-political forces in 
Ethiopia (Chapter Five) and in particular for providing “the heuristic 
foundation” for the southern case study (Chapter Eight) (Hagmann, 2005: 515). 
The approach is meaningful due to its engagement with the key features of the 
co-existence of patrimonial and legal-rational domination in an Ethiopian 
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socio-cultural context. It engages with the complex, and often contradictory, 
patron-client relations, particularly in the southern area of Ethiopia which were 
subjugated during the Imperial-Colonial expansion.  
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Chapter Four. Methodology, Research Design and Methods 
 
This chapter details how this research project was initially designed and how 
data from Ethiopia was collected and analysed. A variety of methods were used to 
collect data, including 8 months of participant observation, 7 focus group 
discussions and 73 semi-structured interviews with community leaders, peasant 
farmers, government officials and personnel from the UNDP’s Small Grants 
Programme (SGP). This was carried out between September 2013 and June 2014. 
This chapter explains the rationale behind each research activity and the 
processes by which questions were raised and answers were found. The 
overarching concern of this thesis is to present an in-depth qualitative account 
of community-based adaptation (CBA) projects and to situate the projects in 
their broader socio-political context. 
 
With that in mind, the first section of this chapter presents the overall 
methodological approach of the thesis. It will be followed by the introduction of 
the case studies and the fieldwork timetable. The fourth section discusses the 
specific data acquisition methods including semi-structured interviews, focus 
group discussions, participant observation and the collection of written 
materials. Limitations and ethical considerations are reviewed in the last section. 
 
4.1  Overall Methodological Approach 
 
This thesis adopts a political ecology approach and this is also where the 
methodology emerged from. As discussed in Chapter Two, political ecology is a 
tradition rooted in “a combination of critical perspectives and the hard won 
insights distilled from field work” (Rocheleau, 2008:716). In order to understand 
the “underlying contexts and processes” (Bassett, 1988:453) of environmental 
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problems and conflicts, political ecology research privileges empirical 
observation of biophysical and socio-economic phenomena (Rocheleau, 2008). 
Fieldwork and empirical observation is key to this methodology and the 
extensiveness of that fieldwork is central to its claim to authority and validity. As 
such political ecology has often used a case study methodology, which has 
modest claims about its generalisability and its predictive capacity but strong 
claims about its authority within its own context and for the case study’s 
relationship to other contexts.  
 
The critical aspect of the political ecology approach emerges from the 
assumption that both society in general and the ideas that emerge from it are 
managed in the interests of elites and it is the job of research to elucidate that 
power relationship. Whilst early political ecology focused on how colonial and 
market capitalism and state policies shaped nature-society relations at various 
scales, recent studies in political ecology have paid more attention to how a more 
diverse range of political and discursive processes and power inequalities 
influence these relations (Young, 2003). In particular, poststructuralist 
approaches (which have altered our understanding of social forces, local agencies 
and indigenous knowledge since the 1990s) have destabilised the structural 
explanations of social struggle that refuse multiple, subjective perceptions 
(Watts and Peet. 2004). Empirically this way of thinking has placed a focus on 
research designs that seek to analyse politics and power dynamics through in-
depth qualitative case studies, but which also emphasise questions of 
interpretation based on subjective position (Dodman and Mitlin, 2011; Ensor and 
Berger, 2009). Whereas early political ecology sought explanations for empirical 
observations based on an analysis of social relations that felt more deductive 
having started from a set of theoretical precepts drawn from Marxism, more 
recent work has explored how the world is interpreted by different groups of 
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people and how individuals generate subjective meanings to understand the 
world and their actions – a project that has a more inductive quality. Again, the 
priority given to empirical case study adds to this sense that this is an inductive 
research process. 
 
A recurring topic in political ecology is the conflict over common-pool 
resources such as land, forest and water (access to which are closely associated 
with climate change). Power relations in such conflicts are complex and often 
related to a crisis of representation (Peet et al., 2011; Pratt, 2009). Political 
ecologists work closely alongside research participants since power dynamics 
occur not only in the realm of formal decision-making process, but also in the 
context of everyday interactions (Schubert, 2007). Such an ethnographic 
approach to power and politics reveals how access to and use of natural 
resources are shaped by these interactions between specific actors in particular 
places with regard to the processes through which decisions are made (Gezon, 
2005). In this sense, qualitative methodologies can be considered to address 
socio-political structures composed of “competing social constructions, 
representations and performances” (Limb and Dwyer, 2001:8).  
 
This thesis thus takes a qualitative research approach for data collection, 
based primarily on interviews, focus group discussions, participant observation 
and the collection of written materials (e.g. project reports, paperwork and 
websites). This prioritises an intersubjective and contextual understanding of 
knowledge and focuses on positionality and power relations (Limb and Dwyer, 
2001). This methodology was chosen as the thesis aims to provide detailed 
descriptions and insights (rather than statistical accounts that test formal 
hypotheses) about particular places, events and situations and about the ways 
they are perceived and experienced by different actors and institutions in the 
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form of participants’ own narratives (Smith, 2001). This approach captures 
people’s subjective perceptions and experiences of the society they live in, which 
is often missing from quantitative methods. Moreover, qualitative methodologies 
tend to see “the social world as something that is dynamic and changing” (Limb 
and Dwyer, 2001:6) which is in line with the way socio-ecological systems are 
approached by resilience thinking which frames the current practice of CBA 
project. 
 
At the same time, this thesis recognises that political ecology is a field of 
inquiry encompassing a plurality of methods (Doolittle, 2015). Methodological 
freedom has been critical to the evolution of the field as a compelling component 
that appeals to academic scholars working in diverse research settings and 
cultures. Political ecologists make methodological choices through framing 
qualitative, quantitative and participatory methods together, illustrating the 
value of methodological pluralism through case studies (Robbins, 2012). Yet 
though acquiring statistical data is useful to understand physical environmental 
change, political ecologists tend to lean towards sources of qualitative data. This 
is because they inherently “make claims about the claims other actors make 
about the environment”, rather than making claims about the physical condition 
of the environment (Doolittle, 2015:515).  
 
The research project used two different kinds of qualitative methodologies. 
One strand is portrayed by cultural and historical studies, focusing on reviewing 
written materials and literature to address people’s association with, and 
understanding of, land in Ethiopia. This approach was mainly employed in 
Chapter Five to describe how Ethiopian elites have historically deployed control 
over land to steer the behaviour of the peasantry and manipulated rural villages 
to maintain their existing socio-political structures and power relations. The 
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other strand is aligned with an ethnographic approach of social geography and 
anthropology, featuring informal interviews, focus group discussions and 
extended periods of participant observation. Based on the everyday lives of the 
Ethiopian peasantry, this approach was concerned with various forms of 
present-day power dynamics around CBA projects and competition over rights 
and access to resources. It was primarily employed to meet the objectives of 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight.  
 
In summary, the research project follows a methodology derived from the 
political ecology tradition. It sets out to analyse discursively constructed 
knowledge, the subjective understandings of environmental and livelihoods 
issues and the changes in power dynamics that shape access to resources. It uses 
a range of qualitative methods drawing on historical textual materials and 
ethnographic data.  
 
4.2  Selection of Case Study  
 
The case study approach is a popular strategy in a qualitative research 
design. It seeks to analyse “concrete cases in their temporal and local 
particularity … from people’s expressions and activities in their local contexts” 
(Flick, 2009:21). Whilst providing comprehensive and thorough understanding of 
a specific locality, the approach is often criticised for its dearth of generalisable 
findings. Whilst the critique is correct, the value of the approach is not placed in 
providing a generally applicable theory of CBA governance. It is argued that 
articulation of local contexts in a project framework produces in-depth 
information about the politics of governance through accessing everyday practice 
of project management (Humphries, 2013) and this is what gives it authority and 
validity as knowledge.  
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4.2.1 The Small Grants Programme (SGP) in Ethiopia 
 
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) Small Grants Programme (SGP) is the 
initiative from which the case studies were selected for the thesis. I worked for 
the programme in Ethiopia from September 2010 to August 2011 as a climate 
change programme officer. During the period, I reviewed a number of project 
proposals and participated in the monitoring and evaluation processes of its 
existing projects. The experience and networks I gained were substantially used 
during the fieldwork to assist with access and case study selection. 
 
Established in 1992, SGP has been supporting community-led initiatives that 
aim to combat environmental problems around the world. Through partnerships 
with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based 
organisations (CBOs), SGP has awarded grants to over 14,500 communities in 
over 125 countries worldwide (SGP, 2014). As a typical community-based 
intervention, the programme claims that community ownership of such projects 
is key to achieving a higher level of sustainable livelihoods and creating a 
balance between human needs and environmental protection.  
 
SGP provides financial (up to USD 50,000) and technical support directly to 
local communities during a project period of two years. It aims to assist 
community-level initiatives addressing environmental concerns whilst 
enhancing their well-being and livelihoods. SGP’s main focal areas are climate 
change adaptation, conservation of biodiversity, protection of international 
waters, reduction of the impact of persistent organic pollutants and prevention 
of land degradation (SGP, 2003). The programme is funded by GEF. It is 
implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on behalf 
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of the GEF partnership, and is executed by the United Nations Office for Project 
Services (UNOPS). Over the last 20 years, SGP has invested more than USD 450 
million and leveraged similar levels of co-financing contributed from other 
partners both in cash and in kind (SGP, 2014). SGP’s primary beneficiaries are 
poor communities in developing countries that are highly dependent on access to 
natural resources for their livelihoods. The programme thus often confronts 
challenges in working with communities in order to reconcile environmental 
priorities with local communities’ needs in different ways across the globe, 
depending on their particular economic, cultural, political, historical and 
biophysical conditions (SGP, 2003).  
 
In Ethiopia, SGP has supported almost 200 communities with more than USD 
3 million since 2005. Co-financing contributions from different development 
actors such as international development NGOs, private sector actors and local 
communities have also equalled USD 3 million (SGP Ethiopia, 2014). Common 
practices of SGP Ethiopia are promoting area closure for conservation, 
distributing fuel saving stoves, raising fruit seedlings and constructing hillside 
terraces and check dams (SGP Ethiopia, 2011). Upon receipt of project proposals 
submitted by local communities, a national steering committee (NSC) of SGP 
Ethiopia approves projects and guides the programme implementation. The NSC 
consists of voluntary representatives from NGOs/CBOs, government agencies, 
academic researchers, the private sector and the UNDP Ethiopia office (SGP 
Ethiopia, 2011). At the country level, the programme is managed by a national 
coordinator, who is given strategic directions from the central programme 
management team in New York and is responsible for ensuring the country’s 
projects follow these directions (SGP, 2014). SGP Ethiopia has one national 
coordinator and one project administrator. They are in charge of administrative 
matters and visit the project sites regularly (two to three times during a project 
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period of two years with each visit lasting between two to four hours) for 
monitoring and evaluation. SGP Ethiopia has also developed its own country 
programme strategy (CPS), which provide guidelines for partnerships, 
geographic locations and expected outcomes.  
 
However, there were some unresolved matters revealed during my time 
working for SGP Ethiopia. First, it is not common for the projects to be fully 
autonomous. In theory, SGP encourages the projects to be independently carried 
out. However, due to the regulations of Ethiopia’s national development policy, 
the projects still need to be approved by local government officials. At the same 
time, in order to secure general development assistance from local governments, 
local communities prefer to keep good working relationships with them. Second, 
it is unclear whether the project leaders represent the whole community or 
particular groups of people in the community. Despite the claims made in the 
programme that the majority of community members participate in the projects, 
the actual administrative and implementation processes are often managed by a 
small number of people. During the monitoring and evaluation processes, it was 
frequently found that many community members do not have a clear 
understanding of the concept of community-based development.  
 
I carried out the fieldwork in two of the SGP’s project sites in Ethiopia, one 
completed and one in progress, after initially visiting three sites. This provides 
an opportunity to compare and contrast two case studies through in-depth 
ethnographic research. Contacts for three sites were gained through the SGP 
Ethiopia office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. To avoid any conflict of interest, I 
independently contacted all three sites and made it clear that I was conducting 
research solely for academic reasons. I again emphasised that I was working 
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independently of SGP Ethiopia before and during the interviews and focus group 
discussions.14 
 
4.2.2 Case Studies of SGP Ethiopia 
 
I conducted research into the implementation processes and outcomes of the 
CBA projects in two rural villages of Ethiopia, but working at multiple local 
scales. The research spanned the gott, kebelle and woreda15 levels.  
 
l Case Study 1: Kebelle A in, Woreda X in East Gojjam zone, Amhara 
region (project completed)  
l Case Study 2: Kebelle B in, Woreda Y in Sidama zone, Southern 
Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ (SNNP) region (project in 
progress).  
l Case Study 3: Kebelle C in, Woreda Z in North Gondar zone, Amhara 
region (project in preparation). 
 
At these lower administrative levels, the thesis tries to preserve the 
anonymity of participants by not using names of kebelle or woreda. In-depth 
research was carried out for the first two case studies to compare and contrast 
northern and southern Ethiopia (See Map 7). In addition, I also visited one other 
rural village and conducted interviews and focus groups discussions. This was 
included in the final research, but did not feature as a whole case study (See 
below).  
 
                                                  
14 See more details of positionality in Section 4.5.2. 
15 Kebelle (village) is the lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia and is geographically defined 
under the jurisdiction of a local official. W oreda (district) is composed of neighbouring kebelles and 
have independent legal entities. Gott (termed Kantas in SNNP region) is a sub-kebelle structure with 
an average household of 30 to 60 in Amhara and SNNP regions. See more details in Chapter Six. 
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This section of the chapter focuses on the geographic and demographic 
aspects of the research sites whilst the political, social, historical and cultural 
aspects are discussed in Chapter Three and Five.  
 
 
Map 7. Map of Ethiopia with the project sites (source: SGP Ethiopia, 2011) 
 
Case Study 1: Amhara region is located in the north-western part of the 
Ethiopian highlands. The region is the homeland of the Amhara people and has 
long been recognised for its ecological significance as it has a large inland body 
of water, Lake Tana, which is the headwater of Abbay (‘the Blue Nile’ in Amharic) 
(CSA, 2014). According to the 2007 census, the largest ethnic group in the region 
is the Amhara (91.47%) and more than 80% of the region’s population are 
Orthodox Christians (CSA, 2010). The region is comprised of 11 administrative 
zones (See Map 8). The research was conducted around the watersheds of Choke 
Mountain within the administrative zone of East Gojjam. Kebelle A in Woreda X of 
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East Gojjam zone was selected as a case study for northern Ethiopia whilst the 
watersheds are shared by six woredas of the zone.  
 
The watersheds of Choke Mountain are located at an altitude of 2,800 and 
4,400 metres above sea level. The mountain was formed by volcanic activity 
approximately 30 million years ago (Saha and Shimelis Gebriye Setegn, 2015). 
More than 80% of the watersheds are considered as Dega16 (‘highland’ in 
Amharic) and have a tropical highland monsoon climate with Kiremt (‘the main 
rainy season’ in Amharic) between July and October. The distribution of 
precipitation around the watersheds is far from uniform; a range of annual 
precipitation shows a wide variability from 600 to 2,000 mm in relation to 
topography (Demeku Mesfin, 2013). The annual temperature also ranges from -2 
to 10°C accordingly (CSA, 2010). The watersheds are characterised by steep and 
mountainous terrain and consist of grayish-black soil, known as Vertisols17 
(Dubale, 2001). Though potentially fertile, these are not straightforward soils to 
use for agriculture. 
 
                                                  
16 The highlands are above 1,500 metres above sea level and characterised by a chain of 
mountains and plateaus. 
17 Vertisols, also known as ‘black cotton soils’, is a type of soil which contains high clay 
contents with rich minerals. However, it waterlogs during the rainy seasons and cracks during the 
dry seasons, which make the traditional oxen-drawn plowing difficult (ISRIC, 2016). It thus requires 
proper drainage systems such as terracing or damming. This type of soil is commonly found in the 
central Ethiopian highlands such as Shewa, Gojjam and Wello (Dubale, 2001). 
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Map 8. Elevation of Amhara region (Case study 1 and 3) (source: CSA, 2014) 
 
Kebelle A is located in a rural area of the region and has a recorded population 
of 7,253 (CSA, 2007). According to the 2005 census, 68.4% of women and 91.7% 
of men are engaged in agriculture, accounting for about two-thirds of the 
region’s GDP (CSA, 2006). The major agricultural products produced in the 
region are teff, barley, wheat, sorghum, potato and beans. Logging is also one of 
important livelihood activities, and the popular types of tree are fast-growing 
evergreen species such as highland bamboo and eucalyptus. The region however 
has the lower GDP per capita18 than the country’s, and more than 90% of its 
rural population still earn less than USD 1 per day (USAID, 2006).  
                                                  
18 According to the 2003/2004 census, the annual GDP per capita of Amhara region was USD 88 
whilst Ethiopia’s was USD 112.7 (USAID, 2006). 
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Case Study 2: Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ (SNNP) region is 
located in the south-western part of Ethiopia. The region is the homeland of 45 
indigenous ethnic groups and has been recognised for cash crop farming as it 
produces almost half of the Ethiopia’s khat, tea and coffee (CSA, 2010). According 
to the 2007 census, the largest ethnic group in the region is the Sidama (19.38%) 
followed by the Welayta (10.59%), and more than half of the region’s population 
are Protestants whilst both Orthodox Christians and Muslims account for less 
than 20% each (CSA, 2010). The region is comprised of 14 administrative zones 
(Awasa Special, Bench Maji, Dawro, Gamo Gofa, Gedeo, Gurage, Hadiya, Keffa, 
Kembata Tembaro, Sheka, Sidama, Silti, South Omo and Wolayita) and 8 special 
woredas (Alaba, Amaro, Basketo, Burji, Dirashe, Konso, Konta and Yem). The 
research was conducted around kebelle B in woreda Y of Sidama zone for a case 
study in southern Ethiopia. 
 
Sidama zone is located at an altitude of 1,500 and 2,500 metres above sea 
level. Almost 60% of the zone is considered as Kolla (‘lowland’- below 1830 
metres in elevation - in Amharic) or Woina dega (‘midland’ - between 1830 and 
2440 metres in elevation - in Amharic) (USAID, 2006). Belg (‘the short rainy 
season’ in Amharic), also known as Gu in the lowlands of Ethiopia, is between 
February and April, followed by Kiremt, the main rainy season, between June and 
September. The zone has a variety of tropical climate conditions depending on 
topographic gradients; annual precipitation varies from 800 to 2,000 mm with a 
range of 18 to 30°C in annual temperature (CSA, 2010).  
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Map 9. Population density of SNNP region (Case study 2) (source: CSA, 2014) 
 
Kebelle B is located in a rural area of the region and has a recorded population 
of 155,265 (CSA, 2010). The area is relatively densely populated compared to 
other parts of the region (See Map 9). According to the 2007 census, almost 90% 
of people are Sidama, and about 85% of the population are Protestants in the 
region (CSA, 2010). In 2008/2009, 73% of the region’s GDP and 90% of the 
region’s employment were based on agriculture, producing enset (false banana), 
wheat, barley, oil seeds, maize, sugar cane and coffee (SIEP, 2011). In particular, 
more than 40% of the country’s coffee is produced in the Sidama zone.  
 
Case Study 3: Between the two periods of in-depth research, I conducted a 
short period of research around the watersheds of Simien Mountains in North 
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Gondar zone, Amhara region, to explore the possibility of using the village for a 
third piece of in-depth research. Kebelle C in woreda Z of the zone was in 
preparation for the CBA project funded by SGP. The socio-ecological 
environment of the area is similar to the first research site. However, I decided 
not to conduct in-depth research for this village. This was because the research 
site did not have any accommodation available for visitors. Public transport was 
unreliable and accessing the village on foot generally takes six to eight hours. It 
would also have meant spending less time at the other sites. However, it has 
been included here partially for completeness and partially because it has added 
to my overall understanding of the context. 
 
First, I organised four focus group discussions in Kebelle C with women at 
various age groups. Although all discussions quickly turned into a collection of 
complaints that there are difficulties in collecting firewood as their villages are 
within the boundary of Simien Mountains National Park, it turned out be an 
opportunity to understand women’s roles in livelihoods and dangers they are 
exposed on an everyday basis. This in part shaped my views on the women’s 
empowerment and participation in meetings discussed in Chapter Seven. Second, 
four interviews with community leaders helped understand the behaviour of 
people in ‘aid-addicted’ villages. They mostly came up with, often short, ready-
made answers and explicitly asked for compensation in cash. This experience 
provided me a chance to rethink about the role of development aid in relation to 
community-based approaches.  
 
The villages were selected by SGP because they fulfilled the standard 
discursive account of environmental problems in rural Ethiopia, which focuses 
on deforestation and subsequent soil erosion. In this account, the main cause of 
deforestation is the intensive logging carried out by local people in order to both 
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feed their cattle and expand farmland after the grain and potato harvests were 
substantially reduced following inadequate rainfall over the last decade. In 
addition, in southern Ethiopia, this dominant discourse additionally draws 
attention to the decline of arable land per capita due to population increases, 
which was also making the situation worse. The starting point for this thesis is 
not that the ‘facts’ of this discourse are ‘untrue’, but that they are narrow in the 
geographical limits they draw around these causal explanations and that such a 
narrowing is not coincidental, but reflects elite interests in the way ideas are 
produced.  
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4.3  Fieldwork Timetable  
 
First, I began with semi-structured interviews with the national coordinator 
of SGP Ethiopia and the project administrator in Addis Ababa (whom I worked 
with between 2010 and 2011 before starting the PhD study). These interviews 
were also used as occasions for collating relevant project reports for the case 
studies. An initial four-month period of research was then spent in Kebelle A in 
northern Ethiopia between September and December 2013, which implemented 
the CBA project between July 2010 and June 2012. It was followed by a one-
month period of research in Kebelle C, which started its CBA project in July 2014. 
The last three months of research was spent in Kebelle B in Southern Nations, 
Nationalities, and Peoples’ (SNNP) region between April and June 2014. The 
project was ongoing at the time of visit, and was expected to be completed by 
December 2014. Table 1 shows the overview of data collection.  
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 Interviews 
Focus Group 
Discussions 
Participant 
Observation 
Case Study 1 
Kebelle A 
in Woreda X 
(Project completed) 
September - December 
2013 
42 interviews 
(30 males  
and 12 females) 
(29 adults  
and 13 young adults) 
2 focus group 
discussions 
(6 and 17 
participants) 
Daily visit to the 
village, Road 
construction 
sites, Kebelle 
and CBO offices, 
Church services 
Case Study 2 
Kebelle B 
in Woreda Y 
(Project in progress) 
April - June 2014 
21 interviews 
(11 males  
and 10 females) 
(13 adults  
and 8 young adults) 
1 focus group 
discussion 
(13 participants) 
Daily visit to the 
village, Kebelle 
and CBO offices, 
Church services 
Case Study 3 
Kebelle C 
in Woreda Z 
(Project in preparation) 
February 2014 
4 interviews 
(3 males and 1 female) 
(4 adults) 
4 focus group 
discussions 
(6, 10, 10 and 4 
participants) 
 
Others 
SGP Ethiopia national 
coordinator, SGP 
Ethiopia project 
administrator, and 
4 NGO workers  
(3 in Ethiopia  
and 1 in Tanzania) 
  
Total 
67 local interviews 
(44 males  
and 23 females) 
(46 adults  
and 21 young adults), 
6 key informants  
(SGP coordinators  
and NGO workers) 
7 focus group 
discussions 
 
Table 1: Data collection overview (Adults: age 30+ / Young adults: age 29-) 
 
4.4  Research Methods   
 
Multiple methods were employed during the fieldwork in Ethiopia: semi-
structured interviews, focus group discussions and the collection of project 
documents, mostly written in Amharic, along with participant observation. I was 
greatly assisted in this by two research assistants, Yared Gebremedhin (in 
Amhara region) and Tesfaye Teshome (in Sidama zone), who worked as 
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interpreters and also helped me to translate documents into English. When the 
dialogue was in Amharic or English I generally led the process. When the 
language used was Sidamo or the dialogue in Amharic was advanced, the 
assistant intervened. We worked closely throughout the period of primary 
fieldwork and in the process of transcribing and translating the recorded 
interviews and discussions. In particular, the translation process required 
triangulation. I cross-checked the translated words and sentences between the 
two assistants and every so often consulted two professors19 at Addis Ababa 
University for linguistic queries that were not clearly answered. 
 
4.4.1 Focus Group Discussions 
 
Focus group discussions were used to investigate themes of study at the 
village level at the beginning of each research period. The discussions proved to 
be an appropriate method to explore local people’s livelihood problems and 
shared knowledge of socio-ecological systems around the villages (Bloor et al., 
2002; Hoggart et al., 2002). The method was employed to provide a social space 
to examine the articulation of generally assumed norms and values (Bloor et al., 
2002). Focus group discussions followed a semi-structured format with a pre-
prepared list of topics of interest. In particular, the method was used as an 
opportunity to ask about commonly shared understandings of biophysical 
environmental change of the village such as soil erosion and deforestation. The 
discussion allowed any ideas to be discussed as they emerged but used the list of 
topics to keep the discussion relevant to the research. The participants could 
discuss freely among themselves and my role was to facilitate and induce a wide 
range of people to express different opinions.  
                                                  
19 Prof Shiferaw Bekele, Department of History and Prof Dereje Feyissa Dori, the College of Law 
and Governance. 
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Figure 4. A focus group discussion (Case study 1) in northern Ethiopia 
 
Focus group (see Figure 4) discussions were also used to address intra-group 
heterogeneity and homogeneity not only in terms of knowledge (e.g. 
understandings of climate change), but also in the context of inter-group power 
relations (e.g. Men and women, adults and young adults). The notions of 
comparison I employed were ‘who comes’, ‘who speaks’ and ‘who gets 
attention’. I also asked all participants to introduce themselves, before starting 
the discussion, with their name, age, gott, and position, if any.  
 
Focus group discussions were mostly held in a public space such as the 
kebelle and CBO office. It was a deliberate decision as people live scattered over 
the hills and the location of the offices are usually located at the geographic 
centre of the kebelle. As a result, the local government officers and leaders were 
around, which was unavoidable. The male participants in Kebelle A in northern 
Ethiopia were more open and vocal than those in Kebelle B in southern Ethiopia. 
  140
Meanwhile, women and young adults were more engaged in the discussions in 
the south than the north. In all locations, however, the participants would not 
criticise the government, the CBA project or CBOs during the discussions. This 
issue of speech will be further discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
The participants were mostly recruited through the CBOs and the discussions 
were held before the CBO’s regular meetings. It was inevitable due to difficulties 
in calling people living scattered over the hills and are mostly busy in the 
daytime, but practical as the discussions turned out to be a good opportunity for 
me to observe the internal dynamics of the CBO not only during the discussions 
but also during the CBO meetings where invited. A consent form was not used as 
most participants were illiterate, but I introduced the purpose of the research 
project verbally in detail, spending a half an hour at least with answering all 
questions the participants came up with.  
 
4.4.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Interviews were the primary source of data. The method has proven to be 
well-suited to political ecology approaches as it is based on dialogic encounters 
between researcher and interviewee (Dove, 2005). The process of dialogue does 
not gain validity from replicability, generalisability and uniformity, but 
facilitates intellectually challenging forms of data collection through the way in 
which it situates individual cases in a broad social context (Burawoy, 1998). The 
method was employed to address interviewees’ thought, knowledge of that 
surrounding environment, aspirations in livelihoods and participation in the CBA 
projects. Dialogue was central to the co-production of information between 
researcher and interviewee, which seeks to understand the links among the 
  141 
specificity of individual cases, the broader levels of social structure and the 
embedded power dynamics.  
 
A wide range of participants were interviewed so as to account for the 
multiplicity of the CBA projects and the complexity of livelihoods in rural 
Ethiopia. This allowed the research to cover a variety of topics and to compile 
diverse accounts of socio-political structures of the villages, providing insights 
into the understanding of social forces, local agencies and indigenous knowledge 
(Watts and Peet, 2004). First, for peasant farmers, both stratified and snowball 
sampling strategies were employed. I recruited the interviewees through the 
process of living in and near the villages where I conducted the research. I aimed 
to randomly find one interview in the morning and one in the afternoon whilst 
wandering around the villages with a research assistant. Meanwhile, I sought to 
have interviews with women, young adults, the landless and non-members of 
CBO. One important criterion was to have at least one interviewee from each gott 
in the kebelle to make sure all gotts were equally represented. This goal was 
physically challenging since a number of gotts were located far apart from each 
other, requiring us to hike over the hills for two to three hours each way. At a 
later stage, a snowball technique was used to interview more women and young 
adults. My aims were to recruit from social groups that are less well represented 
at the kebelle level. Such attempts were made through those who had already 
been interviewed so that I could ask them to introduce their wives and friends. 
However, this did not yield good results. If they missed the specific appointment 
made there was no easy opportunity to see them again. Second, for key 
informants, community leaders and government officials, purposive sampling 
was employed. I actively contacted them and arranged an interview with a 
specific time and place. They were generally pleased to participate in the 
interviews and interested in the research. 
  142 
 
< Research Diary 1> 
There is no accommodation available for visitors in the village, and I am staying in 
a neighbouring village, renting a room attached to a restaurant. This neighbouring 
village is located next to the main road between Debre Markos, the metropolis of East 
Gojjam zone, and the capital of Woreda X… Yesterday it took more than two hours to 
reach the boundary of the research site and at least another hour to find possible 
interviewees by foot as people live scattered over the hills. Maybe by the time I finish 
the fieldwork I will be able to hike up to the village in an hour like those ‘fast boys’ 
who commute from the village to the main road for the local market on every Tuesday 
and Friday. [12 Sep 2013] 
 
I also actively participated in village social events, whenever invited, such as 
meetings, church services, communal works, funerals and celebrations. In 
particular, the road construction site was a place to recruit a diverse range of 
interviewees and had a few members from every gott. I usually waited for the 
break time and asked each group of people if there is anyone who would 
participate in an interview. Despite being 10 to 20 metres away from the work 
site and out of hearing range of the others, some interviewees looked 
uncomfortable and avoided politically sensitive questions such issues of land 
redistribution and corruption. 
 
Most interviewees preferred their houses or yards as an interview site. 
However, interviews were also carried out at the road construction sites, the 
kebelle offices, hillocks, or just on the roadside on some occasions. One of the 
challenges I faced in doing the interviews outside was to keep other people away. 
In particular, interviewees’ family members and neighbouring children were 
often curious about the process and wanted to sit close to us. For example, when 
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asked “Shall we ask him to go away?”, a female farmer answers, “No, he is my 
husband and he wants to join us” (Interview DG-15). 
 
Interviews were an appropriate research method as they provided 
opportunities to ask participants probing questions about particular topics and 
areas of concern and to expand on their lines of thought and reasoning (Smith, 
2001). Through this method, I gained in-depth understandings of different 
events around the local villages and of the ways in which interviewees made 
sense of, and narrated, them. In the context of CBA, the method was an 
important tool enabling me to capture the ways community members talk about 
their own experiences of the SGP. Overall I conducted 73 semi-structured 
interviews with community leaders, peasant farmers, government officials and 
SGP management personnel (See Appendix 1 for the list of interviewees and 
Appendix 2 for the interview schedule used during the field research). 
 
All interviews were semi-structured, using a topic-guide made with themes 
of interest that arose from focus group discussions. Attention was paid to ensure 
that the interviews remained semi-structured, allowing new ideas and subjects 
to be considered as they emerged. Through practice and reflection, I also 
improved my interview skills to avoid asking overly complex questions and to 
phase in and out topics in accordance with levels of knowledge and the moods of 
interviewees (Smith, 1995). For instance, when asked “Please tell us how you 
participated in the project?”, one female farmer answered, “I participated in 
everything with my husband. He knows better than me. Please ask him” 
(Interview DG-03). Then, I changed the topic, “By the way, I saw that you have 
an energy saving stove. Are you happy with it?” Meanwhile, Amharic speakers 
frequently use ‘injah’ or ‘ahlahwekoom’ (both ‘I don’t know’ in Amharic) as the 
filler of choice before speaking. This was disregarded. For instance, when asked 
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‘Why wouldn’t you go to the kebelle meeting without your husband?”, she 
answers, “I don’t know. It is our culture” (DG-03).  
 
4.4.3 Participant Observation  
 
Interviews were supplemented by participant observation during the 
fieldwork. Participant observation is the process of describing the events, 
behaviours and artefacts of people in social settings through observation and 
participation (Marshall and Rossman, 1989). The strength of participant 
observation is that a researcher becomes the instrument for data collection and 
analysis through his/her own experience.  
 
<Research Diary 2> 
There is a tendency for young adults to have interviews inside their house whereas 
elders and those who have social and political positions preferred public spaces such as 
kebelle offices and road construction sites. After the interviews, we have been almost 
always invited for coffee or lunch depending on time of day if the interview took place 
nearby their houses… Most of young adults seemed to ask us to come into the house for 
coffee in a natural manner before the interview started whereas elders and leaders did 
so afterwards. They all in general looked more secure and freely spoke their opinions 
at home though… Women hardly invited us to their home unless there were their 
husbands or male family members. However, a number of women seemed confident 
and candidly expressed their views as long as there is no other men close by. The 
female interviewees at the road construction sites looked uncomfortable, daunted and 
hurried up the interviews. [2 Oct 2013]  
 
During the fieldwork, participant observation was first employed to prepare 
for the research, to build rapport with local people and to situate the data 
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collected through interviews and focus group discussions (Emerson et al., 1995). 
In other words, it provided the foundational context for the development of 
sampling and interview guidelines in the fieldwork sites (Bernard, 2006). Then, 
second, participant observation was used to draw out the general geometry of 
power dynamics around the villages through observing and participating in its 
everyday activities. This is because socio-political relations between individuals, 
groups and communities are often obscure until researchers spend time in 
building informal relationships with local people (Marshall and Rossman, 1989). 
Through the process I identified socially marginalised individuals and groups 
who tend to be more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Various social, 
cultural and historical components that determine inclusion and exclusion of 
community and vulnerability of specific groups were also interrogated. 
 
During the fieldwork, I made regular visits to the project sites, CBO offices, 
government (kebelle and woreda) offices and community centres. I also 
participated in the monthly kebelle meetings, weekly gott meetings and various 
social events of the villages (e.g. church services, communal road construction 
work, funerals, celebrations, etc.) whenever invited. In particular, through 
keeping a research diary, I recorded my observations of, first, people’s feelings 
and behaviour when talking about land issues, and second, people’s behaviour 
when government officers and community leaders are around compared to when 
they are alone or with close family and friends.  
 
4.4.4 Collection of Written Materials 
  
Documents for further understanding of SGP Ethiopia, CBA projects and 
underlying policies were collected during the fieldwork. They are from Addis 
Ababa University, the Forum for Environment Ethiopia, Forum for Social Studies 
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Ethiopia, local government offices of kebelles, woredas and zones, local CBO 
offices and the SGP Ethiopia office in Addis Ababa. These documents were used 
to help design the research process, to formulate the interview questions and to 
understand the social, biophysical and political backgrounds of the research 
sites. In particular, the documents collected from the local CBO offices were used 
to draw a picture of the process of the projects and the context in which the 
projects are emerged.  
 
4.4.5 Data Analysis 
 
After the field research, I developed a coding frame to enable data entry and 
coded all data systematically. Once all data had been coded, I created a database 
in NVivo qualitative data analysis software. During the process, the coding frame 
was continuously refined, starting from the themes emerged in the course of 
data collection, and updated in the NVivo software accordingly. Throughout the 
data analysis, I used descriptive statistics so that the research could be 
understood by a wider audience and focused on the analysis of how power and 
politics in a community shape its adaptive capacity to climate change through 
CBA projects.  
 
4.5  Limitations and Ethical Considerations  
 
4.5.1 Language 
 
One of the practical challenges for the research was that my Amharic was 
only fluent enough to carry out the first half of an interview. Amharic is an 
official and widely spoken language of Ethiopia but there are more than 80 other 
local languages in the country. The village in southern Ethiopia in which I 
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carried out fieldwork included residents who speak Sidamo as their mother 
tongue. Even so most of the people in the village were able to speak Amharic 
fluently. I spent the first four weeks of the fieldwork refreshing and improving 
my Amharic in Addis Ababa having learnt the language with a personal tutor 
during my employment in Ethiopia in 2011 and at the language centre at SOAS in 
2012. The two research assistants mentioned in the previous section acted as 
interpreters when the dialogue in interviews and focus group discussions became 
too advanced for me, particularly in the second half of the interview which 
includes questions about social hierarchies and power dynamics of the villages 
which to capture fully required linguistic clarity and subtlety.  
 
Learning to speak Amharic was a critical component of the research. First, it 
made the recruitment of research participants less challenging as they found 
that they could directly communicate with me, not through a Habesha20 from 
the capital city (i.e. research assistants). Second, it was helpful on occasion in 
creating a pleasant and comfortable environment for interviews, reducing the 
level of artificiality. I also discovered that it created opportunities for some 
participants to feel as if they are teaching the researcher the language. Last, 
being able to conduct interviews in one language reduced the time taken to cover 
issues which is significant given most participants were busy working in the 
daytime.  
 
4.5.2 Positionality 
 
Qualitative research approaches involve social encounters which take place 
within the influence of social processes and relationships (Berg, 2009). Hence 
                                                  
20 The Habesha people, also known as Abyssinians, are a population inhabiting in the Ethiopian 
and Eritrean Highlands. 
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the information collected from interviews and focus group discussions should be 
considered as an artefact of discourse, social norms and values, aspirations of 
participants, and their perception of the research’s intentions (Briggs, 1986). 
Conversely speaking, there is no such thing as value neutral, or politically 
neutral research (Hammersley, 1995). The situation of data collection takes place 
in the context of dialogue were both researcher and participant have vested 
interests, agendas and subjective understandings of those agendas (Kitchin and 
Tate, 2000). 
 
The positionality and subjectivity of participants was also acknowledged. 
Leaders of local communities who have direct stakes in the CBA project were 
likely to narrate its process and activities in positive terms. The awareness of 
this fact helped the research to include counter-narratives and explore the 
subjective and socially-embedded perspectives of actors involved in, if not 
influenced by, the project. The views presented by participants were not taken as 
facts of the project, but rather collated as an account of their dispositions and 
participation. Including other voices with different opinions, such as from 
women and young adults, was critical in balancing out vested interests. 
 
The positionality of myself as a researcher also needs to be accounted for. 
Just as those who participated in the research are influenced by social, cultural 
and historical contexts, my approach (to the research), roles (in the research) 
and relationships (with participants) were also affected by my cultural 
background, socio-economic status, race, gender and age (Howard, 1994). This 
particularly placed constraints on me in relation to my race (e.g. repeatedly 
being told that I was the first ‘foreigner’ visiting Kebelle A since the Second 
World War) (Belachew Gebrewold, 2009), and my status as an outsider and non-
native Amharic speaker. However, as time went by, these conditions encouraged 
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participants to feel as if they are bona fide informants and to create 
opportunities for them to get matters ‘off their chest’. They accepted my status 
as an outsider, academic researcher in search of knowledge, which would only be 
used “to improve the current concepts of the project for other villages in 
Ethiopia” (Interview DG-39). 
 
In addition, my previous work experience with SGP Ethiopia was another 
issue to consider. Having a connection with the villages through the SGP 
Ethiopia office where I previously worked opened many doors for me and 
granted me access, which for others might not have so easily been gained. 
However, being in this position meant participants including local government 
officers could tailor their answers and behaviour in order not to disappoint SGP 
Ethiopia and its national coordinator in the belief that I would report back to 
him. In order to prevent this, only the officers at the zonal level of government 
were informed of my previous employment with SGP Ethiopia, and it was made 
clear to them by the SGP national coordinator that the research is for academic 
purposes only. Below the zonal levels, I was introduced as an academic 
researcher from University College London and, more recognisably, Addis Ababa 
University, where I was attached as a visiting researcher. I also carefully chose 
those zones which I never visited during my time working for SGP Ethiopia.  
 
4.5.3 Sensitive Issues  
 
In discussing sensitive issues, the research approach was cautious and 
attentive. I tried to create a space for participants to disclose hidden or detailed 
accounts of what happened in the villages and the CBA projects, in particular I 
tried to draw out their opinions on issues of power dynamics and corruption. In 
most cases interviews thus took place in the houses or yards of interviewees 
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(whilst feeding fleas my kimchi-flavoured blood), to help them feel comfortable 
and secure. I was careful not to press interviewees to provide more information 
than they were happy to give and changed the subject if they appeared 
uncomfortable with a particular line of questioning.  
 
4.5.4 Ethics 
 
The most basic ethical principle observed during the fieldwork was that any 
people participating in the research should be treated just as a researcher would 
like others to treat him (CAAG, 2009). This project was undertaken in accordance 
with the UCL Research Ethics Committee guidelines and advice following an 
application made to them and subsequent revisions to the plan made at their 
request. Academic research in the past has been criticised for the exploitation of 
participants (Chambers, 1997). I tried to address this issue by instilling an aspect 
of reciprocity into the research. I thus compensated participants for their time 
with a portrait photograph of them, rather than cash, that I took after the 
interview exploiting my photography skills and printing photos in the towns 
nearby. For most of them, it was the first time to have a printed photograph of 
themselves and was welcomed. 
 
As is common practice, all interviewees were informed of the nature of the 
research and the end uses of the information given. They also gave verbal formal 
consent to participate and were given the opportunity to decline to take part. All 
interviews and focus group discussions were recorded on a digital recorder. In all 
cases, verbal permission was obtained for the recording, and the recorder was 
used openly. A consent form was not used as many people in rural Ethiopia are 
illiterate, and the use of forms is both uncommon and closely associated with 
government bureaucracy. Using a written form could have intimidated many 
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participants, and it was more culturally sensitive to obtain consent through an 
explanation and discussion before the interview.  
 
All participants were granted anonymity to ensure that they cannot be 
identified. In line with UK data protection law all data was treated with 
sensitivity and confidentiality, stored securely and never shared with any third 
parties. The names of participants were removed wherever this is not critical to 
the narrative or context.  
 
<Research Diary 3> 
164, 165, 166, 167… 168. One sunny mid-morning at the end of 2013, the research 
assistant and I were counting a number of flea bites on my body on the top of the hill 
in the Ethiopian highlands. I was half-naked and felt I had lost five kilograms at least 
over the last two months. Three ladies, probably in their 40s and 50s, were passing by 
and talking to me, “Oh, Jin-ho, bettam yqrta. Egziabher yibarkih [‘Oh, Jin-ho, so 
sorry, may God bless you’ in Amharic]”, whilst I was shaking off fleas from my clothes. 
However, I felt generally much healthier than at the outset of the fieldwork apart from 
these terrible itchy bites… The reason I have so many fleabites is that many interviews 
took place at the interviewee’s house. In northern Ethiopia, farmers traditionally 
house their livestock at night throughout a year to protect them from erratic weather 
conditions, wild predators and theft. It is thus quite normal to have a flea infestation 
at the homestead. But we could not figure out why I was particularly targeted by them 
apart from being ‘yawch mgb’ (‘foreign food’ in Amharic). [17 Dec 2013] 
 
The thesis now moves on to the empirical chapters. The four empirical 
chapters that follow address four different factors that affect the adaptive 
capacity of the case study communities. They provide different ways of thinking 
about politics in a community that contribute to an overall explanation of 
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why projects succeed or fail in delivering the goals of CBA, that is, improving 
adaptive capacity. Chapter Five argues that the political legacies of 
Ethiopian history are an important factor affecting adaptive capacity because 
they produce a specific form of political culture (authoritarian governmentality). 
Chapter Six argues that questions of scale and indigenous knowledge are an 
important factor because they shape the character of what constitutes a 
'community' in 21st century Ethiopia. Chapter Seven focuses on the internal 
differentiation of the case study communities and the way different groups make 
decisions and allocate resources as a means of determining the goal of increasing 
adaptive capacity. Finally, Chapter Eight draws attention to the invisible politics 
of community leadership that is founded upon the historical neopatrimonial 
relationship that shapes the process through which adaptive capacity is built. 
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Chapter Five. Governmentality, Land and the Political Legacies of 
History 
 
The thesis argues that there are profound problems with the application of 
Community-Based Adaptation (CBA) in 21st century Ethiopia. The chapter focuses 
on one of these problems that CBA easily makes assumptions about a broad level 
of equality in a society. This chapter argues that a considerable number of rural 
communities in Ethiopia have never been internally equal or democratic but 
instead have consistently been strongly hierarchical and internally divided in 
terms of rights and resources. In particular, it argues that over a period of two 
millennia (including periods of Imperial-Colonial expansion, Marxism-Leninism 
and neoliberalism) peasant farmers have not merely tolerated this inequality, 
because they have no choice, but have given their consent and support to 
strongly hierarchical structures, which have often connected villages to a distant 
central government. The belief that such inequality is both right and unchanging 
is a legacy of history and it is this history that the chapter seeks to spell out in 
order to show why it is so hard to apply some of the assumptions of CBA to some 
communities in Ethiopia. 
 
Politics and history matter in determining power dynamics of locality. Local 
power dynamics are shaped by “historical legacies of state formation and 
patterns of state-society relations” (Menocal, 2015:1). This chapter will show 
that how the central elites of Ethiopia have deployed control over land to shape 
the behaviour of the people, particularly the peasantry. It argues that although 
this manipulation of land was an intentional plan by the elites to serve their own 
interest, it was also a strategy to receive people’s willing consent, a strategy 
based on cultural understanding. For this reason, the chapter analyses the long 
history of land tenure and related land issues in Ethiopia - partly through the 
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lens of authoritarian governmentality discussed in Chapter Two. This analysis 
demonstrates how ideas from Imperial and two post-revolution regimes have all 
tried to devise the voluntary participation of the peasantry in land management 
that best suit the elite ruling class. 
 
The Ethiopian government has historically used natural resource 
management as a tool to control its citizens. In particular, this approach has 
been prevalent in the land tenure system without being substantially challenged 
by the citizens. This chapter provides an outline of the ways the land tenure 
system in Ethiopia has been established, promoted and maintained whilst 
drawing a comparison between northern and southern Ethiopia. In so doing, it 
shows that the land tenure system in Ethiopia have not significantly changed 
despite the successive changes of land policy and political ideologies. Rather, the 
system has been strictly controlled by government so as to undermine people’s 
land security with the net effect of increasing inequality of the society. This 
approach has reinforced the existing structures of the society to such an extent 
that those bottom-up development practices have become incompatible, 
particular at the ‘community’ level.  
 
The chapter considers how the land tenure system has been a central 
organising feature of Ethiopian governmentality in line with contemporary 
discourses of progress over the past two hundred years. It argues that how 
governmentality functions in a country where most of the population depend on 
agriculture for their livelihoods should be analysed through land tenure and 
related land issues. Through this discussion, we will have a better understanding 
of how elites steer the behaviour of the peasantry. This practical understanding 
of how power works in Ethiopia helps explain the rationales behind the 
introduction of CBA in the country before the thesis proceeds to the case studies. 
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This chapter is largely based on secondary literature, but it also builds on the 
field experience and my observations of the significance of land tenure as key to 
government in Ethiopia. It gathers together a range of Ethiopian and non-
Ethiopian sources, synthesising the views of the authors. In that sense, the 
distinctive features of the analysis lie in the combination of the concept of 
(authoritarian) governmentality and land management through an analysis of 
the historic (neo)patrimonial systems of Ethiopia as well as narrative accounts of 
relevant events. 
 
What we consider here as modern Ethiopia is more-or-less a product of the 
past two hundred years. The analysis shows the extent to which regimes’ desire 
to stay in power has influenced domestic land policies and draws attention to the 
consistencies between models of land management over the years. Such models 
provide the basis of long-established governmental views about the relationship 
between government and citizens in Ethiopia and about ways of the government 
to shape its environment in the quest for ‘development’. Borrowing from the 
works of governmentality of Foucault and his adherents, this chapter argues that 
the land tenure system and related policies in Ethiopia have been established, 
promoted and maintained as a form of governmentality whilst its citizens have, 
out of their own volition, acquiesced to such a process. The effectiveness of this 
authoritarian governmentality has been enhanced by the administrative 
structures of the society that insulate the neopatrimonial systems and reinforce 
the patterns of political and economic control of its territory.  
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5.1  History of Land Tenure and Related Land Issues in Ethiopia  
 
After the nearly two-millennia-long absolute monarchy, the Derg regime, in 
its very first year, announced the nationalisation of all banks and major 
industries. The following year, 1975, the regime implemented radical land 
reform: all land and natural resources were nationalised; people cultivating the 
land were only given usufruct rights; holding more than 40 timad (4 timad is 
approximately 1 hectare) was outlawed; state farms were established; 
agricultural production quotas were imposed; and leasing, borrowing and 
mortgaging land were prohibited (Clapham, 1990; Pausewang, 1990). To a 
certain extent, the reform was successful in eliminating large holdings, absentee 
landlordism and landlessness through redistributing land within peasant 
communities (Hoben, 1995). In most agricultural areas, however, it did not solve 
the fundamental problem of land shortage. Despite banning large private farms, 
the average size of holdings continued to dwindle in order to accommodate new 
claimants and often ended up being less than 4 timad (Interview DG-24; 27; 28). 
As one farmer explains, “Previously I had big land, but the government took the 
land and redistributed for everyone. Now I have 4 timad of land, ploughing 3 
timad and grazing 1 timad… I have four sons and two daughters. I don’t know 
how to split the land when they get married” (DG-27). Moreover, the question of 
land ownership prevented farmers from investing in land as the nationalisation 
frequently expropriated land for the regime’s initiatives: the Ministry of 
Education forcibly evicted approximately 80,000 households for school buildings 
(in order to then disseminate the regime’s propaganda via school curricula); the 
Ministry of Coffee and Tea forcibly evicted over 15,000 households for state 
farms (to increase the country’s revenue); and 29,000 households for the state 
farms’ water supply (Dessalegn Rahmato, 2009).  
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In the nearly half century that has followed, land management has been a 
focus of extensive government policy in Ethiopia despite the regime change. This 
section considers how the land tenure system has been a central organising 
feature of Ethiopian governmentality. 
 
5.1.1 Pre-Revolution Era 
 
“Power and authority in traditional Ethiopia was in part based on myth 
and custom, and in part on land and access to land” 
(Keller, 1988:46) 
 
In 1622, the Portuguese missionary Manuel de Almeida was appointed as an 
ambassador to the Ethiopian Empire. During his term of office, Almeida travelled 
extensively within the Empire and built a number of churches and monasteries 
including those on the small islands of Lake Tana. In addition, he left a few 
penetrating insights into Ethiopian society, in particular in his assessment of the 
power base of the Ethiopian kings. Almeida wrote, “What chiefly makes this 
King great is that he is lord in solidum of all lands, …so that he can chop, 
change, and take… the lands any man has and bestow them on another…”. 
Whilst arguing for the tenure insecurity that this system might cause by saying, 
“One plows, another sows, and a third reaps”, the Portuguese missionary 
confessed that “it [the tenure system] made all people, great and small, so 
dependent upon him (the king), …some from fear that the lands he has given 
them may be taken away, others in the hope of getting those they have not” 
(Beckingham and Huntingford, 1954:88-89 in Teferi Abate, 2015:3). Even though 
the condition could be over-exaggerated and did not reflect the household and 
community levels, Almeida’s observations about power, fear, land and 
centralised control remain broadly recognisable in present-day Ethiopia.  
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As one of the oldest states in Africa that continues into the present, the 
imperial system of Ethiopia stretches back nearly two millennia, lasting until its 
overthrow by the Derg in 1974. During the imperial era, a rigorous hierarchy was 
built in Ethiopian society by the country’s feudal system placing those with 
authority at the top and those without at the bottom. This hierarchy was 
augmented through “an ingrained public acceptance of the inequalities” 
(Hammond, 2011:418).  
 
This manifestation was only possible because, first, there was a belief in 
northern Ethiopia that authority is a good thing (Levine, 1965). According to 
Amhara mythology, the king, the church and the nobility were considered as 
critical in ensuring the good life of its subjects (Keller, 1988). In other words, the 
tradition regarded authority and faith as indispensable for the well-being of 
society and worthy of constant obedience. Authority figures, from an Emperor to 
a peasant household head, were obeyed, respected and praised for their power 
and achievements through various codes of etiquette (Hoben, 1972). In return, 
the king was responsible for providing security (protection from criminality and 
enemies) and keeping the social order, the church for the spiritual welfare, and 
the nobility for the fertility of the land.  
 
Second, there was no automatically hereditary political position. Unlike their 
European counterparts, there was no differentiation between farmers and 
regional lords in breed or blood, rather it was often claimed that they were all 
descendent kinships from a common ancestor (Hoben, 1972). Yet none of what 
individuals achieved, including the prerogative to land, social status and 
honourable title, were considered as inheritable to the next generation. Children 
of a late authority needed to compete with other individuals although there was a 
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certain level of benefit from their initial ‘class’ position. Thus, whilst in practice 
the sons of the elite were themselves often also elites, the political idea 
emphasised that this was not necessary or inevitable. This custom was partly 
based on the relatively low degree of distinction of backgrounds between 
regional lords, authorities and farmers, and partly from the patron-client 
relationship in northern Ethiopia that works as a shifting contract. From the 
subordinate’s view, the stability of the relationship depended on securing their 
self-interest (such as economic benefit or personal security). In this context, the 
primary concern of authorities at each level of the patrimonial hierarchy was to 
keep themselves in power continuously. This was somewhat better achieved 
through loyalty to superiors, public speaking skills or prowess in battle, rather 
than accumulating wealth through extensive commercial farming or lucrative 
agricultural trade (Henze, 2000). This trend implied the preference of political 
benefits to economic gains even in land administration.  
 
The political legacy in northern Ethiopia of not only acquiescence to strong 
leaders on the basis of a belief in the benefits of authority but also a commitment 
to the idea of accessing authority by merit rather than by hereditary transfers of 
authority is important in understanding: 1) the politics of local leadership and 
their underlying contexts and 2) the dynamics of the land tenure system under 
the two post-revolution regimes. This legacy has continually directed the ways 
both government officials, community leaders and peasants behave and 
approach land within the complex multi-directional relations. This peasant 
behaviour in the context of the local leadership will be further discussed in 
Chapter Eight through the lens of neopatrimonialism that coexists with legal-
rational legitimacy. What we consider in this Chapter is that, whilst both post-
Derg regimes have kept the policy of state ownership of land and exercised 
centrally controlled land allocation, rural peasants have continued to consider 
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their land holdings not as permanent property, but as temporary allocation that 
can be reduced, if not confiscated, by government at a moment’s notice.  
 
What the Ethiopian Empire achieved in the modern era, on top of the 
patrimonial hierarchy built on its feudal system, was the centralisation of 
authority in the person of the Emperor through the establishment of a 
bureaucracy, particularly in the newly incorporated areas in southern Ethiopia 
(Keller, 1988). The Emperors, particularly Tewodros II (1855-1868), Menelik II 
(1889-1913) and Haile Selassie I (1930-1974), found the need to engage in 
political and economic policies that could bolster such efforts. They subsequently 
attempted to achieve rigorous control and regulation of natural resources, 
including land resources, through imposing economic policies such as labour 
conscription and taxation whilst maintaining political control over different 
ethnic groups in the new territories (Bahru Zewde, 2001). The Emperors were 
aware that expanding their reservoir of natural resources (primarily fertile land 
suitable for farming) is the best way to reinforce their authority over the core 
territory. 
 
Land is a key element in the northern Ethiopian definition of authority. The 
Emperors reined in potential enemies and reinforced their sovereignty through 
controlling the distribution of lands, the key tool in a set of “extremely valued 
forms of political patronage” (Keller, 1988:51). In the pre-revolution era, rights 
to land in Ethiopia were basically of two types: rist and gult. Rist tenure was the 
ownership of kinship land of usufruct rights, based on the hereditary system 
through both fathers and mothers (Gebru Tareke, 1996). Individuals were not 
able to own land but could use it by claiming usufruct rights wherever they could 
prove their birthright on the land. This practice sometimes caused peasants to 
claim the rights to widely dispersed plots of land (Gebru Tareke, 1996). In 
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theory, such land could not be sold, except by a few politically influential 
individuals, but leases on land could be sold to other land users. Claims to (and 
subsequent redistribution of) land were regularly adjudicated on by 
representatives of a kinship or clan group, depending on the number of family 
members (Hoben, 1972). These rights did not usually refer to a specific parcel of 
land so much as the right to land in a community more generally and so 
sometimes they caused competition over access to land when securing the 
possession of individually ploughed but communally operated land. Although rist 
rights were generally hereditary, there were some conditions that meant a 
peasant could lose them. According to Fetha Nagast,21 the Emperor possessed the 
ultimate right to all lands in his territory including collection of tribute and 
confiscation of rist land. The confiscation however was seldom practised except 
for a case of treason, heresy or tax resistance. These principles later provided the 
successive regimes with a pretext for extorting rist land, causing ambiguity in 
land ownership.  
 
Superimposed on rist tenure was gult - the prerogative to collect tributes 
from rist-holders (Pausewang, 1983). Gult involves a right to both land (or the 
fruits of land) and labour, but was vested in the Empire at the centre of politics. 
The right of the Emperor to demand tribute from all lands was key to his 
authority and consequently determined the evolution of land tenure system in 
Ethiopia. In the early years of the Empire, it was not only the king of kings who 
could practise gult, but any self-appointed kings or regional lords, who 
demonstrated the capacity to govern a specific area or region, could enter into a 
patron-client relationship with a group of kinship communities by claiming his 
gult from their land (Henze, 2000). As power and authority got centralised and 
                                                  
21 Fetha Nagast: The Law of Kings (1968), compiled by Ethiopia’s 225th and last Emperor Haile 
Selassie I. According to the book, the Empire was particularly concerned with land, trees and water 
and prepared the legal provision for the environment as early as the 13th century in detail. 
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more systematically ordered, the Emperor became able to practise the supreme 
gult with hierarchical layers of gult beneath him. Peasants paid the tribute in 
kind (such as army service or manual labour in the regional lord’s land) and in 
return received military protection, emergency relief and a system of justice 
(Bahru Zewde, 2001). The peasant communities had a certain degree of 
autonomy from the central state in terms of their choices over cultivation and 
decision-making process, and this relationship is thought to have given the 
Amhara and Tigray regions a particular character in land tenure system, 
compared to southern Ethiopia, where had much less autonomy. The significance 
of this difference will be further compared between the two case study 
communities through a degree of local democracy in Chapter Seven. 
 
Gult rights were not necessarily hereditary. It was more like a temporary 
grant and contingent on satisfactory service loyally delivered to the Emperor. 
This system was effectively used as a carrot-and-stick instrument in the process 
of centralising the Empire. As James Scott (2009:41) argues, taxation systems are 
“the foundation of early state-making”. In the Abyssinian centre, these gult-
holders were members of royal family, aristocrats and clergy of Orthodox 
churches whereas they were soldiers and local rulers in the southern periphery 
(Pausewang, 1990). In return for this right to collect tribute, they had a number 
of obligations to the Empire such as land administration, security maintenance 
and military service as well as tribute in kind. Gult rights were the principal 
means by which the Emperor supported state officials, since there was no salary, 
he waived his own gult rights over them. By the early 20th century, the gult 
system became payable in cash and was eventually transformed into a taxation 
system (Pausewang, 1990).  
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The Abyssinian rulers, as discussed in Chapter Three, were dependent on 
surplus extraction of the agricultural sector, particularly in the south. This trend 
had become intense in the 19th century during the time of Emperor Tewodros II 
who founded a national army and restored the imperial throne from the regional 
lords. Emperor Menelik II subsequently extensively expanded its territory to the 
southern periphery adding to the political dependence on an agricultural surplus. 
The expansion was mainly driven by political and economic purposes such as a 
spread of farming levies and grasp of control over the lucrative agricultural trade 
(Bahru Zewde, 2001). In other words, the Empire subsumed other polities and 
nobilities in order to impose the gult system and thereby surrendered the gult 
rights to them so as to collect tribute from their peasant communities. The most 
desired gult land was therefore the most fertile and that which was already 
intensively farmed. Although the degree of autonomy given to these newly 
incorporated areas varied depending on whether they fiercely resisted (e.g. Kafa, 
Borana, Shewa and Harar) or voluntarily capitulated (e.g. Jimma, Gambella, 
Benishangul and Gojjam), the northern tribute system was enforced alike to all 
of them by the northern soldiers (Bahru Zewde, 2001). In return, the neftegna 
(‘rifleman’ in Amharic) was bestowed with grants of land, serfs and arms from 
the Emperor, so that he could build authority to exact the levy from the local 
populations, the gabbar (‘peasant’ in Amharic). These empowered settlers, as a 
new emerging class, replaced the regional lords and started playing a role of 
intermediary between the central state and local peasant communities and 
created their own social and political dynamics with them in the appointed areas 
(Bahru Zewde, 2001; Hammond, 2011). In other words, what had constituted 
features of local hierarchy in southern Ethiopia came to an end as the northern 
system began to overlay it, in particular reinforcing the new bureaucratic reality.  
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This process of encroachment by the north was an incomplete process, and 
this observation is still relevant to ideas behind Ethiopian natural resource 
management today. The expansion of Abyssinian territory never led to complete 
incorporation of the newly conquered areas into the Empire. Rather, the areas 
were only valued for their labourers and natural resources (Clapham, 2002). The 
colonised people were not recognised as its citizens but were kept at arm’s 
length and treated as inferior to the Abyssinian rulers (Hammond, 2011). In other 
words, Ethiopian colonialism penetrated into peripheral areas with an effort to 
graft the values and customs of the north on to the subjected people whilst 
denying their rights at the same time. Ever since then, this trend has been a 
keystone of Ethiopian governmentality in natural resource management in 
southern Ethiopia.   
 
Managing a colony in which a distinction is perpetually retained between a 
small number of colonists and a large number of the colonised is an old imperial 
problem. In the absence of effective colonial administration, the neftegnas, 
mostly adherents of Orthodox Christianity and Semitic-speaking (Amharic or 
Tigrinya languages), were a minority in numbers in those newly incorporated 
areas (Gebru Tareke, 1996). They were in need of local allies, a safe pair of 
hands, whilst most southern gabbars, either Muslims or practitioners of 
indigenous religions speaking Cushitic (Oromo, Somali or Sidama) languages, 
were treated as peripheral - and were banned from having rights to land. For 
that reason, a local elite, balabbat (‘one who has a father’ in Amharic), was 
appointed as a local administrator by the neftegna and remained closely attached 
to the Empire during the imperial era, minimising, though not completely, the 
‘neftegna-gabbar’ dichotomy (Hammond, 2011). Hence, these balabbats, who 
previously served as landlords under the rule of the regional lords, had become 
able to continue their role under the new authority. Balabbats were given a 
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certain portion of land for their own use and the right to collect tribute from 
gabbars. These local notables often appeared to be actively engaged in business 
with the Abyssinians through accepting Orthodox Christianity and discarding 
their original ties to local communities despite the fact that demonstrating their 
loyalty to the Empire required a specific set of cultural credentials such as 
learning Amharic language and changing their names to Amharic (therefore 
Christian) style (Gebru Tareke, 1996). This trend was encouraged by the use of 
political and economic incentives such as dispensation from slavery and grant of 
land property rights. By subsuming the indigenous polities, the Empire 
attempted to construct a broader social structure that reinforce the existing top-
down hierarchy in force throughout its territory. The ‘neftegna-balabbat’ alliance 
was an early form of ‘local bureaucrat-community leader’ relationship that still 
remains critical in understanding: 1) the subordination of individuals and groups 
at the community level and 2) the multi-faceted and multi-layered nature of 
Ethiopian governmentality (Hammond, 2011), particularly in southern Ethiopia, 
which will be exemplified in detail in Chapter Eight. 
 
Under the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie I, the land tenure policies became 
more sophisticated so as to centralise state power by further weakening regional 
forces. He differentiated land tenure system from region to region by reflecting 
assessment of spatial variations in economic potential and security conditions 
(Marcus, 1987). Whilst keeping the system in the north as it had been, in the 
south he delegated the tasks of land administration and tax collection duties to 
neftegnas and left the consequential judiciary and civilian administration with 
balabbats. Over his long reign, Haile Selassie I strengthened his power over the 
territory by systematically exploiting the alliance between neftegna and balabbat 
in the newly incorporated areas (Marcus, 1994). This trend later led to bitter 
factionalism among balabbats (local elite groups) in the areas as some sought to 
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keep their land and power by obeying the Emperor’s order whilst some did not. 
The rivalry in return reinforced the power of the Emperor to play a superior role 
in pitting local rival elites against each other by reversing his own decisions. 
This playing of subservient elites against each other is one of the features of 
Abyssinian imperialism similar to their European counterparts and is still found 
in some parts of the south, particularly at the village level. These ongoing multi-
directional political dynamics will be further illustrated through the case of the 
changing leadership in the southern case study community in Chapter Eight.  
 
In addition, the Orthodox church traditionally held special rights to land and 
labour attached to the land. There were two types of land owned by the Church: 
land held directly by the Church or its high-ranking individual clerics in rights of 
permanent possession (even inviolable by the Emperor), and indirectly through 
peasants responsible for paying tribute to the Church (Keller, 1988). Although, in 
theory, the Church could possess one-third of land in the Empire, it was 
estimated that less than 5 per cent of total land mass was held by the Church by 
the time of the land reform in 1975, compared to the Emperor who owned almost 
the half of total land mass (Cohen and Weintraub, 1975). In particular, the 
largest arable land holdings of the Church were found in the south because the 
Church was encouraged by the Empire to have a role in the spiritual 
consolidation of the newly incorporated areas by evangelising the conquered 
peoples. 
 
In summary, a key to the Abyssinian definition of authority was the 
sophisticated domain of land tenure. First, during the imperial era, a rigorous 
hierarchy was built in the society by the country’s feudal system that controls 
land as a valued form of political patronage. This hierarchy was augmented by a 
public acceptance of the inequalities that places those with authority at the top 
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and those without at the bottom. Second, the political legacy of not only 
acquiescence to leaders on the basis of a belief in merits of authority but also a 
commitment to the idea of accessing authority by merit rather than by 
hereditary transfers of authority is important in understanding the dynamics of 
the land tenure system under the two post-revolution regimes. Whilst those 
regimes have kept the policy of state ownership of land and exercised centrally 
controlled land allocation, rural peasants have continued to consider their land 
holdings not as permanent property, but as temporary allocation that can be 
reduced, if not confiscated, by government at a moment’s notice. Third, the 
peasant communities in northern Ethiopia had a certain degree of autonomy 
from the central state in the land tenure system compared to the colonised south 
which had much less autonomy. The ‘neftegna-balabbat’ alliance was an early 
form of ‘local bureaucrat-community leader’ relationship that still remains 
critical in understanding the multi-faceted nature of Ethiopian governmentality 
at the local level, particularly in southern Ethiopia.  
 
5.1.2 The Military Regime (Derg) (1974-1991) 
 
The ‘Provisional Military Administrative Council’, known as the Derg, ruled 
Ethiopia for only 17 years. That was significantly shorter than the two millennia 
of imperial rule, but during this time the Derg made profound changes in the 
Ethiopian land management system through promoting Agrarian Socialism. This 
new ideology, based on a combination of Soviet-style socialism and Chinese 
agrarian reform, involved radical land reform, the establishment of Peasant 
Associations (PA) and Producer Cooperatives (PC), the expansion of state farms, 
and the villagisation and resettlement programme. The seeds of the regime’s 
downfall were sown by its policies on land tenure and local administration, 
which reproduced state-peasant relations and eventually led to the nearly 
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complete alienation of the peasantry from the regime. This section focuses on 
the radical land reform and related local institutional changes as well as the 
relevant events during the Derg, in order to reveal how the regime conducted its 
population in rural areas through land management. Whilst there were a series 
of famine and regional insurgencies as the consequence of contradictions in state 
policy, the politicisation of land tenure system, particularly at the local level, has 
been relatively less considered as a cause of the regime’s downfall.  
 
Radical Land Reform 
 
The most significant agrarian change of the Derg was a radical land reform 
law, named ‘Proclamation to Provide for the Public Ownership of Rural Lands’ 
(No. 31/1975). This proclamation was prepared to provide the legal basis for 
redistribution of usufruct rights to land to rural peasants by declaring all lands 
to be the property of the state. According to the proclamation, it was not allowed 
to transfer usufruct rights to land by sale, mortgage or lease, and granting the 
rights was strictly limited to close family members upon the death of the rights 
holder. Under the banner of ‘Land to the Tiller’, the bill was modelled on the 
agrarian reforms implemented in several Asian states in the 1970s such as India, 
China, Pakistan and Vietnam. In particular, the land reform was designed based 
on the experience of China (Pausewang, 1983). As the first uniform tenure 
system in Ethiopian history, the reform initially aimed to overcome the 
exploitative imperial tenure system and to provide an egalitarian access to land, 
based on agrarian socialism for all regions of the country. A chance of success 
was substantially high at the time of implementation since the political 
conditions in rural areas were unusually volatile, and the landed aristocrats were 
in no position to resist (Dessalegn Rahmato, 1993).  
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By conventional standards, the land redistribution programme was quite 
successful in the early years in reducing landholding inequalities among peasant 
farmers. All traditional land-owning elites and their landlords (as well as the 
emergent capitalist farmers) were effectively eliminated, and the marginalised 
rural peasants benefitted by acquiring land from the redistribution (Wibke 
Crewett et al., 2008). The scale of land reform was however less dramatic than 
its original models in Asia in terms of the proportion of land and of the 
population that were affected. This was largely because there were not enough 
government or party members in rural villages with sufficient discipline and 
experience to promote government propaganda (Dessalegn Rahmato, 1993).  
 
The outcome of the reform, however, should not be measured just by the 
amount of land redistributed. The redistribution generally involved land taken 
from landlords who held in excess of 40 timad whilst most peasant farmers 
retained their proprietary rights to land that they had been farming (Clapham, 
1990). The significance of the reform rather resided in the abolition of the 
traditional land-based patron-client relationship including the termination of 
tributary and landlordism. In other words, the peasants were freed from the 
previous feudal obligations and enabled to claim their rights to the fruits of their 
land and labours. Moreover, the reform removed the roots of ethnic discontent 
and conflict that had (latently) resided in the peasantry (especially in the south) 
during the imperial era. Overall, these changes encouraged the peasants to boost 
their productivity in farming and subsequently improved their livelihoods, at 
least in the period of 1975-78 (Pausewang, 1990). 
 
In addition, the reform replaced the Empire’s rural land administration at the 
local level with a new lowest residence-based administrative unit, named kebelle 
(‘local/neighbourhood’ in Amharic) (Teferi Abate, 2015). Kebelle later became 
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commonly used by government and by international organisations as the scale of 
‘community’. We return to this scalar context later in Chapter Six when we 
compare the difference in scale of community between government and citizens 
in the context of CBA. The political ecology framework recognises that there is 
nothing inherently natural about scale, but that these dimensions are social 
products that emerge through the choices made by human actors. 
 
In its early years, the reform created a whole new political environment. 
Peasant farmers organised collective action for local autonomy rather than 
competed each other for access to powerful patrons. In particular, one of the 
significant consequences was the improved collaboration among kin and families 
that used to competed for access to land in the imperial tenure system. The 
reform eliminated the ownership of kinship land (rist), which previously caused 
considerable familial discord and sometimes even homicide. Whilst repairing 
those broken relationships, a number of kinship-based associations called Ab-
Woled (‘children from same father’ in Amharic) burgeoned in the late 1970s 
(Teferi Abate, 1994). This trend continued into the 1980s, expanding ethnic-
based ties and eventually becoming one element of the regional ethnic-based 
resistance movements against the Derg’s policies such as forced conscription 
into the army, villagisation, resettlement programmes and unpaid work 
campaigns (Teferi Abate, 1994).  
 
In short, the Derg continued to carry out the land reform despite the regime 
soon realising that, from its perspective, too much autonomy was being given to 
rural peasant communities. The reform organised the kebelle system as a central 
feature of land management throughout the country and used the system as a 
tool to implement relevant local institutional changes and land policies. The 
management of land became a focus of extensive government policy and 
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eventually served multiple objectives of the regime such as promoting 
government propaganda, with a strong sense of déjà vu in what happened 
through land tenure system in the Abyssinian Empire.  
 
Related Institutional Changes and Events  
 
The Derg also brought about major institutional changes whilst promoting 
agrarian socialism including the establishment of formal Peasant Associations 
(PA), Producer Cooperatives (PC) and state farms, and the villagisation and 
resettlement programme. First, PAs were set up at the kebelle level and played a 
central role in implementing the land reform measures as well as local 
development programmes. PA’s were kebelle-scale governments. A PA made up 
of 3,200 timad land-units replaced the primary elements of the imperial land 
bureaucracy at the village level including rist and gult (Dessalegn Rahmato, 
2009). 
 
In the first few years, PAs had a certain degree of institutional autonomy. 
They consisted of male household heads in the kebelle and they freely elected and 
removed their leaders. A remnant of this practice was still observed during my 
fieldwork and this will be further described through the case of local elections in 
the case study communities in Chapter Eight. Soon, however, the regime adapted 
the Soviet-style socialism and gradually subjected PAs to a system of state 
control (Clapham, 2002). In violation of the initial objectives such as local 
democracy, PAs turned into ‘the central tower’ in rural villages as an extension 
of state power (Pausewang, 1983). In other words, PAs replaced the functions of 
neftegna and balabbat with a system of state control, but in a more rigorously 
authoritarian way. The leadership of PAs was often faced with the situation of 
not being able to defend the interests of peasants and became more like a 
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messenger for the government. The peasantry became regarded not as an active 
agent of the revolution but as a passive beneficiary of socialist ideas from above. 
Such a political intervention in rural areas was the manifestation of the growing 
authoritarian character of the Derg against a series of violent resistance struggles 
in northern Ethiopia and the emerging ethnic liberation movements in many 
other regions (Dessalegn Rahmato, 1993).  
 
The establishment of PAs redefined the alliance between neftegna and 
balabbat. At first, those neftegnas who served under the imperial regime were 
stripped their land and authority after being accused of exploiting peasants as 
powerful landlords (Watson, 2006). Afterwards, about 50,000 students, who 
were school teachers or university students in the major cities, were forced to go 
to rural areas to set up PAs and run the state farms. PAs came to prominence in 
every kebelle and had committee members elected by peasant members with 
responsibility for administering the area, implementing the land reform and 
managing communal activities such as zemecha (‘development through 
cooperation’ in Amharic). The zemecha involved teaching local populations the 
benefits of socialism through the Amharic literacy programme. This activity had 
dual objectives: first, filling the administrative vacuum in rural areas caused by 
the removal of neftegna; and second, scattering the intellectuals from the cities 
where they were seen as a threat to the regime (Clapham, 1990). During the 
period, the national army was also notably expanded with the support from the 
Soviet Union, particularly grown through the wars against Somalia in 1977-1978 
and the insurgency movements in the 1980s. During these periods, taxes were 
rapidly increased under the banner of ‘Everything to the Warfront’, and forced 
conscription of young men became commonplace (Clapham, 1990).  
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Second, the regime introduced peasant agricultural collectives, known as 
Producer Cooperatives (PC), and state farms, using PAs as their foundation. 
Believing that small farms are inefficient and that collective holdings promote 
the most productive use of land and labour, PCs and state farms were established 
throughout the country. The regime propagated the idea that this was the best 
way not only to solve the country’s major problem (food self-sufficiency) but 
also to supply a reliable marketable surplus of cash crops such as coffee, sugar, 
cotton and tobacco (Dessalegn Rahmato, 1993). Land and relevant resources 
including livestock were taken from rural peasants, pooled, and then, transferred 
to the new farm sites. A number of incentives such as interest-free credit and 
priority access to fertiliser and improved seed were offered to attract peasant 
farmers. More than half of annual government expenditure and two-thirds of 
material resources were committed to agriculture in Ethiopia (Cohen and 
Isaksson, 1987). Modelled on the Chinese income-based work point system, PCs 
and state farms covered almost 20 per cent of the country’s arable land by the 
end of the 1980s (Cohen and Isaksson, 1987). This frenetic expansion was, 
however, poorly planned; it involved forced evictions of peasants and severely 
damaged the environment. The labourers were badly organised, recruitment was 
seldom based on ability and performance and often resulted in delays and low 
output. The peasants who shifted to these group farming systems of their own 
accord were those who were convinced that “it is the least worst option that they 
comply with it” (Hammond, 2011:430). Changing to the new system did provide 
some food security as the schemes were the beneficiary of uncontrolled 
government generosity. In the end, the schemes were abandoned and served as 
one of the main factors in causing the outbreak of the great famine by 
contributing less than 5 per cent of total agricultural production to the country 
(Cohen and Isaksson, 1987).  
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Third, the villagisation and resettlement programme is another example that 
shows how the Derg regime manipulated the peasantry. The programme initially 
aimed to restructure land-use patterns and social services so as to improve 
agricultural productivity by moving people to new villages (George, 2013). 
However, having been started in the late 19th century by the imperial regime for 
the overcrowded population in the highlands, it became politicised under the 
Derg. The programme was used as a calculated attempt to break the insurgency 
movements by depriving them of their popular base of support, strengthening 
the domestic security against the rebel groups and enhancing political control 
over rural areas. It focused on relocating people from the cool and dry highlands 
of Shewa, Tigray and Wello, where the insurgency movements were fierce, to the 
hot and wet lowlands of Gojjam, Keffa and Wollega (Hammond, 2011; Pankhurst, 
1992). Under the plan of promoting food security, the programme was offered as 
‘the least worst option’ for peasant farmers in those areas in the absence of any 
other feasible options (Hammond, 2011). As a result, almost 600,000 people were 
relocated in the 1980s (Clay and Holcomb, 1986). Due to the limited consultation, 
harsh environmental conditions and lack of adequate facilities, more than 5 per 
cent of the resettlers died from starvation and tropical diseases, and almost 15 
per cent fled from the new settlements (Gebru Tareke, 2013; Horne and Bader, 
2012). 
 
Lastly, the great famine (1984-85) marked a critical moment in the story of 
the Ethiopian land management system. The argument here is that the system 
played a key role both in causing the famine and shaping the response to it. Land 
management schemes such as the establishment of PAs, PCs and state farms, 
and the villagisation and resettlement programme, were a central strategy 
deployed by the government in the famine affected areas before, during and after 
the catastrophe. Whilst the famine was fuelled by a series of droughts in the 
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early 1980s, the insurgency movements raged in northern Ethiopia. They were 
led by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Ethiopian People’s 
Democratic Movement (EPDM) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF), and all sought to overthrow the Derg (de Waal, 1991). The regime 
manipulated the politics of famine and land management in order to dominate 
the war - by increasing surplus extraction, expanding state farms through 
draconian collectivisation and transplanting people from the highlands to the 
lowlands (de Waal, 1991). Moreover, state-led agricultural programmes such as 
PCs and state farms refused to relieve their peasant members of their allocated 
obligations during the famine, and they often had to sell the emergency relief 
supplies to buy food grain from the markets at excessive prices to bear to the 
obligations (Dessalegn Rahmato, 1993). These kinds of manipulation played a 
critical role in the regime’s counterinsurgency measures and were of use to the 
government’s strategy to secure compliance of its citizens.   
 
All these programmes described above were justified by the country’s 
perennial concern: food self-sufficiency. These programmes were developed on 
the basis of environmental rehabilitation discourse, which was highly popular 
worldwide in the 1970s and 80s, with a strong reference to the neomalthusian 
narratives (Keeley and Scoones, 2000). The discourse argued that this fast-
growing unenlightened population would result in widespread deforestation and 
subsequent soil erosion and lead to starvation via famines, if no appropriate 
measures were put in place. In Ethiopia, this trend was substantiated in two 
powerful reports that have been highly influential ever since in the policy debate 
on environmental deterioration – the Soil Conservation Research Project (SCRP) 
by Hans Hurni (1981) and the Ethiopian Highland Reclamation Study (EHRS) by 
the FAO (1986). These reports have been extensively quoted in national policies 
and state-led programmes through the Ethiopian National Conservation Strategy 
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(NCS) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MoANR, 2003). As 
a result, the environmental rehabilitation discourse was effectively substantiated 
through such programmes, involving international donor agencies in this 
practice of authoritarian governmentality. 
 
The environmental rehabilitation discourse also offered a particular policy 
space for international donor agencies to justify providing aid to this Marxist-
military regime (Hoben, 1995). There was a massive pressure on 
intergovernmental organisations to do something about ‘the environment’ in the 
1980s. The World Food Programme (WFP), for instance, took this opportunity in 
the aftermath of the great famine to link relief to addressing this 
‘environmental’ crisis, providing a politically acceptable solution for Ethiopia. 
This idea, the Food-for-Work (FFW) programme, was to use food aid resources 
to pay for public work such as grazing-land rehabilitation activities (Humphrey, 
1999). This programme later turned out to be one of the largest food aid 
programmes in human history (Humphrey, 1999). After all, it was a win-win 
solution to this deeply politicised food crisis both for the Derg and the WFP in the 
name of the sustainable food production. 
 
In summary, the Derg made profound changes in the Ethiopian land 
management system through promoting ‘agrarian socialism’ so as to conduct 
the conduct of its population in rural areas. At first, the radical land reform 
nationalised all land and replaced the Empire’s land administration at the local 
level with a new lowest residence-based administrative unit, named kebelle. The 
reform organised the kebelle system as a central feature of land management 
throughout the country and used the system as a tool for implementing relevant 
local institutional changes and land policies such as the establishment of Peasant 
Associations (PA) and Producer Cooperatives (PC), the expansion of state farms, 
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and the villagisation and resettlement programme. All these programmes were 
justified by the governments socialist ideology and drew on examples from China 
and elsewhere. Later, however, the country’s perennial concern, food self-
sufficiency, re-emerged and the international community negotiated a way into 
supporting agriculture in Ethiopia based on the environmental rehabilitation 
discourse despite the ideological and political obstacles to such collaborations. 
The Derg effectively abolished the traditional land-based patron-client 
relationship and reproduced the alliance between neftegna and balabbat. In 
particular, the land reform replaced the imperial landlords with the state and 
established the institutions that provide more efficient ways of implementing 
their strategies, that is, a better chance of practising (authoritarian) 
governmentality. By politicising land, peasants became increasingly dependent 
on the state and its directives and subsequently more manipulatable even though 
these experiences led many people to despise the Derg and its state controlled 
administration. The management of land was a focus of extensive government 
policy and eventually served multiple objectives of the regime such as promoting 
government propaganda, with a strong sense of similarity to what happened in 
the Abyssinian Empire. 
 
5.1.3 The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (1991-) 
 
“The real issue behind the debate on federalism… is the perennial 
concern with access to land”  
(Markakis, 2011:356) 
 
This section reviews the recent changes of land administration under the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime. Its current 
approach is, whilst holding the state’s right to land, to promote the 
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decentralisation of land management on the basis of ethic federalism, discussed 
in Chapter Three. The section argues that the current land tenure system in 
Ethiopia has not been significantly changed at its core despite the change of 
regime, and the chapter ultimately demonstrates, through the lens of 
governmentality, how ideas from Imperial and two post-revolution governments 
have sought to ensure the participation of the peasantry in land management in 
a way that best suits the elites.  
 
After the fall of the Derg in 1991, a transformation of land tenure system 
towards privatisation was widely expected in Ethiopia by both national and 
international observers (Teferi Abate, 2015). These expectations were derived 
from the land redistribution led by the EPRDF in northern Ethiopia during the 
insurgency movement. This redistribution mainly aimed to resolve the tensions 
between the generations and genders. The strategy was, however, shaped by 
wartime conditions, so that the process was in favour of young adults and 
women whose support was crucial in the protracted war. It later brought about 
further support from landless young adults for the EPRDF during the early post-
war years (Teferi Abate, 2015).  
 
Nevertheless, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) soon 
disappointed the observers and peasant farmers by announcing the continuation 
of the Derg’s land tenure policy. The new constitution of Ethiopia, which came 
into force in 1995, confirmed that “the right to ownership of rural and urban 
land, as well as of all natural resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in 
the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a common property of the Nations, Nationalities 
and Peoples of Ethiopia” (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995:14). 
This aims to centralise power at the federal state whereas general land 
administration is vested in regional and local governments according to the 
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country’s policy on ethnic federalism. At least, the leasing, borrowing and 
mortgaging of land has become permitted in response to calls for more secure 
land holding for peasants, and the full rights to immovable property built on 
land have been also conferred on Ethiopian nationals (Teferi Abate, 2015). Still, 
the private ownership including buying and selling of land is prohibited on the 
pretext of the possible concentration of land in the hands of a few and the 
subsequent dispossession of the poor who are entirely dependent on land for 
their livelihoods. 
 
The fall of the Derg was not the arrival of a new political ideology in land 
tenure system but was rather a socialist to postsocialist transition (Watson, 
2006). This is because, first, Mengistu Haile Mariam, the supreme leader of the 
Derg, announced the end of socialism in Ethiopia and brought in many reforms 
including land privatisation in his very last year, 1990, due to the combined 
pressure of the decline of the Soviet Union outside and the insurgency of groups 
inside (Clapham, 1992). Clapham (1992:115) says that this radical change was 
made “virtually overnight”. Second, the political identity of the TPLF, the 
predominant group in the EPRDF, still involves a strong commitment to 
Marxism-Leninism. At the same time, the EPRDF has become distinctively 
pragmatic through incorporating many features of global neoliberalism and 
expanding its collaboration with western governments and intergovernmental 
organisations and gradually discarded the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. More 
than two decades later, however, there are a few areas where old socialist ideas 
are still persistent, and most notably, one of them is land.  
 
The EPRDF regime has justified the continuation of socialist land tenure 
system by promoting the programme of agrarian transformation (Lavers, 2012). 
Based on the green revolution discourse, this state-led development programme 
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pursues modernisation of small-scale farming through the ideas of 
neoliberalism and the developmental state that had been judged to be successful 
in East Asia. Food self-sufficiency has long been a policy concern in Ethiopia. 
The growth of yields through the supply of new crop varieties, expansion of 
irrigation and promotion of inorganic fertilisers has become a major goal of the 
programme in rural areas of Ethiopia in support of international donor agencies 
(Lavers, 2012). The EPRDF has promoted the idea that a necessary precondition 
for success is that land has to be owned by the state.  
 
One of the well-known examples of the approach is the Sasakawa-Global 
2000 (SG-2000) programme. SG-2000 is a Japanese-funded NGO that promotes 
a package of off-the-shelf modern agricultural technologies tested in South-
East Asia. The NGO views the technologies as promising for entrepreneurial 
smallholder farmers such as high planting density of single crops, fertiliser 
micro-dosing and herbicide use (McMichael, 2010; Sasakawa Africa Association, 
2014; SG-2000 Ethiopia, 2015). Established in 1993, the SG-2000 programme has 
been extensively implemented throughout the country since the then Prime 
Minister, Meles Zenawi, was accompanied to a demonstration site by Norman 
Borlaug and Jimmy Carter in 1994 to observe its great potential (although the 
success that year was largely owed to good weather conditions in Ethiopia) 
(Harrison, 2002). As a result, the number of peasant farmers who participated in 
the programme dramatically increased from 32,046 in 1995 to over 4 million in 
2001 (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). The SG-2000 programme has a strong 
ideological bent towards business-oriented agriculture involving money loan 
services for the purchase of these technologies and is closely associated with a 
number of multinational agricultural companies such as Cargill, Monsanto and 
K+S KALI GmbH (McMichael, 2010). The programme eventually caused great 
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economic distress for a number of those peasant farmers who borrowed money 
from local governments but were not able to pay back (McMichael, 2010).  
 
The salient point here is that the whole process is in another shape of 
authoritarian governmentality. From technology transfers to distribution of 
hybrid seeds and fertilisers, the process is designed, implemented and managed 
by the central government (Howard et al., 1998). At the same time, the peasant 
farmers who participated in the programme of their own accord were those who 
were convinced by the green revolution discourse for fear of facing another 
famine in the absence of any other feasible options (Lavers 2012). In fact, most 
of the programme’s practices, such as the promotion of higher maize planting 
density, are against the traditional farming system in Ethiopia that intercrops as 
a livelihood strategy. Under the banner of food security, the agrarian 
transformation programme was offered as a plausible option that peasant 
farmers have easy access to.  
 
More importantly, the memory of coercive regime is pertinent to the 
behaviour of peasants and so the current practices of CBA. The understanding of 
the subordination of peasant farmers and complex multi-layered structures in 
which this peasantry is embedded with levels of government will be further 
demonstrated through the case of the changing leadership in the southern case 
study community in Chapter Eight. Korten (1972) argues that the relationship 
between superiors and inferiors is extremely inflexible in Ethiopia. The long 
history of acquiescence has meant that it is habituated and has come to be 
perceived as a ‘cultural commitment’. All Ethiopians have experienced at least 
one coercive government; either the imperial regime of Haile Selassie I, the 
Marxist-military rule of the Derg and/or the current ruling EPRDF government. 
Under the rule of Haile Selassie I, most rural peasants experienced a series of 
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commercial agricultural reforms (Pausewang, 1990). One of the prominent 
legacies of the Derg was that peasant farmers were forced to adapt to its 
autocratic administrative structures (Pausewang, 1994). Moreover, the capacity 
of the state to intervene in every part of its territory has been greatly enhanced 
through the neoliberal agrarian transformation programme under the EPRDF 
government. 
 
The question of land ownership was again a major issue during the national 
election campaign in 2005. State ownership of land was heavily criticised by the 
opposition party candidates even though the government reaffirmed the policy 
direction. During the campaign period, despite the political sensitivity, the 
parliament passed the revised ‘Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation’ 
that includes sections on the ‘Expropriation of Landholdings for Public Purposes 
and Payment of Compensation’ (Abbink, 2006). This Proclamation grants the 
power to federal and regional governments to expropriate landholdings for 
public purpose where appropriate to a development project without agreement of 
its settlers (FDRE Proclamation No. 455/2005). It shows the continuing 
importance of the state ownership for the EPRDF government as a central 
organising feature of its governmentality through which to steer the conduct of 
rural peasant communities. Moreover, the post-election violence in 2005 has 
even driven the government to strengthen its control over the land tenure 
system further (Dessalegn Rahmato, 2009). 
 
At the same time, the regional governments made a few changes in their land 
policy in response to calls for more secure land-holding rights for peasants. The 
Amhara region, for instance, has launched a land certification programme that 
aims to strengthen the usufruct rights of households by allowing for semi-
permanent rent and extended inheritance rights beyond the core family 
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members (Deininger and Jin, 2006). The programme was designed to address 
growing tensions caused by the dilemma of increasing population pressure and a 
lack of land resources. By issuing a certificate outlining the rights over land use, 
the programme seeks to add to security for individual households. The 
programme keeps the records of land ‘ownership’ at the kebelle office and 
provides peasants with incentives for land investment plans such as terracing 
and irrigation (Deininger and Jin, 2006). There was some evidence of success 
found in the evaluations of the early stages of the scheme such as increased 
investment, security, productivity and land market activity (Sosina Bezu and 
Holden, 2014).  
 
Yet Amhara’s land certification scheme also had some unanticipated and 
negative consequences, which I explain in terms of historical political legacies of 
patronage. The process of issuing the certificate has greatly increased the power 
of local bureaucrats in land management. In particular, they often wield the 
power in the process of transferring the usufruct right to lessees in land rental 
markets (Teferi Abate, 2015). Moreover, the officers themselves often turn out to 
be the lessees or in a joint application with others. It was also commonplace for 
peasants to approach influential government officers ‘by the back door’ with an 
application for land certificates and investment in order to streamline the 
process (Teferi Abate, 2015).  
 
In summary, this section reviews the recent changes of land administration 
under the EPRDF regime. Its current approach is, whilst holding the state’s right 
to land, to promote the decentralisation of land management on the basis of 
ethic federalism. The section argues that the current land tenure system has not 
been significantly changed at its core despite the change of regime. The EPRDF 
government has justified the continuation of the Derg’s land tenure system by 
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promoting the programme of agrarian transformation under the banner of food 
security. Based on the green revolution discourse, this programme pursues 
modernisation of small-scale farming through the ideas of neoliberalism and the 
developmental state. The whole process is in another shape of authoritarian 
governmentality whilst the peasant farmers who voluntarily participated in the 
programme were those who were convinced by the green revolution discourse 
for fear of facing another famine. Moreover, the memory of coercive regime is 
pertinent to the behaviour of peasants and so the current practices of CBA in 
Ethiopia in addition to its bureaucratic culture based on the hierarchical patron-
client relationship. 
 
5.2  Conclusion  
 
This chapter sets out how three successive Ethiopian regimes have deployed 
control over land to steer the behaviour of the Ethiopian people, particularly the 
peasantry, over the past two hundred years. First, during the imperial era, this 
was done through a rigorous hierarchy built within the country’s feudal system 
that controlled land as a valued form of political patronage. This hierarchy was 
secured by a public acceptance of the inequalities, a political legacy of believing 
the benefits of order and stability and the culturally committed idea that 
authority was by merit. Second, the Derg introduced the radical land reform 
based on agrarian socialism and replaced the Empire’s land administration at the 
local level with a new, lowest administrative unit, named kebelle. They 
nationalised all land and organised the kebelle system as a central feature of land 
management for implementing relevant institutional changes and land policies, 
initially based on the socialist ideology and later on the environmental 
rehabilitation discourse. Third, the current approach of the EPRDF government is 
to simultaneously promote the decentralisation of land management on the basis 
  185 
of ethic federalism and hold onto the state’s right to land. Based on the green 
revolution discourse, this approach pursues modernisation of small-scale 
farming through the ideas of neoliberalism and the developmental state. Such 
federal decentralisation has enabled some sub-national schemes such as land 
registrations in Amhara to emerge. 
 
The argument of the thesis is that there are profound problems with the 
application of Community-Based Adaptation (CBA) in 21st century Ethiopia. The 
chapter focuses on one of these problems, namely that CBA makes assumptions 
about a broad level of equality in a society. The chapter argues that a 
considerable number of rural communities in Ethiopia have never been 
internally equal or fully democratic but instead have consistently been 
hierarchical and internally divided in terms of rights and resources. In particular, 
it argues that peasant farmers have given their consent and support to strongly 
hierarchical structures, which have often connected villages to a distant central 
government. The belief that such inequality is both right and unchanging is a 
legacy of history. The belief that such inequality is incorrigible and 
unchallengeable is a legacy of history, and it is this history that the chapter 
seeks to spell out in order to show why it is so hard to apply some of the 
assumptions of CBA to communities in Ethiopia. Local governments and their 
officers are still ruling with supreme authority, often found unchallengeable in 
Ethiopia. A leader of a One-to-Five network, for instance, pronounces, “For me 
God and the government are comparable and their decisions must be accepted. 
The complaint is not right” (Interview DR-10). Another farmer echoes, 
“Everything is good if it comes through the government… If the government 
brings something, we accept it. It is impossible to reject” (DR-11). This 
submissive conformity will be further exemplified throughout the rest of the 
empirical chapters that follow.  
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In conclusion, the chapter demonstrates a historical outline of the ways in 
which land tenure system in Ethiopia has been established, promoted and 
maintained - partly through the lens of (authoritarian) governmentality. In so 
doing, it shows how ideas from Imperial and two post-revolution regimes have 
all sought to ensure the voluntary participation of the peasantry in land 
management that best suit the elites. Whilst those regimes have kept the policy 
of state ownership of land, rural peasants have continued to accept that their 
land holdings were not permanent property, but temporary allocations that can 
be reduced, if not confiscated, by government at a moment’s notice. In other 
words, by politicising land, peasants became increasingly dependent on the state 
and its directives, and subsequently more manipulatable, for fear of facing 
another famine. The memory of coercive power is still pertinent to the current 
practices of CBA in Ethiopia. This approach has reinforced the existing structures 
of the society to such an extent that bottom-up development practices have 
become incompatible, particularly at the community level. 
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Chapter Six. The Politics of CBA: Competing Scales and 
Knowledge 
 
A social, cultural and historical milieu frames the practice of Community-
Based Adaptation (CBA). In answering research question 1b), ‘To what extent do 
socio-political dynamics within and around a community shape the local 
accounts of adaptive capacity and with what consequences?’, this chapter 
focuses on the political accounts of adaptive capacity which emerged during the 
time the CBA project was implemented in two villages of Ethiopia. These 
accounts demonstrate that the project implementation and outcomes are deeply 
influenced by the socio-political structures and institutions of community in 
which they are residing. As a consequence, decision-making processes in the 
project reflect a combination of agricultural developmental goals and also local 
socio-political concerns. The approach adopted here not only presents a new 
political account of CBA but also offers an original perspective on the structure 
called ‘a community’ in development practice. Just as Foucault attempted to 
produce a relational account and explanation of power, this analysis provides a 
socio-political account of community and engages with individual community 
members as structurally-embedded and reflexive actors operating within a 
network across which power is dispersed.  
 
The chapter examines the effects of the CBA project (which has been framed 
by the existing notion of community) on community members. Those who are 
participating in the decision-making processes are not regarded as a component 
of a single-voiced community; rather they are engaged as complex social actors. 
Chapter Two discussed how power relations embedded in everyday human 
interactions shape the environment and how the methodological approaches of 
applied anthropology for collecting, analysing and using data are employed by 
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political ecologists. Chapter Five also demonstrated how Ethiopian elites have 
historically deployed control over land to steer the behaviour of the Ethiopian 
peasantry and manipulated local communities to remain strongly hierarchical 
and internally divided in terms of rights and resources. Hence, in order to apply 
the principles of CBA to Ethiopia, it is not sufficient to solely rely on the ideas of 
resilience thinking, but it is also necessary to think about this narrative politically.  
 
With this in mind, this chapter demonstrates ‘what kinds of politics’ 
emerged during the time the CBA project was implemented in the context of 
adaptive capacity. The first analysis the chapter brings to the thesis is how the 
scalar configurations of CBA are imposed, contested and reinforced by actors and 
institutions within and outside the structures of community in Ethiopia. It draws 
attention to the politics of scale, which illustrates some of the conflicting values 
and contrasting aspirations of different actors and institutions. The next 
contribution is to analyse the politics of indigenous knowledge that is how such 
knowledge is produced and regulated within and outside the structures of 
community. It calls for increased concern with the democratic content of 
community development through identifying strategies for a more equitable 
mode of knowledge management. In so doing, the chapter adds political 
perspectives to the application of CBA and demonstrates how actors and 
institutions of community shape the building of adaptive capacity through CBA 
projects in 21st century Ethiopia. However, beforehand, it would be worthwhile to 
review the terms of reference of the two CBA projects researched in this thesis to 
address how the object in question is defined, developed and verified.  
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Activities and Organisation of the Two CBA Projects 
 
The projects funded by the Small Grants Programme (SGP) are community-
based – that is, they are, in theory at least, designed, proposed and implemented 
by local populations. The governance system of the projects is centred on a 
newly established institution: Community-Based Organisation (CBO). CBOs 
reside outside the bureaucratic matrix of government but remain within the 
existing governance structures of the community along with a set of other 
nested institutions (e.g. women’s leagues, One-to-Five networks and youth 
associations) which are based on the traditional Ethiopian authority systems. 
Anyone, in theory, can join a local CBO as long as they pay the 40 birr 
(approximately USD 2) registration fee. As members of the CBO, they are entitled 
to participate in and benefit from projects the CBO implements. 
 
In principle, projects are independently governed by the CBO. The CBO has a 
leader, secretary and treasurer elected by the community. They all need to agree 
if the CBO withdraws money from its bank account. The larger governance 
system is composed of other members of the CBO who engage each other 
formally and informally. A degree of democracy is required by the SGP that 
allows for intra-community debates before making any decisions. The CBO is 
responsible for decisions about the project on an everyday basis and generally 
holds a meeting once or twice a month during the project period. It is also 
accountable to the kebelle and woreda offices and the SGP office in Addis Ababa. 
 
The two SGP projects studied in this thesis focused on climate change 
adaptation, one of SGP’s main focal areas. The projects aimed to improve the 
adaptive capacity of the local communities through awareness raising, training 
and practice of conservation techniques. The main activities of the projects 
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chosen and carried out by the communities were area closure, raising fruit tree 
seedlings and construction of hillside terraces. They also distributed farming 
equipment, fuel saving stoves and beehives to promote the diversification of 
livelihoods. In particular, due to the combination of inadequate rainfall and 
human livelihood activities that caused severe land degradation, the area closure 
was prioritised for the restoration of land productivity. This activity closes off a 
certain area of land and its natural resources from human and cattle interference 
during the project period (two years) in order to prevent soil erosion from 
intense rainfall events. Area closure, however, was controversial among peasant 
farmers due to its varying degree of effect on their livelihoods. This will be 
extensively discussed throughout the empirical chapters.  
 
In-depth research was conducted in the two SGP project sites. Case study 1 
(project completed) covers the CBA project implemented in ‘Kebelle A’ between 
July 2010 and June 2012. The project was performed by ‘CBO DG’ and awarded 
grants of USD 24,987 in total from the SGP. ‘CBO DG’ has 502 members (out of a 
kebelle population of 7,253). The monitoring and evaluation report of SGP 
Ethiopia (2012) assesses the project as “generally successful” (2), “efficiently 
managed” (5) and “successfully reforested” (6). Case study 2 (project in 
progress) covers the project implemented in ‘Kebelle B’ between January 2013 
and December 2014. It was carried out by ‘CBO DR’ and awarded grants of USD 
46,900 in total. ‘CBO DR’ has 210 members (out of a kebelle population of 
155,265). The report of SGP Ethiopia (2013) describes the project as “effectively 
organized” (2). The geographic and demographic aspects of the research sites 
are described in Chapter Four. 
 
At these lower administrative levels, the anonymity of participants is 
respected by not using names of CBO, kebelle or woreda. Data collected from case 
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study 1 is quoted as (DG-00), case study 2 as (DR-00) and others (SGP personnel 
and NGO workers) as (AA-00). 
 
6.1  My Community, Their Community: Difference in Scale of 
Community between Government and Citizens 
 
We belong to multiple communities defined by place, institution and activity. 
Understanding community is a topical text questioning specific aspects of society 
such as ethnicity, age, class, gender, religion, education, governance, 
accountability and even family among multiple and contradictory constituencies 
and alliances (Heller, 1989; Li, 2004). The ability of socio-ecological systems to 
adapt to disturbance (adaptive capacity) is specific not only to the spatial scale at 
which climate changes occur but also to the institutional scale because the scale 
at which adaptive capacity is analysed has implications for building resilience 
(Cash et al., 2006). Yet, according to resilience thinking, there is no particular 
scale more desirable than others; instead, a particular circumstance produces a 
new socio-political setting with spatially distinct characteristics which are tied 
to the cultural, historical and economic conditions of socio-ecological systems in 
specific moments of time. In this context, the scale of community is ‘socially-
produced’ rather than ‘ontologically-given’. Swyngedouw and Heynen 
(2003:913) argue, there is nothing inherent in any scale and this scalar 
arrangement is associated with norms, regulations and governance systems of 
locality and continuously “disputed, redefined, reconstituted and restructured in 
terms of their extent, consent, relative importance and interrelations”. This 
fluidity of scale is an integral part of the social strategy of competing over rights 
and seeking to gain differential access to resources and is therefore best 
addressed through the lens of political ecology. If a particular social group 
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cannot control events at one scale, they may try to rescale their activities to 
assert their authority through different relations, networks and institutions. 
 
The introduction of CBA is part of the master plan of ethnic federalism in 
Ethiopia. The plan aims to devolve power away from central, regional 
governments towards the woreda, and kebelle levels. In particular, in the context 
of local development, this devolution process is marked by the advisory role 
afforded to external actors, no involvement of government and the daily 
management responsibilities placed in the hands of individuals elected within a 
local community. In this sense, the governance system of CBA is centred on 
locally established institutions, CBOs.  
 
The story of decentralisation in Ethiopia is typical of countries in transition. 
There is a gap between the constitutional provisions and the practice of these 
provisions. The Ethiopian Constitution promotes ethnic federalism throughout 
the country whilst the ruling party controls the local municipalities. Moreover, 
the promotion of national unity through ethnic diversity often causes gaps 
between the decentralisation of power and authority (Mehret Ayenew, 2002). It 
means that the national policies are generally respected, but its principles are 
frequently compromised by the working practices of the policies at the local 
level. This has been the case with CBA, which aims to enhance the importance of 
community in climate change adaptation through promoting local values and 
aspirations.  
 
This particular circumstance has created a significant degree of difference in 
the understanding of the scale of ‘community’ by government and local 
populations and subsequently affected the adaptive capacity of socio-ecological 
systems. This differentiation is inscribed by power relations and political 
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struggles in the multi-layered structures of adaptive governance. The imposition 
of certain geographical scales in turn alters the geometry of social power by 
strengthening the control of some whilst disempowering others (Swyngedouw 
and Heynen, 2003). Success in climate change adaptation depends on the scale of 
implementation. It is, however, surprising how little political ecological 
discussion there is on this issue of integrity, not only within recipient 
communities, but also within researcher and practitioner groups of CBA 
(Interview AA-05; 06). 
 
6.1.1 Where CBA Comes: A View of Government  
 
Decentralisation in Ethiopia ultimately aims to modernise the legal, fiscal 
and administrative systems of local governments and to deliver public services to 
citizens more effectively. Ethiopia is a federal republic with five administrative 
(federal to kebelle) and one local (gott) tiers of government (see Figure 5). Down 
to the zonal level, cabinets are appointed by upper government officers, but from 
the woreda level downwards representative councils are directly elected by the 
local population (USAID, 2006). The process of decentralisation is mainly 
focused on the delegation of major administrative departments from zonal to 
woreda governments, especially in urbanising rural hinterlands (Yilmaz and 
Venugopal, 2008). In particular, the four most populous regions (Amhara, 
Oromiya, SNNP and Tigray) have been prioritised over the others, receiving more 
resources from the federal government to support this transition of 
responsibilities. 
 
The Ethiopian governance systems at regional, zonal, woreda and kebelle 
levels follow a form of the tripartite structure by which one (elected) head of 
administration, a council executive committee and government bureaus are 
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regulated by a higher level of government office (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2008). 
For instance, at the woreda level, whilst the elected head has out-and-out power 
as a chairperson, the council committee is comprised of three representatives 
from each of the 10-20 kebelle, as well as bureau chiefs. One of the main 
constitutional power and duties of woreda is to draw up and execute budgets for 
both the woreda itself and kebelles within it, on the basis of the local taxes and 
levies collected (Interview DG-38).  
 
 
Figure 5. Governance structures of Ethiopia 
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Meanwhile, most kebelle offices do not enjoy the same institutional capacity 
as regional, zonal and woreda administrations, although this is the level which 
most ordinary Ethiopian citizens have contact with the administration on an 
everyday basis (Interview DG-23; 32; 33; DR-03). First of all, this is because the 
kebelle is not a budgetary unit. Regional, zonal and woreda level governments 
receive block grants from the level of government above. This is to address the 
vertical imbalance in revenue versus expenditure between the federal and 
regional administrations and this is the most important source of income for 
them (World Bank, 2008). The grant is distributed based on population, 
development and poverty indicators as well as regional tax efforts (USAID, 
2006). Revenue collection is still centralised, whereas expenditures are 
decentralised, which gives the federal government superior financial leverage 
over regional and local spending. Hence any development plans at the kebelle 
level requiring budgets need to be approved by the woreda office even though the 
kebelle office is accountable for the preparation of development plans, ensuring 
the tax collection, organising local labour and managing administrative tasks 
(Interview DG-16; 38). It means that the kebelle office, which is the first 
administrative tier of governmental structure that ordinary citizens interact 
with, is heavily reliant on higher levels of government (particularly, the woreda 
office) and has limited opportunity to manoeuvre with administrative autonomy.  
 
In many cases, the kebelle’s budgets are just enough to cover the salaries of 
its officers and operational costs rather than public service delivery. As an officer 
of Kebelle A notes, “This kebelle really needs electricity and roads to markets. We 
have been asking the woreda office for a long time. I came to this village three 
years ago… My predecessor told me that he was also asking the woreda a number 
of times… Sometimes I pay out of my own pocket for stationery in the office. I 
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also do farming and animal husbandry” (Interview DG-16). An officer of Woreda 
X agrees this situation when he explains, “We have 17 kebelles and they all have 
similar problems. As a woreda in rural hinterlands, we have very limited 
budgets… Eventually we will try to deliver what they ask but it takes time” (DG-
38). The national coordinator of SGP also explains,  
 
“That is why we have decided to implement the [CBA] projects at the kebelle 
level. After discussing with EPA [Environment Protection Authority of Ethiopia] 
and MoANR [Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources], also following the 
previous projects implemented by UNDP [United Nations Development 
Programme], we agreed that the kebelle has government officers who take 
responsibility and assist us, but suffers from the lack of financial resources” 
(Interview AA-01).  
 
At the same time, the kebelle, with an average population of 4,000, has rather 
complex governance structures itself which operate as two parallel systems of 
organisation. The first system is made up of locally organised institutions that 
are generally designed for social, cultural and religious activities such as senbete, 
idir and mahaber.22 The other system is that of the state government, which is 
made up of an elected head of the kebelle council, a council committee, a social 
court with three judges (who are often local priests), one administrative officer 
and one police officer appointed by the woreda (Poluha, 2003). The committee 
members are representatives of gotts, head teachers, militias, local priests and 
leaders of state-initiated associations (e.g. women’s leagues, One-to-Five 
networks and youth associations). These two systems are intricately interwoven 
so that local governance structures are seldom independent from any historic 
                                                  
22 Sebete is a religious association organised for religious affairs; Idir is a burial network for 
mutual support during times of funerals; Mahaber is an economic welfare network working for 
community development (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). 
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cultural, social, economic and political institutions, particularly those organised 
by the state and the ruling party.  
 
This overlap between community-led and state-led structures at this scale 
frequently causes confusion in local people’s perception about any messages, 
people or even development projects coming from ‘outside’. It means that most 
people in rural areas regard whatever comes from outside as yebalal akal (‘orders 
from above’ in Amharic) (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). A leader of a women’s 
league shows that she thinks that the CBA project was implemented by the state 
when she says, “If there is another project coming, I would like to ask our 
government for a medical centre and electricity” (Interview DR-07). A leader of a 
gott also confuses the state with the political party when he says, “We meet 
regularly on every Sunday and discuss our problems… If the party does not 
become a leader, show the way and become a light, I do not think of organising 
people alone and solve the problems… If the government helps, nothing will be 
difficult” (DG-22). This is partially because whenever the national coordinator of 
SGP or any other external figures visited the villages they were accompanied by 
the woreda and kebelle officers. Some interviewees even thought that I was from 
the federal government and I needed to reconfirm several times that this 
research is an independent academic study.  
 
The concept of kebelle was initially designed by the Derg regime so as to 
organise every household in rural villages throughout the country into its 
administrative systems. Its aim was to effectively implement the rural 
development and land reform programmes and to ensure that taxes and other 
dues are properly collected (Young, 1997). The kebelle system was however 
quickly transformed into a highly effective apparatus of control and repression 
by the regime and started working as the extended arm of central government; 
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instilling the socialist ideas and implementing its political orders in the rural 
peasantry as well as keeping any grassroots and potential ‘anti-revolutionary’ 
activities under surveillance. Even after the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power the system remained at the lowest 
level of government, which consolidates and extends the influence of the ruling 
party throughout the country. That is to say, the main objective of kebelle, from 
the government’s view, is focused on keeping rural villages under surveillance 
and disseminating government propaganda rather than on delivering 
government services to local populations (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). 
Ethiopian citizens are well aware of this security apparatus and how their 
relations with it may mediate access to resources - land rights, improved seeds, 
fertilisers, infrastructures, health services, and so on.  
 
Below the kebelle level, the governance structures vary depending on the 
region. In particular, there is no formal sub-kebelle structure in the Oromia and 
Afar regions whereas the kebelle is sub-divided into gotts (called kantas in 
SNNPR) in other regions including Amhara and SNNP regions where this 
research took place. In a gott, with an average of 30 to 60 households, there is 
generally one elected leader with two deputies appointed by the leader (Interview 
DG-20). They represent the interests of the gott at the kebelle meetings and are 
mostly males, though in theory women can be deputies (DG-02). There are also 
membership-based groups of One-to-Five networks, women’s leagues and 
youth associations at the gott level for various kinds of political and economic 
activities. These groups are often perceived as an extension of state structures, 
though in theory they have to adopt an independent stance towards government 
and are meant to work for community development only (DG-27; DR-04). For 
instance, the One-to-Five network which was initiated to practise 
‘developmental activities’ has underpinned the massive expansion of the EPRDF 
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in rural Ethiopia since 2005. The party now has approximately 7 million 
members throughout the country (Mosley, 2015). The idea is that the ‘one’ is a 
model farmer and each model farmer - a party member who is trained and 
educated by the EPRDF - brings five neighbouring peasants in his wake, which 
as a result will entrench EPRDF control in places which the capacity of 
government to reach is limited (Lefort, 2015). 
 
The system of gott was initially modelled on a set of quasi-governmental 
structures designed by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). During the 
war against the Derg, the system was built by the TPLF to gain the support of 
organised rural communities in the Tigray region (Young, 1997). That is to say, it 
is in the shape of a kinship-based group or close neighbourhood, which works 
together whilst being a tactical socio-political measure to control peasant 
communities (Tronvoll and Hagmann, 2012). A farmer describes his gott by 
saying, “My brother lives over there with his wife and three children… We often 
work on bamboo trees together” (Interview DG-32). Another female farmer also 
explains, “We women gather and discuss issues… I don’t talk to women from 
other gotts” (DG-18).  
 
In summary, decentralisation in Ethiopia is focused on the delegation of 
major administrative departments from zonal to woreda governments, 
urbanising rural hinterlands. Meanwhile, most kebelle offices do not enjoy the 
same financial capacity as the woreda although this is the level which most 
ordinary Ethiopian citizens have contact with the administration on an everyday 
basis. At the same time, the kebelle has rather complex governance structures 
itself that locally organised institutions and that of the state government are 
intricately interwoven. The kebelle system was initially designed by the Derg to 
implement the land reform programmes, but quickly transformed into an 
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apparatus of security. Under the EPRDF regime, the system has remained and is 
now perceived as the scale of ‘community’, whilst sharing its security function 
with the gott, as having government officers appointed by upper government 
officers. The pattern of social interaction in Ethiopia, including a strictly 
hierarchical stratification of governance, stretches up from very local levels and 
constrains citizens in a rigid system of collective sanctions to obey the ‘orders 
from above’. Having externally funded CBA projects, in this context, may create 
an opportunity to build administrative independence at the kebelle level and to a 
certain extent allow intra-community debates which are often followed by a 
degree of local democracy. At the same time, having the projects at the kebelle 
level demonstrates the intention of the Ethiopian government to keep local 
communities under surveillance, whilst filling the financial gap in local 
development, without any discussions about whether this is a community with 
local communities themselves. 
 
6.1.2 Where CBA Comes: A View of Citizens  
 
The ability to identify what sort of assistance is needed and recognise who 
might provide it are key components of subsistence farming. The Ethiopian 
peasantry particularly needs these abilities in order to survive in a country where 
the government lacks the capacity to provide basic services to its own people. 
The country’s previous agrarian crises were the consequence of contradictions in 
state policy; the politicisation of agriculture and agricultural change; and the 
redefinition of state-peasant relations, all of which were imposed from outside 
of the peasantry (Clapham, 1990; Dessalegn Rahmato, 1993). What has not 
received much consideration is how these local peasant communities have been 
organised, particularly at which scale (in aspects of social life, family security 
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and kinship identity) they build resilience against the potential threats to their 
livelihoods.  
 
In Ethiopia, there is still an open-ended definition of community despite the 
widespread popularity of CBA and a number of government initiatives and 
policies of devolution. Through the promotion of decentralisation, the ethos and 
logics of community are entrenched in the way peasants are organised and 
villages are controlled by the state depending on the region. This spills over into 
the members’ identities and definitions of their community. They envisage it as 
a group of people who share “the same livelihoods and environment” (Interview 
DG-39), “the sorrow and happiness” (DR-01) or “benefits and other good things 
together” (DR-03). For instance, in Amharic, which remains the language of the 
Ethiopian state at the federal and some regional levels, mahibereseb is the word 
used for ‘community’. It is originated from the word of ‘society’ and 
‘association’, mahiber, and the word of ‘socialism’, mahiberesebawinet, which 
were both introduced during the Derg regime.23 This polysemy is also found in 
Swahili,24 jamil refers to both community and society. In Tanzania, for example, 
society generally springs to mind first when it comes to rural peasants and 
community requires further description and clarification in most cases 
(Interview AA-04). It is also the case in Ethiopia that most rural peasants, 
particularly in northern Ethiopia, do not understand the word mahibereseb 
instantly but do understand mahiber without any clarification. This confusion 
rather unexpectedly provided opportunities to discuss “where and how, between 
whom, between what points, according to what processes, and with what 
effects” the concept of community is conceived, instead of just asking 
                                                  
23 Informal talk with Prof Dereje Feyissa Dori, the College of Law and Governance on 5 June 
2015. 
24 A Bantu language of the Great Lake’s region and East Africa including Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
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interviewees’ perception of ‘what community is’ (Foucault, 2009[1977]:2), just 
as Foucault addressed government, so we could think about community.  
 
Community easily becomes a problematic category in a country where the 
top-down hierarchy is firmly in place. This is because a homogenising discourse, 
which regards community as an undifferentiated mass, can be comfortably 
imposed. Moreover, the word ‘community’ is frequently used as a shorthand or 
magic bullet depending on what kind of agenda international donor agencies 
follow.25 This research is thus based on an ethnographic description of 
community from a view of the Ethiopian rural peasantry. In particular, 
adaptation within systems resilience is specific not only to the spatial scale at 
which changes occur, but also to the institutional scale because the scale at 
which adaptive capacity is analysed has implications for building resilience of 
socio-ecological systems. 
 
The personal definition of community is influenced by socio-political milieu 
and individual motivation (Heller, 1989). Eating with friends and family is, for 
instance, an important part of Ethiopian life (Howard, 2009). A man who has no 
private land and so needs to regularly go to cities such as Debre Marcos or Addis 
Ababa for manual labour says, “Community? I do not have much education… For 
me, as a member of the Amhara ethnic group, community means a group that 
eats and drinks together… They are my supporters” (Interview DG-04). He then 
adds, “Addis Ababa is a big city. People are from everywhere… I don’t know 
them… I often eat alone there… Leaving my pregnant wife and children behind” 
(DG-04). He felt alienated in Addis Ababa, which is a melting pot of diverse 
ethnic groups as the country’s capital and has a population of more than 8 
                                                  
25 Informal talk with Prof Dereje Feyissa Dori, the College of Law and Governance on 5 June 
2015. 
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million. Ethiopia is also a religious country. According to the 2007 National 
Census, more than 99.9% of the population has a religion. A local deacon 
describes, “The livelihoods of community is like this… We live in a scattered 
manner over the hills. Then our community is an institution which is a collection 
of people. We live together through social lives. We, brothers, follow Orthodox 
Christianity” (DG-28). One farmer also echoes, “The definition of community is 
being good in a church… We, neighbours, gather together and worship God 
together and mourn together” (DR-18). 
 
Community is also relational because it is communal. It concerns the quality 
of human relationships and the social ties which draw people together and bind 
them over time. An officer of Kebelle A defines community as “their 
organisational status such as women’s leagues and youth associations… We can 
also link it with their education and health condition” (Interview DG-16). This 
perspective focuses on networks of individuals who interact within formal and 
informal institutions (Gusfield, 1978). A former leader of a women’s league 
explains, “Before young people came and put me aside because I am old, I was 
the leader of women’s league… The community is a group of people that gather 
together like a women’s league… That is my community” (DG-15). She then 
adds, “The women’s league is now more active than during my time. It is good 
to be together. Women should participate in the meetings and speak in public 
without being shy” (DG-15). This is community as collective political power, 
referring to a group of people who share similar political interests, as a potential 
lever for social change (Heller, 1989).  
 
This relationship between power and community reminds us that community 
can be also used as a tool of exclusion as well as inclusion. It means, being in an 
alien community whilst living in the same village is sufficient enough to create 
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conflicts in the political sphere by drawing a distinction between ‘the friend’ and 
‘the enemy’ (Schmitt, 1932). However, this incongruity of community is often 
brushed over in the development industry. One member of a youth association 
explains, “The youth groups in our kebelle are disadvantaged and we are 
subjected to various economic problems. We have little land and are unemployed. 
There are some of my friends who have already migrated to Wollega26 in search 
of jobs” (Interview DG-31). Another member echoes this view, “We young adults 
don’t have many animals. Other community members have numerous animals” 
(DG-04). In contrast, a leader of CBO DG complains, “There are some youngsters 
who disturb things here… The community agreed the idea of area closure and no 
one opposed except those youngsters” (DG-42). These issues of young adults 
and area closure will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
 
Meanwhile, it is important to compare the definition of community in 
people’s perception to the official structures of government administration to 
see how different they are. A leader of CBO DG describes community as, “a group 
of people who have a similar culture and similar living conditions. To live 
together in sorrow and happiness is also characteristics of community. My 
community members communicate with me through idir and the like in the 
kebelle” (Interview DG-02). In contrast, a treasurer of CBO DG explains, “A 
community is a group of people who accept our ideas and work with a common 
understanding such as One-to-Five network. A community means people who 
work together with common understanding in a gott” (DG-01). He then argues, 
“Of course, we talk with people from other gotts and share best practices, for 
example in irrigation, construction of latrines and the like. We get connected 
through the idir and the like and we have good relationship… also through the 
                                                  
26 Wollega is a neighbouring zone of East Gojjam and is located in the western part of Ethiopia. 
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watershed project.27 But my brothers and friends are from this gott” (DG-01). 
Here idir is the network organised at the kebelle level and One-to-Five network 
at the gott level. These two narratives show that there is a difference in 
perceptions of the scale of community even between the leaders of CBO DG. 
 
In northern Ethiopia, most research participants considered the scale of 
community as either gott or kebelle in their perception (see Table 2). This is 
because the north is historically a kinship-based society, as discussed in Chapter 
Five, which used to share the corporate ownership of land (rist tenure) and be 
part of the same gult. At the same time, the concepts of kebelle and gott have been 
imposed by the Derg and the TPLF (later the EPRDF) respectively over the last 40 
years. In particular, there was a tendency for those who have social and political 
positions in the gott or kebelle (e.g. leaders, priests and militias) to choose kebelle 
as the scale of community, and for ordinary citizens to choose gott. The reason is 
that those with the positions generally have a greater chance of having contact 
with kebelle officers and people from other gotts and to discuss issues at the 
kebelle meetings. Put differently, their choices are dependent on the physical and 
geographical proximity to the kebelle office. For instance, I found that a number 
of gotts are sparsely scattered over the hills in kebelle A. The kebelle office is 
seldom used by some inhabitants as it is two to three hours away by foot. 
  
                                                  
27 This is the name of CBA project local people call. 
  206
 
Kebelle A  
in northern Ethiopia 
Kebelle B  
in southern Ethiopia 
Total 
Family 0 0 (7*) 0 (7*) 
Gott 19 3 (4*) 22 (4*) 
Kebelle 17 10 27 
Woreda 0 0 0 
Zone 0 0 0 
Region 1 1 2 
Country 3 1 (22*) 4 (22*) 
Table 2. Administrative scale of community in local people’s perception / Unit: 
persons (* The data was collected during focus group discussions) 
 
In contrast, fewer interviewees regarded gott as the scale of community in 
southern Ethiopia. The south is historically a clan-based, if not ethnic-based, 
society. After being subsumed by the Abyssinian Empire, neftegnas were 
appointed as supreme administrator in the region until the Derg replaced them 
with Peasant Associations. Moreover, there were more state farms in the south 
than the north as its land is more fertile and the climate makes it preferable for 
agriculture. Meanwhile, during the focus group discussions, the majority of 
participants chose the country as the scale of community and a few opted for 
family and gott. Attendees at these discussions included kebelle officers, and 
leaders of CBOs and militias and this might have had an influence on their 
decision. This shows how the socio-political milieu of the south has been shaped 
by the state and has in return featured people’s ethos and behaviour in public.  
 
In summary, the individual definition of community is significantly 
dependent on the person’s socio-political milieu, which is formulated by culture, 
history and geography. The government’s definition of community is based on 
  207 
its strategy for ruling the country and controlling local communities. In a literal 
sense, there is a degree of consensus around the kebelle as the scale of 
community between government and citizens – i.e. the scale of socio-ecological 
systems – even if the administrative purpose of the kebelle is different. The 
perception of community, however, cannot be reconciled unless one imposes its 
will upon the other. Ethiopian citizens are well aware of this security role of 
kebelle and how their relations with it may mediate access to resources. In this 
research, the definition of community is taken to be idiosyncratic and to imply 
an individual conceptual schema which shapes people’s social life and 
livelihoods and eventually socio-ecological systems. It is used as a basis against 
the homogenising discourse of community against which the government’s 
understandings and visions are compared. That is to say, the research sets out to 
determine if peasant farmers envisage, describe and articulate a shape and type 
of community that they consider they belong to. Hence, the ways in which the 
farmers understand the concept of community and what communities they think 
they are part of were explored during the interviews and focus group 
discussions, so that the sense of community which shapes their behaviours in 
public and boundaries of socio-ecological systems could be also analysed. Yet, 
the thesis argues, there are forms of bureaucracy and hierarchy existing in the 
Ethiopian society, which in many ways undermine or challenge the principles of 
CBA. It is therefore important to regard the peasants as shaped by milieu, 
livelihoods and individual motivation whilst maintaining a focus on their 
capacity to challenge these structures. 
 
6.2  Knowledge: What We Know and What We Do to Our Environments  
 
Adaptive governance of CBA refers to a system that organises climate change 
adaptation by drawing on indigenous knowledge and experience for the 
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development of common understanding and policies of community. In the 
context of CBA, communities are the main actor that defines their resilience and 
thresholds with their local knowledge and needs and tend to experience the 
current and next regimes of complex socio-ecological systems most (Nelson et 
al., 2007). The governance system is composed of multiple actors of CBO who 
engage each other through formal and informal arrangements of community. 
The management of CBA is responsible for decisions about climate change 
adaptation on an everyday basis, but is also accountable to the kebelle and woreda 
agricultural offices and the SGP office in Addis Ababa. This nested quality of 
governance provides opportunities for this research to capture the dynamics of 
institutional linkages and how indigenous knowledge is produced and regulated 
within and outside the structures of community. 
 
The hierarchical nature of the Ethiopian society creates distinctive 
mechanisms for the production and distribution of knowledge. These 
mechanisms define the socio-political arena of knowledge at different local 
levels, from a household/family to village/community. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, where power is structured by formal institutions such as state, social 
relationships often appear to be in the form of domination - the unequal balance 
of power in which the subordinated actors have an insignificant chance of 
exercising their will (Hannigan, 2006; Lemke, 2002).  
 
In the Ethiopian peasantry, discipline is usually practised under the 
administrative supervision of government, which is empowered by the scientific 
forms of discourse as well as the ultimate authority of state. This practice runs 
through social networks of local community and becomes firmly embedded in 
people’s perception and behaviour as if it was ‘orders from above’. This 
condition was labelled as ‘authoritarian governmentality’ in Chapter Two and 
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Five and is similar to James Scott’s cases of planning disaster (1999). The control 
over knowledge demarcates not only the participation of actors in the discussion 
but also the issues that are subject to debate (Davidson and Frickel, 2004). 
Moreover, Ethiopian citizens often readily accept the fact that the government is 
the most important source of knowledge (Vaughan and Tronvol, 2003). These all 
create little room for manoeuvre with regards to the perspective of indigenous 
knowledge and public debate, which are both emphasised as core principles in 
CBA.  
 
Meanwhile, the upsurge of the community-based approaches in the 
development industry has inspired political ecologists to identify a few 
fundamental questions by problematising the concept of indigenous knowledge. 
Among them three points appear to be vital in the context of CBA (discussed in 
Chapter Two). First, there is no such thing as purely indigenous knowledge 
(Rocheleau, 2008). Second, indigenous knowledge is not necessarily right or best 
(Kothari, 2001; Watts and Peet, 2004). Last, knowledge is frequently disguised 
and unequally circulated within a community (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). 
Political ecologists thus believe that knowledge reflects the political ability, 
rather than the legal entitlement, of individuals and groups and they call instead 
for increased concern with social justice in the analysis of environmental change. 
The ambition of political ecology in this context is to enhance the democratic 
content of community through identifying strategies for a more equitable mode 
of knowledge management as a specific component of systems resilience 
(Swyngedouw et al., 2002). In resilience thinking, adaptation refers not only to 
adaptability, but also to transformability, and these two aspects interrelate 
across multiple scales, based on past experiences and accumulated knowledge 
(Folke et al., 2010).  
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6.2.1 Discursively Constructed Knowledge of Climate Change 
 
Most Ethiopian peasants believe that climate change is happening. Their 
perception of climate change however varies depending on where they live, what 
modes of livelihood they pursue and what role they play in that mode. Strauss 
and Orlove (2003) argue that the weather is so ingrained in our everyday 
practices of livelihood that we often forget how this force profoundly shapes our 
milieu. This section sets out to demonstrate that the way the Ethiopian peasant 
farmers discuss climate change concerns not only their knowledge of it but also 
the contexts in which they interpret that understanding (Strauss and Orlove, 
2003). 
 
In northern Ethiopia, almost 90% of interviewees thought that the weather is 
slowly but gradually getting warmer. A cattle farmer explains, “It was very cold 
in the past, but we are seeing flies nowadays. We are also planting crops like 
bean, sorghum and teff28 which could not be produced here before” (Interview 
DG-03). Another farmer echoes, “Getting warmer for sure. In the previous years, 
we even could not sit here at this time of day” (DG-07). For precipitation, more 
than 80% of interviewees feel that they had more rain both this and last year 
than the previous years, but it did not come at the right times. A female farmer 
describes, “We want rain in March and April but last winter [June and July] we 
had lots of rain and I could not dry manure”29 (DG-30). Another farmer also 
explains, “The last two winters it was very difficult to bring my livestock home” 
(DG-03), whilst a local deacon adds, “I do not know the conditions before my 
birth, but the rain has increased with my age. In the previous years the rivers 
                                                  
28 Teff is an annual grass, native to Ethiopia and Eritrea. It is high in dietary fibre, iron, protein 
and calcium. Teff is an important food grain in Ethiopia and is used to make traditional Ethiopian 
bread, injera. 
29 Manure is used for household fuel and fertilising land and is mostly prepared by women in 
Ethiopia. 
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were passable but nowadays there is too much rain and the rivers become full 
and impassable. The channels of the rivers are broken, trees fall down and the 
torrential rain washes away the soil” (DG-28). Another farmer adds, “Not only 
the rain… the problem is that it comes with hailstones in winter. It destroys our 
crops” (DG-34). 
 
In contrast, in southern Ethiopia, almost all interviewees thought that the 
weather is getting cooler, which they believe is good for farming. A farmer 
describes, “Our area used to be characterised as desert… Now the temperature is 
better” (Interview DR-03). A treasurer of CBO DR agrees by saying, “We used to 
have malaria epidemics and food insecurity… The weather became suitable and 
cooler compared to 10 years ago” (DR-04). Regarding precipitation, almost 70% 
of interviewees found that rain does not come at the right times but the climate 
is improving. A farmer explains, “I do not think we have good rain now, not 
suitable for farming… We expect good rain from March…After September the 
weather should be dry” (DR-11). He then adds, “The rain this year is better than 
last year… It is related with the gift of God and the efforts of the government… 
No one can prevent something occurs through God and the government” (DR-
11). A female farmer adds, “This year the rain came in April but stopped before 
the maize completed its growth… Some crops were devastated by scorching sun… 
Last year the rain came during the dry season which is not appropriate” (DR-15). 
 
Forms of explicitly indigenous knowledge become more apparent when a 
community considers the ways in which management practices adapt to its 
environment. Most research participants believe that climate change happens 
because of their livelihood activities such as logging, cattle feeding and charcoal 
production. This idea is not entirely untrue in terms of the mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions and the local temperature change they may experience 
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“in the shade of trees” (Interview DR-03). However, these activities are not the 
major causes of global warming according to the generally accepted international 
body of scientific knowledge. An officer of Kebelle A describes this as “the 
understanding of the community itself” (DG-16). This perception has been built 
up through various processes of socialisation such as sharing stories with other 
community members, learning at school and acquiring knowledge handed down 
from their parents. A leader of a women’s league explains, for instance, “We 
gather and discuss about our forest… Where we can collect fuel wood and where 
we should not and the like” (DR-14). A former chairperson of Kebelle A adds, 
“This is my opinion… I am at fifth grade and learnt about the impacts of 
deforestation at school” (DG-39). A local priest also describes, “This is my 
opinion based on the information given by my father and grandfather… I stress 
the importance of forest when I preach the sermon” (DG-23). 
 
As a response, a certain proportion of community forest in the two villages 
was closed by the CBA project. After a series of meetings held by the CBO under 
the supervision of the government officers, the project selected the forest in 
Choke mountain for the northern village and in the lowlands for the southern 
village of Ethiopia. Most young adults objected this area closure activity during 
the meetings though their opinion was not considered. A young adult, for 
instance, describes, “During the meetings, we complained, calling for opening 
the enclosed area… We did not agree from the very beginning. They did the area 
closure on their own… We also all know warm weather is good for farming… 
People who get benefits out of the enclosed area are those who have enough 
private lands” (Interview DG-12). He then adds, “We, the youth, will eventually 
need to migrate from this village” (DG-12). How the area closure, as a core 
activity of CBA, was enforced in the villages will be further discussed in the 
following chapters. 
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Figure 6. Green beans destroyed by frost 
 
Indeed, in northern Ethiopia, most farmers believe that the warmer weather 
is better for farming. A farmer describes, “When the weather conditions were 
cold, we produced cabbage, barley and potato with low productivity. They got 
damaged by cold wind (See Figure 6)… Nowadays they grow even faster” (DG-
19). A female farmer agrees, “I prefer this warm weather. It is good for 
agricultural production… Good for maize… When it is cold, the rain comes with 
hailstones and destroys our crops” (DG-30). At the same time, they believe that 
this climate change is caused by deforestation they carried out. A former 
chairperson of Kebelle A explains, “Climate change… It is because of population 
pressure, deforestation of indigenous trees and over-cultivation of communal 
land” (DG-07). A local deacon adds, “What I heard from my forefathers… It is 
because of deforestation and degradation of natural resources. In the earlier 
years, Choke Mountain was covered by forest and the weather was very cold” 
(DG-28). 
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Meanwhile, the woreda and kebelle officers are aware of the local people’s 
understanding of climate change but are concerned about other negative 
consequences of deforestation for local environments (e.g. flooding and 
subsequent soil erosion during the rainy season). They are concerned that local 
people may continue deforesting to get a warmer climate for farming though no 
research participant ever expressed that motivation. In response, they organised 
a series of public education seminars on deforestation, particularly for Choke 
Mountain where local people use communal land for pasture and fuel wood 
collection. In addition, visiting researchers from Debre Marcos and Addis Ababa 
universities delivered ‘the orders from above’. A local deacon explains, “The 
agricultural experts from government taught us…Following the messages, I 
planted trees to protect the soil… This is our forest” (Interview DG-28). A 
secretary of CBO DG adds, “I heard from the experts at the woreda and kebelle 
offices… The importance of the forest… I also attended the training in Debre 
Zeyit with my government”30 (DG-41).  
 
As a result, local farmers become aware of the consequences of deforestation 
but are constrained from pursuing the modes of livelihood that have been 
dominant throughout the generations. In particular, a group of young adults in 
northern Ethiopia were against the idea of preventing them from using some 
parts of Choke Mountain since they do not have enough private land and pasture 
for their cattle. A former leader of a women’s league explains,  
 
“The major problem is the shortage of land. Whilst the population is 
increasing, there is not enough land, especially for our children… We used to 
                                                  
30 The training was organised by the SGP Ethiopia office, not the government. 
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bring our cattle and graze them on our Choke… Young people nowadays go to 
Debre Zeyit, Mojo, Nazreth and Addis Ababa for casual work… I understand the 
problem of deforestation. There is no solution other than using compost and 
improved seeds. We also need to construct terracing so as to conserve the land” 
(Interview DG-15).  
 
 
Figure 7. A girl collecting firewood from Choke Mountain in northern Ethiopia 
 
A 15-years-old girl also describes the situation, “The Choke forest is 
important, we learnt this at school… So we need to go further to collect firewood 
nowadays. We need to follow what the government says. But I hate to go far 
away for firewood. It is hard and scary (See Figure 7)” (DG-25). A young farmer 
appeals,  
 
“Last year one person died because of the flood around Waber. It is because of the 
lack of trees on Choke… I understand the increased temperature and flood… But my 
father has 2 timad of land and did not give any land to me. I have a wife and two 
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children. My wife does not have land from her father either. My income is only from 
animal fattening… If not Choke, where do I feed my animals?” (Interview DG-35). 
 
Nevertheless, some still believe that there is the lack of awareness and relate 
it to political stability and order. A treasurer of CBO DG, for instance, argues, 
“Because of the lack of awareness, there is no unity and solidarity in our kebelle” 
(Interview DG-01). An officer of Kebelle A agrees by saying, “Although the 
kebelle is usually covered by ice and cloud, the area is suitable for living. The 
problem is that the awareness level of community is low… It is related with their 
low adaption level of knowledge and technology” (DG-16). A former chairperson 
of Kebelle A describes,  
 
“The biggest problem in our kebelle is the lack of awareness. They do not 
show willingness to new ideas and projects in appropriate time… When you are a 
leader you should tell followers the boundaries. The people do not have a 
thorough understanding about what they are told to do and they do not give due 
attention to the matters… The leaders raise the awareness of community, teach 
them and build their understanding by explaining the significance of the project 
for them… We have a shortage of land, but based on scientific findings we can use 
the land more efficiently…We have to control population pressure and the youth 
should engage in trading activities and save money. They can use Choke for 
beekeeping and the production of seedlings… The youth has a lack of 
understanding” (Interview DG-39).  
 
In addition, contrary to the widely held belief, the population in this kebelle 
has decreased over the last few years. Most local people believe that the decline 
of arable land per capita is caused by overpopulation. A farmer explains, “In the 
previous years, everything was good. Nowadays there are great problems in 
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livelihoods because of overpopulation” (Interview DG-13). A representative of 
Kebelle A echoes, “The weather is becoming hotter and hotter because of 
overpopulation and deforestation practices” (DG-21). However, an officer of 
Kebelle A explains, “The whole population size has decreased because of the 
departure of students to other places for schooling, the migration of youths from 
rural to urban areas and the use of contraceptives… We have been educated by 
health extension workers” (DG-16). She then adds, “The population will 
continue to decrease in the future” (DG-16). Then where is all land in this 
kebelle? A young farmer gives a hint, “There are people who have more than 4 
timad of land… They are greedy and afraid of the redistribution [of land]… They 
closed our Choke… They don’t like us and we don’t like them” (DG-35). As 
mentioned at the start of the chapter, knowledge is disguised and unequally 
circulated in a community because of the differing power of social groups 
(Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Knowledge reflects the political ability of different 
groups and potentially decreases systems resilience and thus call for increased 
concern with social justice in the analysis of environmental change. 
 
Political ecologists problematise the concept of indigenous knowledge in the 
community-based development approaches. Governance of CBA refers to a 
system which organises climate change adaptation by drawing on indigenous 
knowledge and experience for the development of common understanding and 
policies of community. Meanwhile, the hierarchical nature of the Ethiopian 
society creates distinctive mechanisms for the production and distribution of 
knowledge, labelled as ‘authoritarian governmentality’. Most Ethiopian peasants 
believe that climate change is happening because of their livelihood activities 
such as logging, cattle feeding and charcoal production. This idea is neither 
entirely indigenous nor necessarily right, but was used to legitimise the area 
closure activity of the CBA project in those two villages. Knowledge reflects the 
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political ability of different groups and the ambition of political ecology in this 
context is to enhance the democratic content of community through identifying 
strategies for a more equitable mode of knowledge management as a specific 
component of systems resilience. 
 
6.3  Conclusion  
 
The chapter analysed how the scale of CBA is configured and how indigenous 
knowledge is taken up in discussions in Ethiopia. Peasant farmers who 
participated in the research were not regarded as a component of a single-voiced 
community, but as complex social actors with a variety of forms of social, 
cultural and political powers and aspirations. The chapter, first, drew attention 
to the politics of scale which represent the conflicting values and contrasting 
aspirations of different actors and institutions, and, second, called for increased 
concern with the democratic content of community through identifying 
strategies for a more equitable mode of knowledge management. In so doing, the 
chapter added political perspectives to the application of CBA and demonstrated 
how the hierarchical structures of community shape the building of adaptive 
capacity through CBA projects in 21st century Ethiopia. 
 
In a literal sense, there is a degree of consensus around the kebelle as the 
scale of community between government and citizens – i.e. the scale of socio-
ecological systems – even if the administrative purpose of the kebelle is different. 
As the lowest level of government, most ordinary Ethiopian citizens have contact 
with the Kebelle administration on an everyday basis. At the same time, the 
kebelle has complex governance structures that locally organised institutions and 
that of the state government are intricately interwoven. The kebelle system has 
been used a security apparatus of security by both the Derg and the EPRDF 
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regimes and is now perceived as the scale of ‘community’. Having the CBA 
projects at the kebelle level may create an opportunity to build administrative 
independence with a degree of local democracy, but also shows the intention of 
the Ethiopian government to keep local communities under surveillance whilst 
filling the financial gap in local development. Meanwhile, the individual 
definition of community is significantly dependent on the person’s socio-
political milieu. The perception of community cannot be reconciled unless one 
imposes its will upon the other and Ethiopian citizens are well aware of this 
security apparatus role of kebelle. The individual definition of community is used 
as a basis against the homogenising discourse of community against which the 
government’s understandings and visions are compared. 
 
Governance of CBA organises climate change adaptation by drawing on 
indigenous knowledge and experience. In the Ethiopian peasantry, discipline is 
often practised under the administrative supervision of government, which is 
empowered by the scientific forms of discourse as well as the ultimate authority 
of state. This practice runs through social networks of local community and 
becomes firmly embedded in people’s perception and behaviour as if it was 
‘orders from above’. This condition was labelled as ‘authoritarian 
governmentality’. Moreover, forms of explicitly indigenous knowledge become 
more apparent when a community considers the ways in which management 
practices adapt to its environment. Most Ethiopian peasants believe that climate 
change is happening because of their livelihood activities such as logging, cattle 
feeding and charcoal production. This idea is neither entirely indigenous nor 
necessarily right, but was used to legitimise the area closure activity of the CBA 
project. Knowledge reflects the political ability of different groups and thus call 
for increased concern with social justice in the analysis of environmental change 
as a specific component of systems resilience. 
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In conclusion, the approach adopted in this chapter not only presents 
political accounts of CBA, but also offers an original perspective on the structure 
called ‘a community’ in development practice. Yet, the thesis argues, there are 
forms of bureaucracy and hierarchy existing in both Kebelle A and B, which in 
many ways undermine the principles of CBA. It is therefore important to regard 
the peasant farmers as a component of socio-ecological systems that are shaped 
by their socio-political milieu, livelihoods and motivation. With this in mind, 
this thesis now moves on to the politics emerged during the CBA projects and the 
way the power dynamics of community were redefined by the projects. 
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Chapter Seven. Changing Power Dynamics within the Case Study 
Communities 
 
The creation of community-based organisations (CBOs) has led to the 
emergence of a parallel governance system alongside the kebelle office for 
natural resource management. Whilst inheriting the top-heavy and intricate 
socio-cultural norms and rules of kebelle, this process necessarily involves a 
multifarious web of relationships between CBOs and other sub-kebelle 
institutions such as One-to-Five networks, women’s leagues and youth 
associations. In this context, this chapter sets out to demonstrate the 
simultaneous decentralisation and recentralisation of power and authority 
within the case study communities, particularly through the case of area closure, 
which is one of the core activities of community-based adaptation (CBA).  
 
In order to answer the research question 2), ‘to what extent does the current 
practice of CBA shape complex socio-ecological systems of a community in 
Ethiopia’, this chapter first addresses ‘who participates in the decision-making 
processes of CBA’ and ‘how their identities are determined’ (the research 
question 2a). Based on these findings, Chapter Eight will examine ‘to what 
extent do CBA projects change the geometry of power of a community’. 
 
The discussion which follows in this chapter aims to show how actors and 
institutions exercise various forms of political assets within the predetermined 
socio-ecological systems to compete over access to resources. The assertion of 
power is a source of social and administrative assets which community members 
wish to convert into a form of dominance in the decision-making process. In the 
two villages in which the field research was conducted, people gained a 
significant amount of political influence through their participation in the CBA 
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projects because of the extent to which the structures of community are 
inscribed into the way in which the projects are implemented. That is to say: 
participation in the CBA projects is a product of a politically-conflicted, 
economically-varied and culturally-imposed social order. In this sense, those 
forms of power are not simply projected into the practices of CBA, but rather the 
participation of actors emerge out of their experience and engagement with the 
social, economic, ecological and political realities of the community. 
 
The first half of this chapter analyses the intra-community politics in the 
case study communities in terms of socio-political components such as position, 
education level, wealth, age and gender. Based on this analysis, the second half 
interrogates the change in power dynamics, considering the interaction between 
the practice of politics and the unfolding of the CBA projects in the northern case 
study (Kebelle A). In so doing, this chapter demonstrates how the dominant 
group of Kebelle A managed to remain predominant which directly affected the 
community’s adaptive capacity – quite possibly in a positive manner in this case. 
 
7.1  Internal Differentiation within the Communities 
 
There are over eighty-five separately categorised ethnic groups in Ethiopia. 
The cultural diversity leads to an extremely complex and varied range of 
practices of power and authority within each group, which makes any kind of 
generalisation difficult. At the same time, many groups share a few key elements 
of what can be regarded as customary practice of democracy, which highlight 
consociational approaches to power-sharing whilst still being hierarchical 
(Bahru Zewde and Pausewang, 2002). Although it may sound far from an ideal 
democracy, this so called Abyssinian political tradition has long been considered 
the symbolic foundation on which to build a modern democratic political system 
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in Ethiopia. It is commemorated and recounted as ‘indigenous’ in vindication of 
these customary practices of democracy (Bahru Zewde and Pausewang, 2002). 
This tradition exists in different forms of practice depending on the ethnic 
groups throughout Ethiopia; the Xeer of the Somali (Lewis, 1961), the Gada of the 
Oromo, and the Seera of the Sidamo and the Gurage (Bassi and Boku Tache, 
2011).  
 
The Ethiopian peasantry is characterised by a complex set of norms and rules 
that often guide the social behaviour of people and ensure their place in their 
own socio-political structures. The CBA approach aims to empower local 
communities by strengthening members’ participation in decision-making 
process. Yet there is a widely accepted assumption in the aid industry that if 
meeting places are local and rules for access and distribution are fair, all parties 
will be able to participate and benefit (Cleaver, 2009). The aspirations of the 
members become entrenched in the structures, ethos and logics of the 
communities. Bearing this in mind, this section first sets out to analyse a degree 
of local democracy in two villages, before proceeding to the specific case of CBA 
projects. 
 
There is an institutionalised process of decision-making at the kebelle level. A 
officer of Kebelle A describes the process as,  
 
“The kebelle office drafts agendas of discussion and then we discuss this with 
the kebelle council committee and based on their suggestions we have another 
discussion with the kebelle people. If they do not accept our decision and if the 
case is strong, we refer it to the upper governing structures… The kebelle office 
cannot make a decision alone. There are about ten government structures that 
work with us… We have a women’s league meeting on the 21st, a militia meeting 
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on 7th, the kebelle council meeting on 29th, etc. For the kebelle meeting, we have 
around 300 people coming. Half of them are women” (Interview DG-16).  
 
A representative of Kebelle A adds, “When people have opinions, the platform 
is open and they raise questions. In the kebelle meeting, around 200 people come 
and some 20 people may speak and then a vote will be made” (Interview DG-21). 
Most interviewees during the field research agreed with this opinion and 
confirmed that both women and men have the right to attend any meetings and 
speak out. A leader of CBO DG explains, “Though people differ in communication 
skills, all have an equal right to speak” (DG-42). A young militia member also 
adds, “They speak equally. They have equal rights. Every Sunday we have a 
meeting [at the gott level] on gender specific basis, men and women separately. 
Sometimes they all come together for discussions” (DG-11). A female farmer also 
agrees by saying, “Nowadays everyone can speak in the meetings. There is 
nothing stopping you from speaking… even for women” (DG-09).  
 
However, whether their voices are heard or not is another story. For some 
interviewees, the improved awareness and enhanced rights do not necessarily 
mean freedom of speech or automatically grant them a platform from which to 
express their views. A leader of a gott explains, “Yes, open-minded people speak 
openly and equally. However, people who are mentally sick and have negative 
motives do not get an attention” (Interview DG-22). This comment encouraged 
me to attend a few different kebelle and sub-kebelle meetings around the villages. 
My aim was to reveal who and what sort of criteria there are to decide the level 
of attention that a speaker receives and the influence a speaker has on the 
others. These include socio-political positions, education level, wealth, age and 
gender though their weighting is dependent on the make-up of the audience. 
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First, despite their own claims to listen to their ‘constituency’ the local 
government officers have very great influence over the residents in their 
designated village. In particular, there are one or two development officers at 
each kebelle appointed by the woreda government. This full-time position was 
initially created by the Derg to fill the role of previous neftegna. This was a 
mechanism to secure upward accountability whilst ensuring that a kebelle 
chairperson and leaders tow the government line rather than following 
community demands (Pausewang, 2002). The officers are often more qualified 
than the chairperson and move unpredictably between kebelles within the same 
woreda every three to five years.  
 
In the Ethiopian tradition and language, there is no distinction between the 
word ‘state’ and ‘government’, they are both referred to as mengist. Being a 
government representative, the kebelle officers are vested with the authority of 
the state/government and as discussed in Chapter Five they have historically 
controlled the public political domain and activities of social groups at the village 
level. Considering the hierarchical structures of Ethiopian bureaucracy, they 
seldom question the ‘orders from above’ whilst also seldom being questioned by 
citizens in their locality. One farmer describes this condition as, “The kebelle 
officers are afraid of the woreda officers and dare not tell them the real situations 
here… And we are afraid of them… Then what is the point of having a number of 
meetings here?” (Interview DR-22).  
 
Second, social, political and religious positions provide a great degree of 
influence to ‘patriarchs’ at the kebelle and sub-kebelle levels. For instance, more 
than 30% of interviewees answered ‘Animaw Taye’, the name of the current 
chairperson of the kebelle, when they were asked which kebelle they live in, in the 
northern case study. A former chairperson of Kebelle A explains, “People think 
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the leader of kebelle is the kebelle itself” (Interview DG-39). Most leaders of 
kebelles, gotts, CBOs, One-to-Five networks and women’s leagues get a certain 
degree of public respect and tend to introduce themselves with reference to their 
position. Just as the bureaucracy inculcates ways of thinking and acting, the 
positions also extend a degree of influence further and take on broader socio-
political, patriarchal and symbolic significance.  
 
There are also nepotistic networks in villages created by those positions. A 
leader of a women’s league introduces her family as, “My first son is a teacher at 
school, the second son is a leader of a gott and my husband is a leader of kebelle 
militias” (Interview DG-14). A treasurer of CBO DG also says, “The kebelle officer 
is a daughter of my cousin and we often discuss matters here [his house]. I also 
go to the kebelle office frequently” (DG-01). This trend somewhat divides the 
kebelle into multi-networked communities which support and oppose each other 
according to circumstances. Meanwhile, it often further isolates the already 
marginalised groups. When asked “Do you have any position in your gott or 
kebelle?”, a young farmer answers, “Of course not, we are young adults and we 
do not have much land and I am not close to any of those people” (DG-13).  
 
Militia men31 and party members also have a strong influence in public 
meetings. Over the last 15 years, most chairpersons in the two villages have been 
ex-militia men. A militia man explains, “We are supposed to safeguard the 
village. The militia has no power unless they are educated… But more 
opportunities are given to militias if we are educated” (Interview DR-02). Here 
‘more opportunities’ means leadership positions in the village. In general, they 
                                                  
31 ‘The People's Militia’ was first established by the Derg to ‘safeguard the revolution’ in 1975. 
The regime’s intention was to raise a regional force on a local basis to carry out police duties in order 
to protect collectivised properties of Peasant Associations (PA) (Markakis and Waller, 1986). The 
system has still remained largely in rural Ethiopia and is used to organise community activities. 
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receive a certain degree of public respect and always introduce themselves as 
militia as they were trained, bestowed with a rifle and ‘ordained’ by government 
as a guardian of the village. They also go around the village and call people to 
come to the communal activities of kebelle (See Figure 8).  
 
 
Figure 8. Militia men calling people to come for community work in northern 
Ethiopia  
 
The political party members seemed more active in decision-making in the 
southern case study. According to a leader of a One-to-Five network, “The 
militia men and religious leaders speak more than others, but they only speak 
when they are asked to do so… But the political cadres [the political party 
members] always speak more” (Interview DR-03). A judge of Kebelle B also says, 
“Yes, the party members and kebelle leaders speak more… The agendas made by 
the kebelle leaders could not be accepted unless approved by the party members. 
Then the agendas go to the kebelle meeting which can be accepted or rejected by 
the members” (DR-05).  
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The religious leaders of Orthodox Christianity (in the north) and Protestant 
Christianity (in the south) have the influence on defining the boundaries of 
appropriate behaviour and to limit the social space of specific groups such as 
women. In northern Ethiopia, there were several local priests and deacons at 
every kebelle meeting, based on the researcher’s observation, and they were 
often engaged in decision-making as small-scale power brokers. They ensure 
that the norms and rules of the Church are followed by people and confine 
women to narrowly defined roles (Vaughan and Tronvol, 2003). A local priest 
(and a treasurer of CBO DG) explains, “Elders and priests are more accepted by 
the people. We have only one religion, Christianity. The elders and priests do 
arbitration work and they can be heard more in the meetings” (Interview DG-
23). A militia man agrees by saying, “The religious leaders are the platform 
themselves and they are given a place around the table in the meetings. They are 
also involved in arbitration” (DR-02). 
 
Third, relative wealth and education levels are also central elements in 
determining people’s socio-political status and therefore their authority and 
behaviour within decision-making processes. Built upon the cultural customs, 
the status is also judged by the appearance and behaviour of people in public. A 
local priest (and a treasurer of CBO DG) points out, “When your clothes are not 
similar… For instance, the rich dresses in clean clothes and the poor may not 
have soap to wash their clothes… Their acceptance will not be same and the poor 
will be shy in public” (Interview DG-23). A female farmer also agrees by saying, 
“People are not equal… After achieving the expected changes, such as hygiene at 
home, the rich can express their opinion freely” (DG-03). Or the difference 
might be about the way a person gives a speech, as a farmer explains, “The 
uneducated people do not speak in an orderly manner but they can still raise 
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their hands and speak like the educated people” (DG-31). A female farmer adds, 
“Educated people bring the truth to the attention of the public. They are 
appreciated and their speech makes us glad” (DG-17). An elderly farmer 
confirms, “The educated people speak more and we accept them. We like orators. 
They teach and advise us… So yes, educated people have a better chance of being 
heard in the meetings” (DG-34).  
 
This condition may inhibit the poor and uneducated from speaking in public. 
As a militia man points out, “Poor people have anxiety and fear things. But rich 
people fear nothing… The poor may be afraid of politics and they fear that they 
will be imprisoned for an unknown political reason. The rich have some skills 
and they do not say things that could upset the political cadres” (Interview DR-
02). A secretary of CBO DG also explains, “Since the majority is illiterate, people 
are slow to understand the issues… I was trusted by the community as I am 
educated and can make decisions by consulting with my friends” (DG-02). It is 
therefore apparent that the rich’s influence is tied to their understanding of how 
to play politics, whereas the uneducated/poor often say what they think and 
expose themselves to risk. This explains how having a voice is not the same as 
being influential. 
 
Fourth, whilst there are signs of ongoing changes to socially-imposed gender 
roles on the ground, various forms of social oppression of women persist in rural 
Ethiopia. A representative of Kebelle A explains, “Women come to the meetings 
by being forced… Not only women, but also some people did not have such 
chances previously. Nowadays there are more chances for women and they can 
speak even more than men if they want” (Interview DG-21). A female farmer 
supports this point, “Sometimes we speak more than men and probably with 
better logic, but it is less accepted by the public” (DG-18). A male farmer adds, 
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“Women come to the meetings but do not speak. [Researcher: Why?] They have 
not got used to the meeting procedures and they come only to observe the 
situation” (DG-19).  
 
This oppression is in relation to other social circumstances of women such as 
education, perceived expertise or marital status. For instance, “Women alone 
will never go to meetings. We usually go with our men [husbands or male family 
members]” (Interview DG-03), as a female farmer explains. Another female 
farmer elaborates,  
 
“There is a chance for everyone to speak. Only being uneducated can prevent 
him from speaking… I do not speak. We, women, stay silent… They [men] give 
permission but we do not participate because even if we speak, they do not accept 
us. When we make a mistake everybody laughs… They will laugh at men too, but 
they are not shy… The leader [of a women’s league] gives some comments in the 
meeting but even she becomes shy as she is illiterate” (Interview DG-17).  
 
In addition, this social boundary is often defined by the religious leaders as a 
local priest (and a treasurer of CBO DG) explains, “They fear to speak but they 
raise their hands during voting… This is our culture…They never get used to 
attend meetings and they lack experiences. Men are not afraid of speaking in 
public” (DG-23).  
 
Last, older age is traditionally accorded higher socio-political value in 
Ethiopia. A shimagile (‘elder’ in Amharic) is invited to meetings and is often 
involved in a process of settling local disputes, for instance, over land or grazing 
rights. A secretary of CBO DG describes how this works, “If the difference and 
contradiction is too much, the elders intervene and convince the arguing people 
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by saying that the leaders are our children and they do not bring bad issues to 
our village” (Interview DG-02). A local deacon adds, “The elders are heard when 
some wrong actions are carried out and they give decisions, arbitration and 
consultation and they are respected” (DG-28).  
 
Yet, although they play an important role as arbitrators of power relations, 
they do not represent the community as a whole. As a farmer explains, “Elderly 
people tend to speak in the churches and meetings, but they do not participate in 
other community activities” (DG-32). Rather, they often support the community 
leaders and stay behind the scenes. Also, not all elders achieve the status of a 
respected shimagile, as the uneducated or women, for instance, are basically 
excluded. Generally, those who had previously held leadership positions are 
retired into the status of respected shimagile (Vaughan and Tronvol, 2003).  
 
In addition to these criteria, there is a widely accepted opinion that decision-
making processes in Ethiopia are not discussions of issues, but a process of 
convincing people about decisions already made at higher levels of government. 
One farmer complains, “When we have the meetings, they [the leaders] say the 
decision is already made at the woreda with the experts… In principle the CBO 
decides everything but in fact the decision is already made and the CBO leaders 
say that we have to apply it. The area closure was like that” (Interview DR-13). If 
decisions have not been predetermined outside the community, they generally 
reflect the views that leaders have already settled on before the meeting: “The 
leaders speak more and they are well accepted… They always try to get their 
ideas accepted and are always in competition with each other… They may listen 
to our opinions but might go for their ideas” (DG-26).  
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This predetermination of outcomes can be enforced by social censure, as a 
treasurer of CBO DG explains, “It is the decision of leaders. We discuss and make 
decisions based on cases. We also meet in church and decide against wrongdoers 
who act against the law of the village… We exclude them from social activities. 
Since they could not live alone, they will eventually agree with us…When there 
are strong arguments, it will be resolved by the law enforcing bodies of kebelle” 
(Interview DG-01). A local priest (and a treasurer of CBO DG) adds, “We teach 
[rather than discuss with] them about the benefits of the project for current and 
future generations” (DG-23).  
 
In summary, the lives of the Ethiopian peasantry are characterised by a 
complex set of norms and rules that guide their social behaviour and tend to 
impose their place in the socio-political structures. The ethos and logics which 
the peasantry live by reinforce the structures which best suits the interests and 
aspirations of the central Ethiopian elites, as discussed in Chapter Five. The 
structures of community are bound up in a multifarious web of relationships 
between actors and institutions. They demonstrate that social action and 
domination in decision-making processes are multifaceted in terms of socio-
political factors such as position, education level, wealth, age and gender. Hence 
the approach this study takes is not in a conventional form with a quantitative 
allocation of power, but considers ‘community’ in broader relational forms of 
analysis of complex socio-ecological systems. With this in mind, this chapter 
now moves on to the change in power dynamics at the kebelle level in the context 
of area closure, one of core activities of the CBA projects in Ethiopia.  
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7.2  Redefinition of Power Dynamics 
 
Power relations are inherent in CBA projects. The CBA approach involves a 
variety of agencies and different degrees of community participation. This often 
causes friction among actors and institutions during project implementation and 
through these processes communities become politicised. In other words, 
through the CBA projects, communities are caused to become a field of “the 
practices and processes through which power, in its multiple forms, is wielded 
and negotiated” (Paulson et al., 2005:28) in which various actors compete over 
rights and resources. In order to seek locally identified problems and locally 
appropriate solutions, CBA needs to be built on indigenous norms and rules and 
to facilitate practices from within a community. This means that the CBA 
approach requires an appreciation of local socio-political dynamics and needs to 
confront the existing structures of communities that might oppress specific 
groups of people that are often ‘invisible’ to outsiders (Ensor and Berger, 2009).  
 
CBA promotes equal benefits within a community through freedom of 
expression and debate (Ensor and Berger, 2009). The desired outcome of CBA is a 
product of negotiations built on the relationships of actors and institutions 
during the implementation of agreed rules and activities. In other words, the 
scope for aspects of adaptive governance to enable CBA is significantly 
determined by the geometry of power and politics around communities, not just 
within the context of CBA. Here politics is the (generally public) dialogue about 
the rules (both formal laws and less formal social regulations) by which a 
community lives and operates and through which scarce resources are allocated. 
At the same time, dominant narratives of ‘who we are’ and ‘what we need’ are 
often defined by the established groups within communities. The participatory 
space risks being dominated by these groups even when well-intentioned efforts 
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are made to initiate equal participation within CBA processes. Moreover, 
institutions have great influence in the decision-making processes which 
determine the scope for adaptation and are deeply rooted in social hierarchies, 
often without being challenged. This section thus aims to acknowledge and 
probe the highly complicated socio-political nature of community, which is 
composed of actors and institutions with different degrees of influence, and 
describe the simultaneous decentralisation and recentralisation of power and 
authority within Kebelle A in northern Ethiopia. With this in mind, the focus is 
now on area closure of community forest (often described as communal land by 
locals), one of the contentious, but important activities of CBA projects in 
Ethiopia.  
 
The most significant environmental problem in the Ethiopian highlands is 
deforestation. The starting point of this process is often the intensive logging 
done by local people to pasture more cattle and expand their farmlands. The 
need for this expansion stems from the substantial reduction in grain and potato 
harvests, due to the poor weather conditions over the last few years. Also, the 
decline in arable land per capita worsens the situation (Negusu Aklilu, 2010). In 
this context, the demarcation of protected lands, called ‘area closure’, has 
become one of the core activities of CBA. This activity closes off certain areas of 
land and its natural resources from human and cattle interference in order to 
prevent soil erosion resulting from intense rainfall. In the northern case study, 
the CBA project has closed more than half of the community forest in Choke 
Mountain, affecting several kebelles that belong to Woreda X.  
 
Most leaders in the northern case study village admit that there were some 
disputes at first between the CBO and citizens of the kebelle on the issue of 
closing the community forest. However, they argue that nearly all those who 
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were in opposition are now ‘convinced’ by the changes the project has made. A 
local priest (and a treasurer of CBO DG) explains, “When we initiated the 
activity, some members stood against our idea by saying that we are going to sell 
our Choke. When the kebelle saw the tangible changes they accepted the idea of 
area closure” (Interview DG-23). A secretary of CBO DG also describes how,  
 
“Initially there was such disagreement. But at the moment they are 
convinced and nowadays they support the idea of area closure… We had 
discussions about area closure with the kebelle and then we went to the gotts and 
identified the available land for area closure and we closed the land. [Researcher: 
What if the gott refuses area closure?] We have to convince them. Even at the 
beginning of the project some people from one gott came up with axes and 
threatened to cut us into pieces and so we ran away. But today they appreciate 
the area closure” (Interview DG-41).  
 
A leader of the gott, who previously opposed the project and was one of the 
alleged axe wielders agrees by saying, “The area closure was made in 
consultation with our elders. We were also pressurised by our neighbours. We 
therefore agreed to the area closure and protect the forest. The area closure has 
many advantages since we can cut and bring the grass to our cattle whilst the 
forest is protected” (Interview DG-22).  
 
There was also pressure from external actors such as the SGP coordinator 
and professors from Addis Ababa University. As discussed earlier, all messages 
coming from outside are considered as ‘orders from above’. A secretary of CBO 
DG points out, “The SGP officer and professors from Addis [Ababa] suggested 
some new seeds which I knew could not be adapted to our environment, but it 
was included in our activities… The woreda people were also there and I could 
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not voice my opinion” (Interview DG-41). A leader of a CBO also explains, “They 
brought us an improved ploughing tool which was not suitable to our kebelle. But 
many other things they suggested benefitted us. Our activities were heavily 
based on their advice… They are more educated than us. It is good to be done by 
them” (DG-42).  
 
The main concern here is that the decision to carry out the area closure was 
made by the CBO in cooperation with the kebelle and woreda officers, without 
being discussed at the kebelle meeting. There are however only 487 CBO 
members; not enough to represent the entire kebelle with a population of about 
4,000. Nevertheless, it was only possible as a chairperson of the kebelle at that 
time gave his full support to the CBA project and most kebelle council committee 
members are registered at the CBO. A young farmer complains, “Since I was not 
a member of the CBO, I do not know why they did it [the area closure]. They 
didn’t tell me… They only hear the voice of the [CBO] members” (Interview DG-
12). Another young farmer adds, “There was no discussion at the kebelle meeting 
about the area closure. It was the decision of the CBO” (DG-35). A number of 
other non-CBO members echo this view whilst arguing that they are neither 
convinced, “the dispelling of doubts”, nor persuaded, “the changing of minds” 
(Shovel, 2011). A farmer explains, “The leaders decided and managed the area 
closure. When people complain, they [the leaders] penalise them. That is why I 
say there is pressure and burden from the leaders” (DG-32).  
 
In the first place, many young adults did not join the CBO as they were not 
convinced enough to pay the 40 birr (approximately USD 2) registration fee. A 
young adult explains, “My major income source is manual labour. I do not have 
land... Sometimes I buy animals and sell them again… Money is not always with 
me… I couldn’t pay the registration fee for the CBO at that time” (Interview DG-
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04). Moreover, the practice of area closure has made the group of young adults 
who are already economically vulnerable and mostly dependent on animal 
husbandry even more economically marginalised. Another young farmer 
complains, “We still complain and shout for reopening the enclosed area. We go 
to the kebelle meetings to ask them to reopen the land… I graze my animals on 
the communal land at Choke Mountain… We live on animal husbandry and there 
is a shortage of land… I do not agree with the area closure although I understand 
the idea” (DG-12). Another young farmer adds, “Even though our Choke is given 
to the project and the CBO, no tangible changes are seen. Only we youngsters are 
disadvantaged by this” (DG-13).  
 
The majority of the CBO members are males who are relatively well-off 
(which means having more than 4 timad of land and/or a good number of 
livestock) and educated, in their 40s and 50s, with a socio-political position in 
their gott or kebelle. They are less affected by the area closure since they can 
pasture livestock on their private land. They also tend to be more interested in 
the development of the kebelle. A militia commander explains, “Most of the 
enclosed areas are on cliffs and gorges. Anyway, we don’t use that land. So we 
have never been affected… My own land is large enough to feed my cattle” 
(Interview DG-08). A secretary of CBO DG agrees by saying, “We did area closure 
on bare and marginalised land where no one uses it” (DG-41). A local priest (and 
a treasurer of CBO DG) echoes, “I had no problem from the beginning. I have 2 
cattle, 2 horses and 10 sheep… I have a small plot of land where my animals can 
graze” (DG-23). That is to say, the CBO is given significant influence not only by 
the governments and the SGP, but also by having the already dominant group of 
people in the kebelle.  
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It also means that this dominant group that considers young adults as 
potential competitors for resources have managed to relabel themselves through 
the new institution of CBO. This new institution secured the support of 
government and external funders (the SGP) by using environmental 
rehabilitation as a justification. A leader of CBO DG criticises the young adults 
who oppose the area closure by saying, “Some people think of their own benefits 
rather than thinking of the national and environmental benefits. There are some 
youngsters who cause disturbance and go to other people’s land…The kebelle 
agreed with the idea and no one opposed it except the youngsters” (DG-42). A 
member of the kebelle council also adds, “Initially it was because of the lack of 
understanding… But there are a few people who always have negative views on 
what we do and don’t think about future generations” (DG-10).  
 
Meanwhile, there is shared anxiety among these dominant group of people 
that the woreda government might redistribute land in the near future, 
particularly to those young adults who suffer from a shortage of land. They are 
also conscious that Choke Mountain is the only land in their area left for 
redistribution. An officer of Kebelle A explains, “Initially we talked to people and 
reached a consensus on enclosing the area… There are many people with small 
plots of land, not only the youth group… There are people who fear that the 
communal land may be given to the youth group through the land 
redistribution” (DG-16). A young farmer points out, “The kebelle and elders 
promised to give us [the young adults] the communal land six years ago and they 
abandoned their words and closed the land” (DG-35). That is to say, there is a 
shared belief among the dominant group that enclosing Choke Mountain is a 
better idea than giving it to the young adults. 
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There is a mixed perception of the young adults in the kebelle. On the one 
hand, some feel sympathetic towards them since they are the children of the 
kebelle as a leader of a women’s league describes,  
 
“It is true, we have a shortage of grazing land and the communal land is 
closed. I am sorry for the youth group. We adults own land from earlier years and 
have some possessions. But, the youth group does not have access to land and 
sometimes buy animal feed. So they migrate to Wollega and other regions where 
they may face different challenges… I have sympathy for the youth group, but I 
can’t help them. I can’t give my own land” (Interview DG-14).  
 
On the other hand, the kebelle is in need of their labour as a young adult 
explains,  
 
“I am a youth who has no land. We youths work hard and there is a high 
number of unemployed youths. So I live on trade activities like the sale of grains… 
We also get hired to work on other people’s farms and carry out terracing… The 
gott and kebelle give us nothing but work like this road construction (See Figure 
9) and we don’t have time to go to Waber [where the market is held]. My father 
has only 2 timad of land and we are three bothers… I like seeing the land being 
protected, but I need land. The land allocation is not equal. It needs to be 
redistributed without corruption” (Interview DG-31).  
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Figure 9. The road construction site in Kebelle A 
 
There were some efforts made by the leaders to convince and persuade the 
young adults on the basis of protecting the environment. A former chairperson 
of Kebelle A explains, “I made my best efforts to bring the watershed project here 
by discussing with the kebelle and the woreda officials… When they [young 
adults] argued about the communal land, I told them to use my land. I even 
quarrelled with some of my son’s friends” (Interview DG-07). An elderly farmer 
also explains, “They [young adults] are opposing and confronting us. However, 
we are telling them that the area closure is beneficial. In order to protect the 
land, we are advising them to reduce their number of animals but focus on their 
quality” (DG-26). A local priest (and a treasurer of CBO DG) notes, “I told the 
youth group that we still get benefits from the area closure through beehives and 
the sale of grass on top of the rehabilitated Choke” (DG-23). There were even 
some attempts by the CBO leaders at reconciliation with the young adults. He 
adds, “We were all affected [by the area closure] and I needed to sell some 
animals too. But the grass from the enclosed area is only given to the youth 
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group, not all community members. We also hired some of them as guards for 
the enclosed area” (DG-23). A young farmer who was hired as a guard of the 
closed area explains,  
 
“The watershed project is good and you can see many trees there are now. 
The beehives and other items help a lot. Some youngsters complain about the 
area closure…But we held the meetings and discussed it with the leaders. We 
argued but ended up closing the area… Cutting one tree is equivalent to the death 
of one person… I don’t like people contradicting what the government says” 
(Interview DG-37).  
 
However, most young adults are still socially and economically marginalised 
and remain against the CBO and the CBA project. A young militia man explains,  
 
“Yes, I am terribly affected, nowadays I buy grass for my animals… I 
understand the land has to be protected and trees should grow… But we need to 
strengthen our unity and solidarity towards the development [not the 
rehabilitation] of land… There is a shortage of land because land was allocated in 
the previous years and the youth has no access to land now. This is inadequate 
for us… We need to approach the woreda. We expect the woreda to allocate those 
unoccupied lands to the youth” (Interview DG-11).   
 
Nevertheless, the leader of CBO DG notes that the CBA project has been 
successful because it has slowed down the adverse effects of climate change in 
the area. He explains, “There are indigenous trees coming back to our village 
since we closed the areas with the watershed project… Fewer trees are being cut 
and the weather is becoming good again” (Interview DG-42). Despite the politics 
of the CBO, a number of people generally agree with the leader on the fact that 
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the project has contributed to improving the condition of Choke Mountain (See 
Figure 10). However, many young adults subsequently left the village during the 
project period, leaving their wives and children behind. The livelihoods of those 
who have decided to remain have also been significantly deteriorated. Some of 
them gave up gazing their own animals and became casual manual labour 
working on other’s farm.  
 
 
Figure 10. The site of area closure (the left side of valley) in Kebelle A 
 
In contrast to the young adults, most research participants agreed that 
women’s participation in decision-making process has been significantly 
increased. There are two major reasons. First, local governments have 
encouraged men to let their wives to join the CBO and come to the gott and 
kebelle meetings together, according to the principles of CBA. A female farmer 
describes how, “Gender equality is being promoted now after the project came… 
The culture of washing the legs of husband has been abandoned. In the previous 
years, the husband did whatever he liked… Nowadays during the weekend we can 
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even go to the meetings with them” (Interview DG-03). However, a leader of a 
women’s league explains,  
 
“As a leader I tell them [women] to know their right as equal to men and 
encourage them to come to the meetings. Previously my husband used to beat me 
and send me back to my parents. Now we own the resources including the house 
equally… [Researcher: Do you also speak out at the kebelle meeting?] No, no, 
totally not. We women participate in the meeting but we do not raise issues and 
we do not ask questions most of the time… [Researcher: How long would it take 
for women to have an equal voice to men in the meetings?] If we make 
consultations and agreements, it will not take much time. We are learning and 
teaching each other” (Interview DG-14).  
 
 
Men’s view on how many 
women speak for every 10 
men 
Women’s view on how many 
women speak for every 10 
men 
Total 
Kebelle A 3.7 2.3 3.3 
Kebelle B 4.1 3.2 3.7 
Total 3.9 2.7 3.4 
Table 3. Comparison of men and women’s views on the number of women that speak in 
a meeting (Unit: persons) 
 
Table 3 (based on meetings attended) shows that women still speak far less 
than men in meetings, although the result in southern Ethiopia is slightly better 
than the north. A female kebelle officer points out, “Three to five women would 
speak nowadays… Before the project, it was zero… They even did not come to a 
meeting” (Interview DG-16). A young male farmer adds, “I would say four 
women compared to 10 men. Women are still ashamed of speaking in public… It 
has increased a lot though. In the earlier years they never spoke” (DG-31).  
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Yet single women tend to have less voice than other women. A widow 
explains, “I would say two women, but I wouldn’t be one of those two because I 
have no husband… Women with husbands speak more… We are not educated and 
when support comes from the government the leaders marginalise me. I even 
borrowed money from my neighbours” (DR-18). A divorced female farmer 
agrees, “Because of our shyness, we do not speak freely. Our voice is zero. I go to 
the meetings and say nothing but listen to the messages delivered the whole 
day… If we speak there will be slanders and insult” (DG-29). Moreover, the 
absolute number of women in meetings is still lower than the men. Most women 
in meetings were older (40+) because it is traditionally considered a women’s 
responsibility to take care of livestock, unless their child is old enough to do so, 
so they would not leave their livestock for a long time to come to a meeting.  
 
Next, the reason most interviewees agreed that women’s participation in 
meetings has increased, particularly compared to the young adults, is that men 
(the dominant group of the kebelle) let women do so. Many women believed that 
they are given a right to speak by men. A former leader of a women’s league 
explains, “Women are given rights by men but we are ashamed of talking in 
public… This is our problem. The culture forbids us to speak in public even 
though men empower us to be better” (Interview DG-15). Women still discuss 
their concerns through women’s leagues or at informal gatherings with their 
neighbours. The extent to which these informal channels of expression feed into 
the decision-making of kebelle depends on whether those concerns conflict with 
men’s values. That is to say, women’s participation was only possible because 
the dominant group found the participation not threatening to their dominance. 
An elderly farmer points out, “It is ok, we don’t mind having women in the 
meetings… Anyway, they don’t speak” (Interview DG-33). 
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Meanwhile, this research provided the interviewees with a chance to review 
their perception on women’s voice. A gott leader answers, “Women are not 
prohibited from speaking and now it is 10 women speak. [Researcher: You are 
the first person to say 10] [He laughs] In fact, women are afraid of speaking, but 
we encourage them to speak confidently. Their voice is not equal to men’s… I can 
guess three or four women [He laughs]” (Interview DG-22).  
 
In summary, power imbalances are inherent in CBA projects. CBA promises to 
promote equal benefits within a community through freedom of expression and 
debate. During the implementation of the project in Kebelle A, however, the 
group of young adults who were already socially and economically marginalised 
have become even more isolated by the activity of area closure. Meanwhile, 
women have achieved a certain, limited degree of participation in meetings. This 
is because the dominant group of kebelle members found women’s participation 
not threatening to their dominance whilst the young adults continue to be 
marginalised due to fears about the possibility of land redistribution. The 
dominant group managed to stay in power through relabelling themselves with a 
new institution of CBO and by using the justification of environmental 
rehabilitation to support their own ends/interests.  
 
7.3  Conclusion  
 
This chapter has examined the intra-community politics and the 
simultaneous decentralisation and recentralisation of power through the activity 
of area closure in the case study in northern Ethiopia. Considering ‘community’ 
in broader relational forms of analysis, it answered the research question 2a), 
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‘who participates in the decision-making processes of CBA and how are their 
identities determined?’. 
 
The first half of the chapter argued that the lives of the Ethiopian peasantry 
are characterised by a complex set of norms and rules that determine their place 
in the socio-political structures of community. These structures are bound up in 
a multifarious web of socio-political relationships between actors and 
institutions in terms of socio-political factors such as position, education level, 
wealth, age and gender. Based on these findings, the second half of the chapter 
interrogated the change in power dynamics, considering the interaction between 
the practice of politics and the unfolding of the CBA project in the northern case 
study, Kebelle A. It demonstrated the current power imbalance of the kebelle and 
how the dominant group managed to remain predominant by relabelling itself as 
a new institution – i.e. CBO – and by justifying their control by using a discourse 
of environmental rehabilitation. During the implementation of the project, the 
group of young adults who were already socially and economically marginalised 
became even more isolated by the activity of area closure whereas women 
achieved a limited degree of participation in meetings. This was a result of the 
dominant group deeming women’s participation unthreatening, in contrast to 
the status-quo challenging idea of land redistribution that the young adults 
constantly request. 
 
As a result of the CBA project, Kebelle A managed to a large extent to restore a 
forest in the Choke Mountain but many young adults subsequently left the 
village, giving up their livelihoods. Given the evidence, we can see that CBA in 
Ethiopia is a complex, multi-voiced process which represents contrasting 
aspirations and conflicting imperatives and gives rise to a variety of outcomes at 
the end of the project with both winners and losers. However, the monitoring 
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and evaluation report of SGP Ethiopia (2012) failed to capture this socio-political 
aspect of adaptive capacity and only focused on the physical environment as the 
outcome, describing the project as “generally successful” (2), “efficiently 
managed” (5) and “successfully reforested” (6). The thesis now moves to the 
next chapter to address ‘to what extent do CBA projects change the current 
geometry of power of community’ through examining the invisible politics of 
community leadership. 
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Chapter Eight. The Invisible Politics of Community Leadership 
 
Power and politics greatly determine the adaptive capacity of communities to 
climate change within community-based adaptation (CBA) projects. The four 
empirical chapters of this thesis address four different factors in the political 
arena of everyday life that affect the adaptive capacity of the case study 
communities. Chapter Five discussed the political legacies of Ethiopian history; 
Chapter Six analysed the politics of scale and indigenous knowledge; and Chapter 
Seven explored the internal power dynamics of local communities. In particular, 
Chapter Seven showed that the existing structures of the community were 
central to the decision-making processes of the CBA project in the northern case 
study community.  
 
This final chapter examines the invisible politics of leadership in 
communities and their “underlying contexts and processes” (Bassett, 1988:453). 
In contrast to its northern counterpart, the project in southern Ethiopia was 
more transformative in the sense that the changes that occurred enabled new 
voices to be heard in public and new individuals to take on leadership roles. To 
some extent it escaped from the rigidity of pre-existing political relations within 
the community. Such a claim should not, however, be over-stated or over-
generalised. The experience of people participating in the project demonstrates 
that CBA still tends to embrace the conventional structures of community but 
sometimes provides an opportunity to reshape its power relations. There is a 
contradiction here between CBA’s claims about its potential for driving social 
transformation but its inherent tendency to enforce existing structures.  
 
In order to consider this contradictory nature of CBA, this chapter draws 
attention to the politics of leadership. In such an historically hierarchical society, 
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the role of leaders is central to the socio-political dimensions of CBA projects 
and thus building adaptive capacity. During the fieldwork on which this thesis is 
based, it was repeatedly made clear by interviewees that leadership issues were 
almost synonymous with political issues in both key field sites. The politics of 
leadership existed before the projects began, are being redefined in the course of 
the projects and will continue after they ends. In most cases, however, these 
kinds of stories are ‘hidden’ or invisible because they are not explicitly part of 
the CBA projects. They reside in the space between written policy and the actual 
practice of everyday human interactions. In this context, it is important to 
understand the process through which leadership is legitimised and the place in 
which the process is carried out.  
 
The neopatrimonial relationships are situated within multi-layered 
clientelistic networks and two of the layers in which these networks are found 
are (1) in between government officers and local leaders of community-based 
organisations (CBOs) and (2) between the leaders and the CBO members. 
Particularly in southern Ethiopia, neopatrimonial relationships hark back to the 
historic relationship between ‘neftegna and balabbat’ and ‘balabbat and gabbar’ 
respectively, as discussed in Chapter Five. Based on the findings of Chapter 
Seven (the socio-political components that affect local power dynamics), this 
chapter addresses how neopatrimonial relationships shape: the character of 
leadership in CBA projects, the community’s internal politics and, therefore, the 
process through which the adaptive capacity is built.  
 
Kebelle B in southern Ethiopia is used as the case study since it experienced a 
transformation of the key structures of community through the course of the 
project. Through this analysis, this chapter answers the questions: Who are the 
patrons and clients of this neopatrimonial systems? What are the outcomes that 
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patronage politics produce in this village? and eventually, research question 2b): 
To what extent do CBA projects redefine the geometry of power of community? 
To answer these questions, the chapter first discusses local people’s perceptions 
of the politics of leadership. In particular, this is illustrated through discussions 
of elections and of nepotism. The chapter then moves on to the transformation 
of two different neopatrimonial relationships that are exemplified through the 
southern case study and considers the consequence of these issues in terms of 
the community’s adaptive capacity. In so doing, it demonstrates what makes 
CBA complex is that challenging patriarchy in these leadership traditions might 
be normatively attractive, but environmentally problematic. 
 
8.1  Politics of Community Leadership 
 
Leadership in the Ethiopian highlands is often based on the management of 
neopatrimonial relationships with government officers and/or dominant groups 
in a village. In such an environment, local leaders tend to either swear an oath of 
loyalty (figuratively though) to government patrons or acquire social status 
through building their own patronage networks in a village. The CBA project in 
the village in southern Ethiopia shows both the former (enacted by the current 
leader) and the latter (enacted by the previous leader) model of leadership, 
whilst also illustrating a transformative change of the key structures of 
community. First, this section will briefly review the way people narrate their 
perceptions of leadership by contrasting the northern and southern villages of 
Ethiopia. Then it will discuss how neopatrimonial relationships are practised in 
the case study communities, firstly through the elections of the leaders of the 
CBOs and secondly through issues of nepotism.  
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Definition of Leadership 
 
The way people define leadership shows its significance within the socio-
political structures of the kebelle. First, the definition of leadership skills in the 
case study in northern Ethiopia is focused on perceived fairness, morality and 
honesty. A young adult explains, “If the woreda assigned leaders who are not 
corrupt, who are from the outside of kebelle… If the timad of land required for 
one person is identified, if the land allocation is fairly conducted… that would be 
good” (Interview DG-31). A farmer adds, “In the future, they [leaders] should be 
elected based on their morality, qualifications and experience. Their performance 
should be evaluated every year. They should be closely monitored and supervised 
in terms of their honesty” (DG-10).  
 
Most of the leaders in Kebelle A also think that they were elected because they 
are trustworthy, educated or recognised in their socio-political networks. A 
leader of CBO DG explains, “Yes, I was elected as a leader because, first, people 
believe that I am trustworthy, and second, they consider me as a person doing a 
good job for people” (Interview DG-42). A secretary of CBO DG describes, “When 
the CBO was established, the woreda people said that the leaders should be ones 
who know how to handle financial resources. People elected us thinking that we 
do not embezzle their money and we can serve the CBO efficiently” (DG-41). It 
was clearly a post they undertook willingly, and in some cases with enthusiasm, 
because they were aware of the impact the project would bring about to the 
village and the role of leaders in this process. A local priest (and a treasurer of 
CBO DG) adds, “Based on the woreda procedure, the change of leaders [of a CBO] 
should be done every three years. However, since two of us are priests and 
honestly serving the CBO, the members reaffirmed us as leaders for another 
term. It is also painful to choose new leaders and teach them” (DG-23). The last 
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point, that it takes time and resources to train new leaders, is indicative of the 
way a conservative attitude to elite continuity is justified in apparently plausible 
rational ways that seem to have nothing to do with ideology. 
 
In contrast, the leaders in Kebelle B insist that their positions were forced on 
them by the government. A chairperson of Kebelle B explains, “The woreda 
imposed upon me this position to serve the kebelle as a chairperson and it was 
neither my initiation nor my interest because this position takes so much of my 
time… And it is not salaried” (Interview DR-22). A former leader of CBO DR 
adds, “I did not want to be a leader of the CBO. The woreda assigned me and they 
brought the proposal to the CBO” (DR-20). A current leader of CBO DR echoes, 
“It was not me who wanted to be a leader… But it was them [not specifically 
defined]” (DR-21). Leadership is seen as a burden not a privilege in the south, 
partly because it is historically associated with collaboration with a distant (and 
to some extent colonial) alien power. To be a leader in the south is to feel obliged 
to the authority of that central power in Addis Ababa. 
 
Alongside these differences in leaders’ enthusiasm, there are also contrasting 
ideals around what makes good leadership. The definition of leadership skills in 
the southern community places great emphasis on strong leadership, the ability 
to command. A leader of CBO DR argues that strong, father-like leadership is 
required by leaders, saying,  
 
“During the time of the previous leader, the CBO was weak. Under my 
leadership, the CBO is becoming strong… A leader of the CBO should act as a 
father of the CBO and has to show an ownership of the CBO and the project. He 
has to avoid his personal interests and be considerate. He should be in a position 
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to teach and lead the CBO members and be able to handle the different opinions 
of people” (Interview DR-21).  
 
A chairperson of Kebelle B agrees, “The future of the CBO will be good if only 
the leader strongly leads the members” (DR-22). The sense here is that the 
‘strength’ is required to overcome a natural position of reluctance among the 
population to participate and engage with the woreda and the CBO. In the south, 
it takes a strong leader to make things happen.  
 
This perception is attested to by the way people assess their current leader of 
CBO DR. A chairperson of Kebelle B explains, “The current leader is educated 
compared to the previous one. He has a diploma and works better in 
documentation and financial recording… But he is not as strong as his 
predecessor” (Interview DR-22). A female farmer elaborates, “The leader calls 
for a meeting every 15 days, but the members are not coming these days… He is 
not calling upon the members seriously, for instance, using the kebelle 
militiamen. The previous leader was strong in calling upon the members. But the 
current leader is boastful and says that it is up to us whether we come or not. 
People are not interested in the current leadership” (DR-14). The implication is 
that the CBO leader does not have effective connections to the militia men, 
therefore has no control over them and cannot use them to coerce people into 
attending. A former militia man adds, “Last week after you left [after the focus 
group discussion], we had another meeting and discussed some issues. Then the 
leader reported [the woreda agricultural officer] about what we discussed. The 
officer told the leader to kick out anyone opposing your leadership” (DR-13). 
This shows that the current leader of the CBO is dependent on external 
government authority rather than carrying the people through his own charisma 
and respect.  
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Local perceptions of leadership in the southern case study have been built on 
geographical particularity. In particular, the colonisation during the Imperial era 
have reshaped the perceptions of leadership in a way that local leaders are forced 
to either confront or be compliant with local bureaucracy. This has also 
discouraged people to be a leader, compared to the northern counterpart.  
 
Perceptions of Local Election Process 
 
In Ethiopia, there is a system of elections at the kebelle and sub-kebelle levels. 
In the northern case study, local people’s perceptions of the election process are 
that it is generally democratic and its outcome is not to be challenged as a 
feature of legal-rational state structures. A member of a kebelle council explains, 
“Yes, the election [of the CBO] was democratic. All members were happy and 
accepted the leaders by showing their hands” (Interview DG-10). A farmer 
echoes by saying, “The election is fair. People choose leaders they like to follow… 
At least I did so” (DG-12). However, such positive assessments are not universal. 
Particularly in the northern village, people freely express their opinions in public 
on who should be elected as a leader and are less inclined to hide their personal 
views. For instance, a commander of a militia team insists, “In the project 
committee, they did not elect better educated and experienced people. They did 
elections by friendship” (DG-08). A female farmer also complains, “Talented 
and open-hearted people were not elected in the election, if you have many 
relatives and families, you can be elected” (DG-17). This willingness to express 
public opinions in public is the most democratic aspect of these elections, 
particularly given that the electoral process itself is not unconstrained. 
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The election is not a secret ballot and it is generally attended by the 
government officers, which clearly has an impact on a process of ‘voting by a 
show of hands’. A secretary of CBO DG explains the CBO’s election process by 
saying, “Initially there were seven candidates. The CBO men and women 
gathered and elected three of us [a leader, secretary and treasurer] by voting, 
showing their hands… The leader got the highest number of votes, but he is 
illiterate and people said that the secretary and treasurer should be literate. That 
is why we were assigned. I completed grade 8” (Interview DG-41). A local priest 
(and a treasurer of CBO DG) adds, “People from the woreda and kebelle attended 
the election… At that time, we had 502 members and around 300 members 
attended the election to vote” (DG-23).  
 
Moreover, the woreda and kebelle officers often get involved in the selection 
process of the election candidates. A officer of Woreda X explains, “We take care 
of the activities and performance of leaders of kebelles… But it depends on the 
votes of people. It depends on the activities of a chairperson and the needs of 
people in the kebelle” (Interview DG-38). But at the end of the interview he adds 
the ‘invisible’ side of the process,  
 
“He was previously a deputy chairperson and now is an officially elected 
chairperson of the kebelle. We are aware that the kebelle is divided into two 
groups supporting the previous leader and the current leader… In fact, the 
woreda prefers the previous leader. The current one is too calm [not active 
enough]. In a short period of time we may nominate the previous leader as a new 
chairperson depending on his activities on the given tasks… With the interests of 
the woreda and the community” (Interview DG-38).  
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Local populations are also aware of this quasi-democratic power to make 
appointments held by the woreda office. A local farmer explains,  
 
“There were some disagreements between the leader and the woreda. The 
policeman and the woreda even disturbed the work of our monastery… 
[Researcher: Do you think that the woreda office can change the chairperson of 
the kebelle if they want to?] The woreda will not consult with us on the issue. 
This custom was abandoned during the Derg time. People have no actual power 
to select, but we still elect” (Interview DG-37).  
 
This shows that although there is a system of elections in place, a person 
cannot be elected as a leader if there is no support from the majority, even if 
they are selected and backed by the woreda office. That is to say, the procedure is 
still a mixture of top-down and bottom-up processing. The role of woreda 
government is clearly defined as supervising and guiding the administration of 
kebelles whilst acknowledging a certain, if not limited, degree of autonomy in 
local villages.  
 
In the southern case study, the intervention of governments in the election 
process seems more complex. First, a former leader of CBO DR explains, “I did 
not want to be a leader of the CBO. The woreda assigned me and they brought the 
proposal to the CBO and then the CBO members approved me by seeing my 
experience and dedication… If the CBO rejected this, I could not have been 
elected. It is the community who accepted the proposal of the woreda and elected 
me with full accord” (Interview DR-20). A member of CBO DR agrees by saying, 
“Yes, he [the former leader of a CBO] was chosen by the woreda and approved by 
us because he is capable and strong” (DR-15). However, a female member of CBO 
DR has a slightly different view, “The leader was assigned by him [the woreda 
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agricultural officer]. He passed the decision and told us to accept the leader” 
(DR-14). Another member of CBO DR adds, “Of course, the decision of the woreda 
was greatly involved in the selection process of the leader” (DR-17).  
 
Given this evidence, we can see that the local governments are generally 
involved in the election processes of both case study communities, albeit with 
different degrees of intervention. Local governments make no secret of the fact 
that they are keen on having someone who is cooperative, if not compliant, with 
them. This may be a consequence of the historically embedded distrust between 
governments and peasant farmers throughout the history of Ethiopia, as 
discussed in Chapter Five. A current leader of CBO DR concludes his interview by 
saying, “I have become a leader because I have developed good relationships 
with the woreda and strengthened the documentation system for the woreda” 
(Interview DR-21). This then seems to be one key facet of leadership – the ability 
to successfully manage relationships up the hierarchy with the woreda officials 
and down the hierarchy with community members. Thus, this is a position that 
clearly lends itself to patrimonial networks.  
 
Nepotism and Leadership  
 
The legitimacy of leadership depends on the support of dominant groups in 
the village as much as on the process of election or the leader’s attitude to the 
law itself. Even where a leader is democratically elected there is tradition of 
appointing supporters to local committees and this tradition is often inevitably 
related to access to resources. This practice of nepotism creates a clientelistic 
network within the community and is subsequently used to secure votes in their 
constituency. In return, the group of supporters are given preferential access to 
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resources such as land and information and priority in the distribution of 
farming equipment.  
 
Challenges to the governance of CBA are often related to this practice of 
nepotism. During the CBA projects, a number of people who were close to a 
chairperson of a kebelle or leaders of a CBO were given the information about the 
CBA project earlier than others. A young farmer complains,  
 
“This is corruption. I paid the registration fee but received nothing. No tools, 
no beehive, not even a per diem for manual labour. I was told [about the CBO] 
later than people who are close to the leaders. I registered as soon as I was told. 
But they said all gifts are gone because it is on a first come, first served basis… I 
wanted my registration fee back and asked the leaders but they never gave me an 
answer” (Interview DG-31).  
 
Nepotism not only provided the leader’s network with the opportunity to 
register as a member of CBO earlier, but gave them a better understanding of 
benefits of the project. A young farmer explains, “I was disadvantaged by the 
[CBA] project. They work through blood relations and I was not given a chance to 
be involved. I was excluded. I don’t know what benefits they share. I think this is 
partiality” (Interview DG-13). This quotation also reminds us that these project 
practices are often as much about exclusion as inclusion. 
 
The distribution of farming equipment, which was based on a first come, 
first served basis, is a clear illustration of the way nepotism affects the CBA 
projects. Forewarning of this activity was of great advantage. Some members 
who joined the CBO later than others, due to either their financial condition or 
uncertainty regarding its benefits, did not receive any equipment and were thus 
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disappointed. A farmer complains, “Both my wife and myself are not members 
of the CBO. The leaders picked up their relatives, brothers and sisters first. They 
did not give me a chance to join the CBO… I did not want to join later as they 
serve on a first come, first served basis” (Interview DG-27). Another farmer 
adds, “Our kebelle is divided by corruption. When there is a conflict between 
people, the leaders and judges are in favour of their relatives and friends… It was 
the same when they distributed the benefits of the [CBA] project such as spades 
and apple trees” (DG-20). Seen from the perspective of ‘fairness’ there is an 
obvious basis to judge these practices critically. Seen from the perspective of 
politics, however, they represent an effective use of leadership skills through the 
maintenance of networks.  
 
 
Figure 11. The office of Kebelle A in northern Ethiopia 
 
Nepotism is a common accusation made by those who feel they lost out, but 
other explanations for the uneven distribution of information are also plausible. 
The geographical remoteness from the kebelle office (Figure 11), for instance, is 
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another reason that some people not receiving the information in an appropriate 
time. I met a number of people at the road construction site who rarely come to 
the kebelle office, unless there is a particular reason, as it takes two to six hours 
of walking depending on where they live. Some of them who did not join the CBO 
but who knew about the project told me that they heard about it at the local 
market (on Fridays) or churches (on Sundays). These places are generally where 
people gather and share information apart from the kebelle office. In particular, 
men discuss issues of the kebelle at restaurants or cafes near the market place, 
albeit infrequently. Women were rarely found at these places.  
 
Local understandings of governance show how it is shaped by the socio-
cultural norms of accountability, responsibility and legitimacy. A young farmer 
describes it as follows:  
 
“For instance, there is a man in our neighbour who has six cattle and a huge 
farm land. He and his wife are members of the association [the CBO] and close to 
the kebelle leader. Although his wife is illiterate, whenever there are any training 
opportunities, she represents our gott and kebelle and attends… She never shares 
the information from the trainings with us though. I was told that it was not like 
this during the Derg time. Students at grade 9 and 10 used to give us necessary 
information and we shared it equally… When the EPRDF came and redistributed 
land, she invited the leaders and committee members with food and honey and 
then received more land… This is true to my knowledge” (Interview DG-31).  
 
Most people were aware of this practice of nepotism in the case study 
communities. One farmer grumbles, “When God gives us rain, it is equal for 
everyone. When money comes, it is distributed through blood relations” 
(Interview DR-12). 
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Chabal and Daloz (1999) argue that this practice of nepotism is an indigenous 
form of governance, which is itself neither good nor bad. However, as discussed 
in Chapter Seven, this is also another way of consolidating the dominance of 
certain groups in a village, an outcome about which advocates of CBA tend to be 
more sceptical. Moreover, some in the community worry about the future 
implications of this practice. A young farmer says, “There will be corruption, if 
land is redistributed, through inviting people for food, bribing people and using 
their blood relations. With this condition, the size of land given to people will be 
different with each other. Probably the poor person ends up having less than half 
a timad only” (Interview DG-31). So, whilst it is of value to move beyond the kind 
of banal ‘good governance’ language that sees nepotism as inherently 
problematic because it does not accord with global norms of legitimate 
leadership, it is equally important to acknowledge the hostility that emerges to 
nepotism from within the community. 
 
In summary, the practices of managing elections and of nepotism in relation 
to information, appointments and resources are often central to the real 
processes of securing and legitimising leadership in the case study communities. 
Through using these neopatrimonial strategies to secure the loyalty of 
supporters, both routes provide leaders with authority through the legal-rational 
structures of the state. At the same time, a significant degree of political 
influence is still determined by the local governments in this process. This 
aspect matters in the context of CBA because, although decisions are made 
within a community, either local governments or specific groups within the 
community often dominate the process for better access to resources. The 
influence of these leadership processes upon the CBA project will be further 
elaborated and exemplified through the case study in southern Ethiopia in the 
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following section that demonstrates the transformation of two different 
neopatrimonial relationships and its consequence on the community’s adaptive 
capacity. 
 
8.2  Game of Thrones: Whose Adaptive Capacity Matters?  
 
CBA is centred on building adaptive capacity but is shaped by the political 
dynamics surrounding local communities. It is thus important to analyse CBA 
with a focus on the role, capacity and aspirations of actors who participate and 
benefit from it. Analysis must also consider a wider range of social institutions, 
which are culturally and historically formulated and built-in at every level of 
society. As discussed in Chapter Three, the theory of neopatrimonialism is 
relevant in understanding the socio-political forces in many parts of Ethiopia 
and in particular for providing “the heuristic foundation” for the southern case 
study (Hagmann, 2005: 515). The neopatrimonial approach is particularly 
meaningful in southern Ethiopia because of its engagement with the key features 
of historic community practices (the legacies of imperialism and colonialism) 
and ‘modern’ legal-rational state structures.  
 
Neopatrimonialism in Ethiopia has a complex relationship to postcolonial 
theory. This is not only because there are critiques of the idea of 
neopatrimonialism that accuse it of being Eurocentric and colonial in its 
representation of African politics (Mustapha and Whitfield, 2011) but also 
because of the particularities of colonialism in Ethiopia. In relation to the 
former, it is acknowledged here that the framework of neopatrimonialism runs 
the risk of seeing African politics from the perspective of a single global norm, 
which casts Africa in its ‘traditional’ role of backwardness and criminality. But at 
the same time neopatrimonialism is an approach that can usefully be applied to 
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many other parts of the world beyond Africa so does not necessarily single Africa 
out in the way critics suggest. In relation to the latter, the idea of southern 
Ethiopia as a space colonised by Africans within a nation-state that builds part of 
its identity around the idea of being the African space that was never colonised is 
always going to be complicated. However, empirically the case of Kebelle B 
certainly concurs with Bratton and Van de Walle’s description: “In contemporary 
neopatrimonialism, relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal 
political and administrative system and leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less 
to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. The 
distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred” 
(1994:458). Neopatrimonialism provides a set of ideas that seemed to fit very 
accurately to the observations made during the fieldwork. 
 
Game of Thrones 
 
The case study in southern Ethiopia faced a similar problem to its northern 
counterpart; a group of young adults in the kebelle opposed the area closure 
activity, which was organised by the CBO as part of the CBA project. The 
objection was based on the same reason as that given in the northern case study 
participants; the forest is largely used by young adults who do not generally 
possess enough private land and are thus most severely affected by its closure. 
One difference between the northern and southern case studies was that from 
the beginning young adults were actively called upon by the CBO in the south as 
it was looking for people with “physical strength” (Interview DR-13; 16). A 
former member of CBO DR explains, “I understand that the youths have less 
land. But we all generally suffer from the shortage of land. This land [the 
community forest] belongs to the government. Although this land is communal-
based, no one controls it totally. Instead, we encouraged the youths and the poor 
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to join the CBO to bring changes to our environment and livelihoods” (DR-09). A 
number of young adults soon became members of the CBO and managed to 
obtain influence within the CBO, even though they were not part of the network 
of the man who was then the leader, a farmer who came from an older 
generation and had different interests and resources.  
 
In neopatrimonial society, struggles in politics usually begin with the 
emergence of a group of new elites rather than the movement of sub-groups 
within the ruling party (Erdmann and Engel, 2007). This incites a marginalised 
and previously leaderless social group to obtain direct access to patronage 
(Erdmann and Engel, 2007). That is to say, the leadership of a reformed coalition 
usually comes from outside the incumbent group as the insiders in a ruling 
coalition are unlikely to promote political reform. This certainly was the case 
with the CBA project in southern Ethiopia. Whilst most young adults were 
sidelined by the CBO’s dominant group, one female young adult who has a 
college degree managed to become a treasurer of CBO DR soon after the CBA 
project started. It was her individual initiative rather than an organised plan. The 
change occurred mainly because the CBO was in need of educated personnel for 
documenting and reporting. Effectively, this provided an entry-point for this 
more marginal group to start building up their own power-base. This brought 
about an opportunity for the group of young adults to transform the existing 
leadership of the CBO. This could also be analysed as evidence for the argument 
that neopatrimonial regimes are marked by the rapid turnover of political 
personnel to regulate rent-seeking and to prevent potential political rivals from 
developing their own networks.  
 
The woreda agricultural office in the south, particularly its officer, was not in 
favour of the CBA project at the beginning. A former leader of CBO DR explains,  
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“When he [the SGP national coordinator] came to visit our kebelle before the 
project was commenced, he [the woreda agricultural officer] told him [the SGP 
national coordinator] that the grant should not be directly transferred to the CBO 
since the leader is uneducated. But he [the SGP national coordinator] said that he 
will directly transfer the grant to the CBO and he hopes that the CBO members 
can learn from this practice even though they may make a mistake… This made 
him [the woreda agricultural officer] upset” (Interview DR-20).  
 
Moreover, at the early stage of the project, the former CBO leader was 
encouraged by the SGP national coordinator to try to keep the financial 
autonomy of the CBO from the kebelle and woreda offices to secure the benefits of 
the CBO for himself and his supporters. When asked “Why was he [the woreda 
agricultural officer] unhappy with the former leader?”, a member of CBO DR 
answers, “I don’t know. You can ask him [the former leader]. I think he [the 
officer] wanted to have some financial benefits, such as per diems, from the 
project just like all other government officers… But the leader shut him out of 
the CBO and CBA project totally” (Interview DR-15).  
 
A group of young adults from the CBO who opposed the area closure and the 
dominance of the former leader finally conspired against him in close 
cooperation with the woreda agricultural officer. Shortly afterwards, the former 
leader was accused of financial misconduct by those young adults and was 
subsequently discharged from the position by the woreda office. A chairperson of 
Kebelle B explains, “Initially there were some disagreements between the young 
CBO members and the former leader on the area closure activity… Once the 
woreda agricultural officer invited me to solve the problem, I found that there 
was the financial misconduct and that the former leader lacked financial 
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management skills” (Interview DR-22). A female farmer adds, “People say that 
he [the previous leader] embezzled the CBO money which was generated through 
the sale of agricultural products… During the audit, the woreda and kebelle 
officers made him resign” (DR-14). Another young member of CBO DR describes,  
 
“It was based on the interests of the CBO. The CBO can promote a person and 
kick a person out. [Researcher: Wasn’t it the woreda office’s decision?] The 
opinion of the woreda is also involved. But if the members dislike the leader, they 
do not engage in development activities and meetings, so rather than keeping 
that kind of leader, it is better to make him resign. [Researcher: Why was he 
kicked out?] We were afraid of him whenever we found him in the office or 
community forest… The CBO could be in danger. It is better to kick him out. I 
supported the idea. After he left we are doing better work in the lowlands” 
(Interview DR-17).  
 
However, some members of the CBO argued that there was no internal 
discussion within the CBO on the issue. A militia man (a member of CBO DR and 
a brother-in-law of the former leader) argues, “We did not know how they 
changed the leader. The woreda decided and kicked him out. When we asked, 
they said that the decision was made based on the Articles of the CBO’s 
constitution and was final. They did not accept our complaints” (Interview DR-
19).  
 
Another member of CBO DR insisted that the CBO’s treasurer should be 
responsible for the financial misconduct, not the former leader, “The main 
problem was the lack of financial records, which is the treasurer’s responsibility. 
The former leader wanted the treasurer to keep financial records every time they 
bought animals and equipment, but she was not happy… Later she mobilised a 
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few members and brought the case to the woreda officer who was also not happy 
with our leader, accusing him of the financial misconduct whilst he was working 
in the community forest” (DR-15). The former leader of CBO DR agrees by 
saying,  
 
“I quarrelled with the treasurer and told her not to report everything to the 
woreda agricultural officer. The CBO is independent and we have to make a 
decision by ourselves. But she did not agree with me… They accused me of 
making personal financial benefits from the construction of the CBO’s new office. 
But I did not use the SGP grant for the construction. I managed to find another 
source of money for the office… This new leader is going to use the SGP grant for 
the new office… Based on the constitution of a CBO, they should have called a 
community meeting and held appropriate evaluations before kicking me out. But 
the woreda officer made the decision by himself and kicked me out without 
consulting the CBO members” (Interview DR-20).  
 
A former militia man supports the former leader’s defence, “The previous 
leader listened to us in meetings… He just didn’t execute some tasks given by the 
woreda officer… That was the problem” (Interview DR-13).  
 
Because of their relations to higher levels of authority via the ruling party, 
Local government officers still rule supreme in many parts of southern Ethiopia. 
A leader of a One-to-Five network explains, “For me God and the government 
are comparable and their decisions must be accepted… The complaint is not 
right” (Interview DR-10). A farmer (and a former soldier) echoes, “Everything is 
good if it comes through the government… If I say something, it doesn’t work. If 
the government brings something, we accept it. It is impossible to reject” (DR-
11). So the transformation of the CBO (and with it the CBA project) was as much 
  268
about the relation between the new young leaders and the woreda office as it was 
about their capacity to transform their own community from within. 
 
Though the authority of the new leaders rests on their ability to maintain 
good relations with the state, it is a relationship that they seek to deny publicly, 
in order to assert their own capacities as leaders. The current leader of CBO DR 
yet denies the accusation of complicity in the dismissal of his predecessor, “It 
was the decision of the CBO. The woreda gives us technical support only” 
(Interview DR-21). A treasurer of CBO DR adds, “The woreda does not have any 
influence on the CBO. Maybe a little at the stage of planning a project in finding 
appropriate activities. For instance, they suggested the omitting of poultry 
activities as there is a risk of attack by wild animals. The woreda cannot do 
anything without our consent” (DR-04). Meanwhile, the woreda agricultural 
officer refused to be interviewed.  
 
In the meantime, a member of CBO DR alleges, “The new leader is smart, 
educated and has a diploma in clinical nursing… But it was the former leader 
who first brought him [the new leader] to the CBO as a member. He [the new 
leader] was more like an adopted son of the former leader. The former leader 
financially supported him [the new leader] during his schooling… Then the 
treasurer suggested him to the woreda officer as a new leader… So he betrayed 
his adoptive father” (Interview DR-15). 
 
As a result of this move between the generations in the CBO, the members of 
the previous dominant group have become less active in the CBA project and 
gradually left the CBO. This minor political intrigue at the lowest level of the 
state brought about consequences for the CBA project which will be analysed 
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from two points of view in the following section: financial transparency and area 
closure activity.  
 
Corruption: Financial Transparency  
 
In the case study communities, most research participants were found 
accepting a certain degree of corruption from their leaders since they are aware 
that most of the leadership positions are voluntary and unpaid. They tend to turn 
a blind eye to the indirect benefits the leaders receive from aid or development 
projects. For some of them, this is also partially due to their clientelistic 
relationships with the leaders. In return for their disregard of corruption, they 
gain a certain degree of influence on specific matters directly related to their 
livelihoods (e.g. which parts of the forest are selected for area closure activity). 
In where the livelihoods of populations are solely dependent on a few economic 
sectors, the membership of a group like the CBO is one prominent way of 
securing earnings, if not directly, then indirectly. The case of the CBA project in 
southern Ethiopia shows the multi-layered clientelistic networks that work both 
upwards and downwards. In this context, corruption works as an apparatus that 
the patron (the woreda agricultural officer) uses to ensure that the clients (the 
current leaders of the CBO) are dependent upon him.  
 
Accusations of corruption are often used by the government or by opposition 
as a political weapon of choice to undermine their opponent’s credibility. A 
former militia man complains, “No, there has never been transparency in 
finance. For instance, this year we produced coffee seedlings and sold them for 
12,000 Birr. After that we expected some benefits. But the [current] leaders gave 
each member only 35 Birr and shared the rest of money with the woreda office. 
They didn’t tell us for what purpose the money was used… Most of us 
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complained” (Interview DR-13). A female farmer agrees by saying, “Last week 
after you left [after the focus group discussion], the [current] leader asked the 
members to come and work for the CBO once a week, but people asked why we 
should suffer without benefits. The previous leader told us that all money is in a 
bank and the current leader says nothing… They gave us only 35 Birr this year. 
Some people were weeping and saying that they will only give us the money 
after we die” (DR-14). The former leader of CBO DR accuses the current leaders 
and the woreda agricultural officer of misusing the CBO’s money by describing 
the case in detail,  
 
“There is government interference in the CBA project although the CBO has 
its own leaders and members. These days the management decisions are usually 
made by the woreda officer. [Researcher: Why does the woreda officer want to be 
involved?] Because of the financial benefits from the purchasing of animals and 
other project expenditures. The treasurer did not agree with my idea to exclude 
him and even communicated with him directly and misused the money… 
[Researcher: How did they misuse the money?] For instance, when animals need 
to be purchased for the animal fattening activity, the current leaders go to Chuko 
and Dilla markets with the officer rather than using the local market in Darra. 
They use a lot of money for per diems and transports… Moreover, if animals are 
purchased for 25,000 Birr, they write the price down as 35,000 Birr and make a 
deal with the seller to take 10,000 Birr… The CBO is supposed to be independent. 
If the woreda continues to interfere regarding financial expenditure, the problem 
is not going to be solved. [Researcher: Have you considered discussing this issue 
with the SGP office in Addis Ababa?] At some point, the CBO members made a 
consensus to tell the truth, but the woreda officer told us that if we say the truth, 
the project will be terminated and there will be no more projects coming” 
(Interview DR-20).  
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Meanwhile, a young member of CBO DR argues back, “Some CBO members 
are not educated and do not understand financial issues. In principle, an audit is 
done and reported to the woreda once a year. When a CBO meeting is called, we 
also spend some money on coffee and the like. The members expect everything 
to be reported… I think there is no hidden work done in finance” (Interview DR-
17). A treasurer of the CBO adds, “We are doing this work for our kebelle and 
woreda. I left my family behind and went for trainings to engage in community 
mobilisation. If I quit this job, I can earn more through trade activities. He [the 
SGP national coordinator] told us that the SGP grant should be regarded as an 
agricultural seed for a community and should not be used as per diem. So the 
CBO members have decided the per diem is 50 Birr (approximately less than USD 
3). We have only 50 Birr for food and transport and get nothing else” (Interview 
DR-04).  
 
As a result, the members of the CBO, mostly the supporters of the former 
leader, found that they were not benefitting from the CBA project under the 
current leadership. This has discouraged them from participating in the project. 
It also revealed that most young adults who just got married or have young 
children are busy working on their farm and pasturing their livestock, and thus 
tend to have much less time to participate in the CBO’s activities compared to 
those who recently left the CBO. They are likely to be older and their children 
tend to be old enough to take care livestock, which allows some free time for 
them. The paradox here is that whilst on the one hand this account celebrates 
the capacity of an intervention like the CBA project to transform local political 
relations on the other it recognises that simple project goals are less likely to be 
delivered under the current leadership because older people have withdrawn 
from the project. In effect, the story endorses the view of some external funders 
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that it is better to turn a blind eye to the lack of democracy in local development 
projects than to put the project’s goals at risk. 
 
Area Closure: More Victims in a Newly Enclosed Area  
 
 
Figure 12. The former site of area closure in Kebelle B  
 
“If something is not used as what it is meant to be, it is a burden.”   
(A former leader of CBO DR, Interview DR-20) 
 
As soon as the leadership was changed the CBO moved the site of area closure 
to the lowlands and reopened the previously enclosed area near the kebelle. Since 
then, the area has been heavily used for pastoral activities, not only because it 
was nearby but also because it was adequately reforested by then after a few 
months of area closure. The area has quickly become deforested again (See Figure 
12). Moreover, the newly closed area was far away, three to four hours by foot, 
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from where most of people live. A young member of CBO DR describes the 
process:  
 
“We had a series of discussions, made a decision and reported it to the 
woreda. Then the woreda gave us the land in the lowlands… We put it to a vote 
and the majority accepted the idea… [Researcher: But I heard that some people 
left the CBO after that decision] Nobody resigned after the decision was made. 
Rather, we used to work only once a week, but now twice a week. [Researcher: 
Isn’t the newly enclosed area too far from your home?] No, only lazy people say 
so and they are lagging behind. We are hardworking” (Interview DR-17).  
 
However, a former member of the CBO argues to the contrary,  
 
“The problem is that we had our community forest near the Ulaula river and 
now it has moved to the lowlands which is far away. When we go there, we do 
not have adequate food and safe water. Sometimes we need to spend a night 
there to guard the area without light or electricity. We are subjected to the attack 
of wild animals and mosquitos… Many people got disappointed and resigned and 
are not actively participating anymore… [Researcher: Was the decision made 
through consultation?] They had some discussions led by the new leader, but I 
didn’t attend… Our leader is now kicked out and if we complain it will be 
reported to the woreda officer. I just do not participate anymore” (Interview DR-
09).  
 
The phrase ‘our leader’ is a telling indication of how different factions within 
the community see this transformation of political leadership. There is little 
sense of a whole community project, rather the partisan interests of different 
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generations are shaping decision-making and ultimately therefore adaptive 
capacity.  
 
Another problem revealed was that there are people living in this new closed 
area and they are in danger of being forcibly evicted from their land. A militia 
man (and a member of the CBO and a brother-in-law of the former leader) 
explains, “There are about 30 people living inside the area. They have been 
weeping as the CBO and the woreda told them to move out… This new leader 
moved the area closure to the lowlands, which is too far for us… That is why a 
number of people resigned” (Interview DR-19). Another former militia man 
adds, “There are a lot people who live in the enclosed area in the lowlands. Some 
people even joined the CBO… But they were told to move out and their livelihoods 
are in great danger” (DR-13). A leader of a One-to-Five network also complains, 
“The CBO is now meant only for the youths. Only the youths are allowed and 
actively participate. Who could walk to the farm in the lowlands every week? 
Only young and healthy people. Maybe my son could go, but not me” (DR-10).  
 
However, a current leader of the CBO argues,  
 
“Those people [who live in the newly enclosed area in the lowlands] are 
without land certificates and we [the CBO] sued them at the woreda court. The 
woreda justice officer ordered the people to move out. The woreda gave us 2,000 
timad of land there. Five people refused the order and we will open a case 
against them as well. They will get imprisoned maybe for two years although 
they said that the land was inherited from their forefathers. We have successfully 
managed to make a number of people move out already through accusing them 
at the court” (Interview DR-21).  
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Meanwhile, I tried to interview with people who live in the newly enclosed 
area, but all of them refused due to the sensitivity of the issue and referred me to 
the chairperson of the kebelle who explained the situation in detail: 
 
“There are two kinds of people living there. Firstly, some people started living 
there more than 20 years ago and have legal land certificates. They have 
inherited land from their mothers. Secondly, some people moved to the lowlands 
over the last 10 to 15 years following the kebelle’s development plan. They used 
to be our neighbours but moved to the lowlands due to the shortage of land. Then 
the woreda this year gave the land to the CBO for area closure and ordered all of 
them to move out. Now it is beyond our control… [Researcher: What is the status 
of people’s livelihoods in the lowland?] Most of them are poor. Although the land 
is fertile, the life is not easy there. It is very hot and there are a number of wild 
animals and mosquitos. They work hard and have invested a huge amount of 
money and energy in it… [Researcher: Didn’t the kebelle office and the CBO talk 
to the woreda about the issue?] The kebelle officers [who allocated the land for 
the people moved to the lowlands] are afraid of the woreda and not dare to 
report the situation. So, I have visited the land myself a couple of times to make a 
report and submitted it to the woreda… But the woreda officials ordered me to 
drive the people out by demolishing their houses and damaging their assets. For 
me, this sounds illegal… The problem is the kebelle officers. They should go to the 
woreda with the tangible and real information… People lived there for many 
years and some of them even inherited the land. But no one is forwarding their 
opinions to the woreda. The case is still going on. The woreda told them to 
continue farming until the case is settled. It is difficult to drive them out and it is 
illegal… I understand that the CBO is doing something good for the environment. 
I also understand why they wanted to move the farm to the lowlands. But it is 
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causing another problem and putting some people’s livelihoods in danger” 
(Interview DR-22).  
 
In summary, the consequence of the political turmoil between the dominant 
group and young adults was ultimately detrimental not only to the CBA project 
but also to a number of the poor households. The previous site of area closure 
became deforested again and the residents of the newly enclosed area are in 
danger of being forcibly evicted from their land. However, it is not easy to 
criticise those young adults who were previously marginalised from the 
decision-making processes of the CBO and have relatively weaker financial 
capacity (i.e. less land). They strongly believe the decision made regarding to the 
area closure is fair in that it enables them to make enough of a livelihood that 
there is no need for them to migrate to other regions for manual labour like 
those in the northern case study.  
 
8.3  Conclusion  
 
The practice of neopatrimonialism does not entirely rest on historical forms 
of authority but coexists with legal-rational legitimacy. Yet, despite the changes 
in political ideology and the market economy, there has been remarkable 
continuity in the characteristics of politics in Ethiopia. Informal relationships 
between patrons and clients remain prevalent and manifest themselves in 
notable levels of corruption and nepotism in which government officers and local 
leaders offer rent-seeking opportunities to other political elites or supporters in 
return for their support (Gray and Whitfield, 2014). In this context, the practice 
is based on the idea theorised by Weber and the prefix ‘neo’ just “serves to 
emphasise that we are no longer in a traditional context” (Blundo and Médard, 
2002: 10 in Bach and Gazibo, 2012:11). Both formal and informal structures of 
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Kebelle B in southern Ethiopia are intricately interwoven in a way that ensures 
the submission and loyalty to patrons. That is to say, the concept of 
neopatrimonialism is based on not only the patriarchal values of society, but also 
the rationally managed exchange of service between patrons and clients. When 
the former leader of the CBO failed to exchange services with the woreda 
agricultural officer in this manner the relationship breaks down and, as a result 
he was replaced by someone more compliant – even though this involved 
transforming the ‘internal’ political relationships within the community by 
marginalising an older elite and replacing them with younger, less well 
connected individuals. 
 
In understanding a society, it is important to analyse not only the political 
influence that actors wield through their relationships, but also the context in 
which their capacity to steer change is exercised. The case study in southern 
Ethiopia shows that there are ongoing political dynamics in the multi-layered 
clientelistic networks around communities. The CBA project has given rise to 
transformability in the political arena, that is to say, a transformation of the 
community’s decision-making process and leadership, that has subsequently 
affected the community’s adaptive capacity – in this case quite possibly in 
negative ways.  
 
As the consequence of this political turmoil between the dominant group and 
the young adults, the former site of area closure reopened and became bare land 
again, and the residents of the newly enclosed area are in danger of being 
forcibly evicted from their land. However, the new leadership strongly believe 
that the decision made regarding the area closure was less of an affect upon their 
livelihoods. As Van de Walle (2001) argues, the clientelistic system makes 
governance politically resilient but often economically and environmentally 
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irrational. In this context, neopatrimonialism is still a useful paradigm for 
understanding local politics in post-1991 federal Ethiopia’s socio-cultural 
landscape (de Waal, 2015). In this thesis, this analysis of how important 
leadership is within the CBA projects has only been possible through 
understanding the ‘invisible’ politics of community, which existed before the 
CBA projects began, are being redefined in the course of the project and will 
continue after they end.  
 
Leadership matters precisely because of the political resilience of clientelism, 
and this is something that organisations seeking to intervene in environmental 
management need to acknowledge. What makes it complex, however, is that 
challenging patriarchy in these leadership traditions might be normatively 
attractive, but environmentally problematic. To return to the over-arching 
question here we can ask to what extent CBA projects change the geometry of 
power of community? Clearly the project provided the resources that made it 
worthwhile for the woreda officer to collaborate with the new younger political 
challengers in overturning the existing socio-political dominance of locality. Yet, 
other ideas of power, primarily national-scale multi-layered clientelistic 
networks remain the structure within which such transformative changes at the 
local level occur. What looks like transformation locally is continuity nationally. 
The paradox here is that whilst on the one hand this account enjoys the capacity 
to transform local political relations on the other it recognises that simple 
project goals are less likely to be delivered. In practice, it supports the view of 
some donor agencies that it is better to turn a blind eye to the lack of democracy 
in local development projects than to put the project’s goals at risk. 
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Chapter Nine. Conclusion: Towards a Recognition of Politicised 
Communities 
 
“I understand that the land has to be protected and trees should grow… But there 
is a shortage of [private] land… Now, we, the young adults, have no access to the 
community forest [because of the project]. This is inadequate for us.” 
(A young farmer, Interview DG-11) 
 
This conclusion sets out to identify the key arguments made in the thesis and 
to draw them together. In so doing, it seeks both to summarise specific 
theoretical conclusions and to outline the links between the theory and the 
empirical materials laid out in the thesis. Ultimately the conclusion recapitulates 
the consequences of the analysis of the case studies presented in the thesis for 
the practice of Community-Based Adaptation (CBA). 
 
CBA is a community-led intervention, which seeks to address climate change 
through participatory approaches, based on communities’ priorities, knowledge 
and capacities. Particular emphasis is placed both on integrated adaptation 
measures capable of eliciting local knowledge and on understanding complex 
socio-ecological systems (Ensor et al., 2016). CBA, in this thesis, is also about 
development processes that bring participatory decision-making to the centre of 
climate change adaptation. Decision-making processes likewise may be about 
governing communities as much as increasing adaptive capacity. Given that 
communities are shaped by conflicting values and contrasting aspirations, CBA 
comes to be seen as a complex, multi-voiced process which gives rise to a variety 
of outcomes. 
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The first key argument developed through the thesis is that power dynamics 
are inherent to the working out of CBA projects. The stated goal of the projects is 
to help villagers to cope with the consequences of climate change through their 
own institutions and actions. This thesis, however, argues that the CBA projects 
are also a crucible for competition over rights and the pursuit of differential 
access to resources in complex socio-ecological systems. That is to say, CBA is an 
intervention that forces us to question the usefulness of pre-formulated 
understandings of community-based development as context-free and apolitical. 
Different actors, institutions, environments, ideas, traditions and hopes shape 
the activities of CBA in different places as well as the variety of outcomes. In 
order to address this, the thesis has analysed the politicised narratives that 
emerged through a study of two CBA projects funded through the Small Grants 
Programme (SGP) in Ethiopia. In particular, it has attended to the ways 
community members narrated their own experiences of the projects.  
 
In the account of a young farmer quoted in the previous page, for example, it 
is evident that his complaint makes no explicit mention of politics, but on 
further analysis it shows how political the changes the CBA project requires are. 
The conflicting values and contrasting aspirations of the young farmer’s 
situation are familiar from accounts by others cited in this thesis: environmental 
rehabilitation (climate change adaptation), land shortages and socio-political 
stratification are inherently divisive. They are therefore political issues. The 
thesis has pursued the idea that though everywhere is different, power dynamics 
are important in every community. Although CBA is presented as outside 
politics, it is the local contexts and wider political relations that shape the way it 
is implemented and the outcomes of the projects. 
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A second, subsidiary argument that flows from the first is that power 
relations are seldom symmetrical. The decision-making processes of the CBA 
projects are frequently dominated by a few members or groups. Critical analysis 
of the power dynamics of communities is therefore necessary. In an era of 
shrinking international development budgets and rising climate change 
concerns, international donor agencies are increasingly referring to the need for 
practice to come ‘from the community’. It is the task of academic work to 
interpret community action in the light of field research. In order to accomplish 
this task, the thesis has demonstrated the need for a flexible, context-sensitive 
and power-conscious analytical framework to evaluate CBA. It has then 
synthesised resilience thinking and political ecology to produce a conceptual hybrid 
that strengthens the socio-political dimensions of the former and the policy-
relevant dimensions of the latter. The thesis aspires to make a distinctive 
contribution to the field of studies of community development in general, and 
studies of CBA in particular, by developing an analytical framework that 
foregrounds underlying contexts and both local and national politics.  
 
Using this lens, the thesis has analysed the dynamics of two interrelated 
aspects of CBA at different levels, or scales, of adaptive governance. First, it has 
examined control of land as a central organising feature of Ethiopian 
governmentality at the national level. It has argued that three successive 
Ethiopian regimes over two hundred years have deployed control over land to 
steer the behaviour of the peasantry. As a result, a number of rural communities 
in Ethiopia have never been internally equal or fully democratic, but instead have 
consistently been hierarchical and internally divided in terms of rights and 
resources. Peasant farmers have not merely tolerated this inequality; they have 
given their consent and support to hierarchical structures, in part because these 
  282
connect villages to a distant central government. Such relationships shape the 
way CBA works out in 21st century Ethiopia.  
 
The second aspect relating CBA to governance operates at a more local scale. 
The thesis has offered a political account of adaptive capacity during the time the 
CBA projects were implemented in two case study communities in the Ethiopian 
highlands. Attention was given to the details of the ways in which different 
individuals and interest groups within these communities articulate their 
experiences of the projects. The research participants were not regarded as a 
homogeneous component of a single-voiced community, but as complex social 
actors with a variety of forms of social, ecological, cultural and political assets 
and aspirations. The case studies reveal that the CBA projects gave rise to a 
variety of outcomes, with both winners and losers. Some people gained a 
significant amount of political influence through their participation in the CBA 
projects because of the extent to which the structures of community are 
inscribed into the way in which the projects are implemented. That is to say: 
participation in the CBA projects is a product of a politically-conflicted, 
economically-varied and culturally-imposed social order. CBA has been 
conceptualised less as a set of recipes or procedures geared to an agreed set of 
climate-related outcomes and more as a visible manifestation of invisible and 
contested social relationships infused with diverse expressions of power. This 
demonstrates how new theorisations can be brought to bear on the empirical 
stories from the case studies in Ethiopia. The practical consequences are shown 
to include, significantly, a recognition amongst those who are expected to deliver 
CBA that, though it can be an important opportunity to bring social reform to 
communities, it can also promote inequality and maintain the political status 
quo, with all its existing complexities and social injustices. 
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9.1  Summary of Findings  
 
By bringing together resilience thinking with a political ecology approach, 
the thesis has shown that the current practice of CBA will have limited long-
term success. This is because it is conceptually under-developed, depending on 
an unrealistically depoliticised understanding of the communities involved. CBA 
is currently thought of primarily as a type of development practice with agreed 
goals; but it is also a redeployment by powerful actors of ideas of progress and 
development that serve their own interests. The thesis has taken a critical 
approach, treating CBA as a discourse and seeking to analyse the relationships of 
power, scale and knowledge that underpin the production and operation of that 
discourse, thereby revealing their political nature. It has analysed the standard 
or orthodox theoretical foundations of CBA, showing how the participatory 
development (PD) discourse and the concept of resilience came together to 
formulate the notion of CBA. It has then conceptualised CBA through the 
alternative lens of political ecology, developing the argument that this approach 
responds to the weaknesses associated with resilience thinking notably its 
limited capacity for political analysis. It has approached the research setting not 
as a paradigmatic site for the analysis of a particular process, but as a location 
from which to build theories that might be productively applied elsewhere. The 
thesis has intervened in current conceptual debates to make three theoretical 
contributions to the field of research on CBA. 
 
The first of these conceptual innovations is to understand participation and 
empowerment in specific local communities without neglecting the politics and 
wider structures in which these local communities are embedded. Far from being 
purely ‘local’, CBA projects are part of a vertically nested hierarchy of scales, so 
it is necessary not to treat the local in isolation from regional, national and even 
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international relationships. The thesis has taken this injunction seriously and 
analysed the assumption that the idea of ‘the local’ has itself become hegemonic 
in some development discourses and needs to be treated more critically. The role 
of ‘the local’ in development practice should be determined in relation to other 
scales. The thesis has responded to this paradox by analysing the dynamics of 
specific CBA projects without losing sight of the dynamics of regional, national 
and global scales in terms of decentralised decision-making, effective knowledge 
management and participatory processes. This – rather than merely stressing 
the physical impacts of climate change at the local village level – is the key to 
identifying appropriate solutions for Ethiopian peasant farmers. 
 
In answering the research question 1a), ‘how are the socio-political 
structures of a community constructed?’, the thesis has questioned the 
assumption of social equality that characterises CBA projects. It has addressed, 
in Chapter Five, how three successive Ethiopian regimes have deployed control 
over land to steer the behaviour of the Ethiopian people, particularly the 
peasantry, over the past two hundred years. It has demonstrated that a 
considerable number of rural communities in Ethiopia have never been 
internally equal or fully democratic but instead have consistently been 
hierarchical and internally divided in terms of rights and resources. In particular, 
it has argued that peasant farmers have given their consent and support to 
strongly hierarchical structures, which have often connected villages to a distant 
central government. The belief that such inequality cannot be challenged is a 
legacy of Ethiopian history. This history has been examined in order to show 
why it is so hard to apply some of the assumptions of CBA to communities in 
Ethiopia. 
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The thesis has provided an historical outline of the ways in which the land 
tenure system in Ethiopia has been established, promoted and maintained - 
partly through the lens of authoritarian governmentality (Dean, 2010). It has 
shown how ideas from imperial administration and two post-revolution regimes 
have all sought to ensure the voluntary participation of the peasantry in land 
management in ways that best suit the elites. The policy of state ownership of 
land has been retained, and rural peasants have continued to accept that their 
land holdings were not permanent property but temporary allocations that can 
be reduced, if not confiscated, by government at a moment’s notice. The 
politicisation of land has made peasants increasingly dependent on the state and 
its directives and more easily manipulated, particularly when they fear another 
famine. The memory of the coercive power of the state is pertinent to the 
behaviour of peasants and so to the current practices of CBA. This approach has 
reinforced the existing structures of the society to such an extent that, despite a 
verbal commitment to bottom-up development practices, the reality is still one 
in which, in practice, higher tiers of governance retain their primacy.  
 
A second analytical contribution of the thesis is to link CBA with the idea of 
systems resilience. This defines communities and their surrounding 
environment as complex socio-ecological systems. In such systems, all 
components of the systems are intricately interconnected (Berkes et al., 2003). 
The definition of community, in this thesis, is a group of people who share 
similar socio-political interests that are shaped by differences and competition 
in terms of access to rights and resources. Thus to understand communities it is 
necessary to question representation, authority, governance and accountability 
among multiple and contradictory constituencies and alliances (Li, 2004). The 
notion of adaptive capacity – central to resilience thinking – involves cross-level 
and cross-scale activities that aim to formulate an overarching management 
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system to guide climate change adaptation. This is conceived holistically, 
bringing together knowledge of systems, studies of institutional linkages and 
collective action in response to climate change (Folke, 2006; Walker and Salt, 
2006). Considering adaptive capacity in terms of resilience thinking also implies 
the ability to respond to change and transform systems into more desirable 
states.  
 
In answering the research question 1b), ‘to what extent do socio-political 
dynamics within and around a community shape the local accounts of adaptive 
capacity and with what consequences?’, attention has been drawn, in Chapter 
Six, to the socio-political accounts of adaptive capacity which emerged during 
the time CBA projects were implemented in the two villages in the Ethiopian 
highlands. The thesis has argued that the scale on which CBA is configured and 
the way indigenous knowledge is regulated represent conflicting values and 
contrasting aspirations on the part of different actors and institutions. This calls 
for increased concern with the democratic content of community (Swyngedouw 
and Heynen, 2003; Watts and Peet, 2004). In particular, the thesis has 
demonstrated how the socio-political structures of community shape the 
building of adaptive capacity through CBA projects in the case study 
communities.  
 
In a literal sense, there is a degree of consensus around the kebelle as the 
scale of ‘community’ between government and citizens – i.e. the scale of socio-
ecological systems – even if the administrative purpose of the kebelle is different. 
As the lowest level of government, most ordinary Ethiopian citizens have contact 
with the kebelle administration on an everyday basis. At the same time, the 
kebelle has complex governance structures through which locally organised 
institutions and those of the state government are intricately interwoven. The 
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kebelle system has been used as a security apparatus by both the Derg and the 
EPRDF regimes. Organising CBA projects at the kebelle level may create an 
opportunity to build administrative independence with a degree of local 
democracy, but it also reveals the intention of the Ethiopian government to keep 
local villages under surveillance whilst filling the financial gap in local 
development. Ethiopian citizens are well aware of this security role of kebelle. An 
individual’s definition of ‘community’, the thesis has argued, is significantly 
dependent on their socio-political milieu. Individual definitions of community, 
“a combination of critical perspectives and the hard-won insights distilled from 
field work” (Rocheleau, 2008:716), have been used to critique the homogenising 
discourse of community. 
 
Adaptive governance of CBA organises climate change adaptation by drawing 
on indigenous knowledge and experience. The thesis has shown that most 
peasant farmers in the case study communities believe that climate change is 
happening because of the effect of their livelihood activities such as logging, 
cattle feeding and charcoal production. This idea is neither entirely indigenous 
nor necessarily correct, but has been extensively used to legitimise the area 
closure activity of the CBA projects. Access to knowledge reflects the political 
capacity of different actors and institutions. It calls for increased concern with 
social justice in the analysis of environmental change as a specific component of 
systems resilience. 
 
The third analytical contribution of this thesis is to weave political ecology’s 
understanding of relational power into resilience thinking in order to rethink 
questions of politics in the analysis of CBA (Foucault, 2009[1977]; Haugaard, 
2002; Scott, 2001). Here politics is the (generally public) dialogue about the rules 
(both formal laws and less formal social regulations) by which a society lives and 
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operates and through which scarce resources are allocated. This is a recognition 
of the need to improve understanding of power relations in communities in 
order to respond flexibly and collectively to climate disturbances in complex 
socio-ecological systems.  
 
In answering the research question 2a), ‘who participates in the decision-
making processes of CBA and how are their identities determined?’, Chapter 
Seven of the thesis highlighted the way that actors and institutions deploy 
various political assets around the structures of community to compete over 
access to resources linked to CBA projects. It has examined the intra-community 
politics and the simultaneous decentralisation and recentralisation of power 
through the activity of area closure in the northern case study.  
 
The lives of peasant farmers are characterised by a complex set of norms and 
rules that determine their place in the structures of community. These structures 
are bound up in a multifarious web of relationships between actors and 
institutions in terms of socio-political factors such as position, education level, 
wealth, age and gender. Based on these findings, the thesis has interrogated the 
change in power dynamics, considering the interaction between the practice of 
politics and the unfolding of the CBA project in the northern case study (Kebelle 
A). It has demonstrated the current power imbalance of the kebelle and how the 
dominant group managed to remain predominant by relabelling itself as a new 
institution – i.e. Community-Based Organisation (CBO) – and by justifying their 
control by using a discourse of environmental rehabilitation. During the 
implementation of the project, the group of young adults who were already 
socially and economically marginalised became even more isolated by the 
activity of area closure whereas women achieved a limited degree of participation 
in meetings. This was a result of the dominant group deeming women’s 
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participation unthreatening in contrast to the status-quo challenging idea of 
land redistribution that the young (male) adults constantly request. 
 
In answering the research question 2b), ‘to what extent do CBA projects 
change the geometry of power of a community?’, Chapter Eight of this thesis 
examined the ongoing political dynamics in the multi-layered clientelistic 
networks around the case study communities. In understanding a society, the 
thesis has argued, it is important to analyse not only the political assets that 
actors gain through their relationships but also the context in which their 
capacity to steer change is exercised. The case study in southern Ethiopia (Kebelle 
B) has shown that there are ongoing political dynamics in the multi-layered 
clientelistic networks around local communities. The CBA project gave rise to 
transformability in the political arena, that is to say, a transformation of the 
community’s decision-making process and leadership that subsequently affected 
the community’s adaptive capacity – in this case quite possibly in negative ways.  
 
The practice of neopatrimonialism does not entirely rest on historical forms 
of authority but coexists with legal-rational legitimacy. Yet, despite the changes 
in political ideology and the market economy, there has been remarkable 
continuity in the characteristics of politics in Ethiopia. Informal relationships 
between patrons and clients remain prevalent and manifest themselves in 
notable levels of corruption and nepotism in which government officers and local 
leaders offer rent-seeking opportunities to other political elites or supporters in 
return for their support (Gray and Whitfield, 2014). The concept of 
neopatrimonialism is based not only on the patriarchal values of society but also 
on the rationally managed exchange of service between patrons and clients. 
When the former leader of CBO DR failed to exchange services with the woreda 
agricultural officer in this manner, the relationship broke down, and as a result, 
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he was replaced by someone more compliant – even though this involved 
transforming the ‘internal’ political relationships within the community by 
marginalising older elites and replacing them with younger, less well connected 
individuals. 
 
The clientelistic system, as Van de Walle (2001) argues, makes governance 
politically resilient but often economically and environmentally irrational. 
Kebelle A managed to a large extent to restore a forest in the Choke Mountain 
(See Figure 13), yet many young adults subsequently left the village, giving up 
their livelihoods. Meanwhile, as the consequence of this political turmoil in 
Kebelle B, the former site of area closure reopened and soon became bare land 
again (See Figure 14), and the residents of the newly enclosed area have been in 
danger of being forcibly evicted from their land. Given this evidence, we can see 
that CBA is a complex, multi-voiced process which represents contrasting 
aspirations and conflicting imperatives and gives rise to a variety of outcomes at 
the end of the project, with both winners and losers. However, the monitoring 
and evaluation report of SGP Ethiopia (2012) failed to capture this socio-political 
aspect of adaptive capacity and only focused on the physical environment as the 
outcome, describing the project as “generally successful” (2), “efficiently 
managed” (5) and “successfully reforested” (6).  
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Figure 13. The site of area closure in Kebelle A 
 
 
Figure 14. The site of area closure in Kebelle B 
 
Leadership matters precisely because of the political resilience of clientelism, 
and this is something that organisations seeking to intervene in environmental 
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management need to acknowledge. What makes it complex is that challenging 
patriarchy in these leadership traditions might be normatively attractive, but is 
environmentally problematic. To return to the research question 2b), ‘to what 
extent do CBA projects change the geometry of power of a community?’, the CBA 
project in southern Ethiopia (Kebelle B) provided the resources that made it 
worthwhile for the woreda officer to collaborate with the new younger political 
challengers in overturning the existing socio-political dominance of locality. Yet, 
other power relations, primarily national-scale multi-layered clientelistic 
networks, remain the structure within which such changes at the local level 
occur. What looks like transformation locally is continuity nationally. There is a 
paradox here. On the one hand this transformative account enjoys the capacity to 
change local political relations, on the other it recognises that simple project 
goals are less likely to be delivered. In practice, it supports the view of some 
donor agencies that it is better to turn a blind eye to the lack of democracy in 
local development projects than to put the project’s goals at risk. 
 
9.2  Critical Reflections  
 
In promoting the concept of ‘politicised communities’, the thesis has 
engaged with the political legacies of Ethiopian history, competing scales and 
knowledge of the environment, varied power dynamics of the communities and 
the politics of local leadership in the multi-layered structures of adaptive 
governance. In so doing, the thesis has contributed a sympathetic critical 
analysis, rather than a dichotomous view of whether it works or not, to the field 
of research on CBA. There is a wider set of reflections to be considered at the end 
of this research project. The concept of ‘politicised communities’ is not a theory 
that seeks to explain all instances of community-based development approaches; 
rather it seeks to provide a framework for studying these processes. The thesis 
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as a whole has developed concepts that can be employed to analyse diverse 
settings and address the power dynamics that give rise to a variety of outcomes.  
 
These socio-political accounts have been interpreted in the light of field 
research that seeks to understand complex socio-ecological systems. In an era of 
shrinking international development budgets and rising climate change 
concerns, international donor agencies are increasingly referring to the need for 
practice to come ‘from the community’. Many of the attempts to find a formula 
for community-based development falter when they are confronted by the 
heterogeneity of communities. Different actors, institutions, environments, 
ideas, traditions and hopes shape the activities of CBA in different places. CBA 
increasingly comes to be seen as a complex, multi-voiced process that forces us 
to question about power, justice and democracy in the context of environmental 
change. 
 
There are aspects of this thesis which might be undertaken differently if the 
opportunity arose again. For example, the accounts of the CBA projects the thesis 
collated are mainly drawn from the peasant farmers’ perspectives and are thus 
complicit with a silence on the perspectives of (CBA) field practitioners who 
monitor and evaluate the projects. The thesis was written from the perspectives 
of the local populations and could not do justice to the autonomous perspectives 
of actors in NGOs and on the donor side, whose own views on the aspects of CBA 
also merit attention and reflection. This should be noted in view of the ‘ivory 
tower syndrome’ prevalent in political ecology, that is to say, it is better at 
criticising the status quo than developing a feasible or practical blueprint for 
policy-makers to address the future.  
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Political ecology tends to advocate structural changes in the relations of 
production. These changes are both profound and radical and (as such) alien to 
the more modest ambitions of most real world policy-makers. Political 
ecologists believe that the sources of environmental changes are rooted in the 
political and economic dimensions of society. Accordingly, they argue for the 
need of “the far-reaching changes to local, regional and global political-
economic processes” (Bryant and Bailey, 1997:3). These changes, however, 
require a substantial amount of political effort because they inevitably involve 
the transformation of highly unequal power relationships upon which the 
present system is based. This is why political ecologists have been sceptical 
about the concept of sustainable development, which is built on the ‘business-
as-usual’ agenda (Peet et al., 2011). The concept of political ecology sees 
resolving environmental problems as a basis for radical change in the context of 
the developmentalist onslaught (Escobar, 1996). Such a position would seem 
easier to sustain at an academic conference than at an NGO workshop. 
 
Is it possible to bridge this gap between theory and practice, between 
political analysis and practical action? This thesis opens up some key practical 
questions for the future. As participatory development ideas are progressively 
incorporated into CBA, the concept of participatory monitoring and evaluation 
(Estrella and Gaventa, 1997) should also be revived. CBA projects might then 
begin to incorporate a process of critical evaluation based on the ideas 
considered throughout this thesis. Practitioners could be trained to apply this 
research methodology as part of the project monitoring and evaluation process. 
Although it would undoubtedly be a challenge to find the time and resources for 
such ethnographically informed project assessment, it could be put into practice 
by reducing a number of CBA projects implemented in a country – that is to say, 
‘quality, not quantity’. In Ethiopia, for instance, 54 projects were being 
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implemented in 2015 alone, by only two members of SGP staff. The pay-off 
would be more realistic project design and, ultimately, more effective projects. In 
a field so critical to our global future, such a development would be a step in the 
right direction. 
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Appendix 1. List of Interviewees  
Name Gender Age Job Place Remarks 
DG-01 M 48 Farmer, cashier 
of CBO  
His yard  
DG-02 M 48 Farmer, chair of 
CBO 
His yard  
DG-03 F 30 Housewife Her husband’s yard  
DG-04 M 26 Farmer Common field  
DG-05 F 25 
Farmer, 
housewife Road construction site  
DG-06 M 40 
Farmer, 
commander of 
militia 
Road construction site  
DG-07 M 48 Farmer, militia Road construction site Previous leader of 
kebelle 
DG-08 M 40 Farmer, militia Road construction site Commander of 
the militia team 
DG-09 F 34 Housewife Road construction site  
DG-10 M 33 Farmer Road construction site One of leaders at 
kebelle level 
DG-11 M 25 Farmer, militia  Road construction site 
Development 
team leader 
DG-12 M 25 Farmer  Near his house  
DG-13 M 30’s Farmer  
Hill where he herds his 
cattle  
DG-14 F 40’s Housewife, 
farmer 
In front of the kebelle 
office before the 
meeting of women 
Leader of 
women's league  
DG-15 F 45 
Housewife, 
farmer 
In the field with her 
husband 
Leader of 
women's league  
DG-16 M 24 Kebelle 
administrator  
DG-01’s house  
DG-17 F 40 Housewife, 
farmer 
Near her house  
DG-18 F 45 Housewife, 
farmer 
Road construction site  
DG-19 F 38 Farmer Road construction site Leader of One-
to-Five network 
DG-20 M 36 Farmer  Road construction site  
DG-21 M 52 Farmer Road construction site 
Representative of 
kebelle  
DG-22 M 55 Farmer Near his house Leader of gott 
DG-23 M 32 Farmer, priest DG-16's House 
Deputy leader of 
gott / Casher of 
lower kebelle CBO 
DG-24 M 25 Housewife, 
farmer 
Next to her house  
DG-25 F 15 Student Near her house  
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DG-26 F 51 Farmer Near her house  
DG-27 M 50 Farmer Road construction site  
DG-28 M 35 
Diaqon (pre-
priest) 
Road construction site  
DG-29 M 28 Housewife Near his house  
DG-30 F 18 Farmer Near her house Divorced 
DG-31 F 24 Farmer Road construction site  
DG-32 M 35 Farmer Road construction site  
DG-33 M 65 Farmer Near his house  
DG-34 M 70 Farmer Near his house  
DG-35 M 22 Farmer Near his house  
DG-36 M 56 Farmer Road construction site  
DG-37 M 35 Farmer Road construction site  
DG-38 M 26 
Woreda 
agricultural 
officer 
Near the office  
DG-39 M 35 Farmer My accommodation 
Gott leader and 
vice chair of 
kebelle 
DG-40 M 45 Farmer Kebelle office Leader of kebelle 
DG-41 M 29 Merchant A local pub Secretary of CBO 
DG-42 M 47 
Farmer, 
merchant My accommodation 
Leader of CBO, 
former soldier 
DR-02 M 45 Farmer, militia  Near his farm  
DR-03 F 40 Farmer Near her house 
Leader of One-
to-Five network 
DR-04 F 25 Housemaid   Casher of CBO 
DR-05 M 30 Student His house 
Secretary of One-
to-Five network, 
judge of kebelle 
court 
DR-07 F 40 Housemaid   
DR-08 F 30 Farmer, 
merchant 
 
CBO member, 
leader of One-to-
Five network 
DR-09 M 37 Farmer  
Committee 
member of kebelle 
/ Land 
administration 
officer 
DR-10 M 38  His house Leader of One-
to-Five network 
DR-11 M 56 Farmer His house Former soldier 
DR-12 F 25 Farmer His house  
DR-13 M 30 Farmer  
Former militia 
man 
DR-14 F 25 Farmer   
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DR-15 F 25 Merchant  
Wife of former 
leader of CBO, 
member of 
women's league 
DR-16 F 20 Farmer Kebelle office Former student 
DR-17 F 20’s Farmer, student Kebelle office  
DR-18 F 45 
Farmer, 
merchant  
Member of 
women's league, 
widow 
DR-19 M 29 Farmer, militia 
Former leader of CBO's 
house (His brother in 
law) 
Member of One-
to-Five network 
DR-20 M 40 
Former leader 
of CBO His house 
Leader of One-
to-Five network, 
EPRDF party 
cadre  
DR-21 M 22 Student  
Leader of CBO, 
executive 
committee 
member of the 
electoral board 
DR-22 M 50’s Farmer My accommodation Chairperson of 
kebelle 
DP-01 M 37 Woreda officer Woreda office  
DP-02 M 41 Woreda officer Woreda office  
DP-03 F 32 Woreda officer Woreda office  
DP-04 M 40 Kebelle officer Kebelle office  
AA-01 M 56 
SGP Ethiopia 
national 
coordinator 
SGP Ethiopia office  
AA-02 F 34 SGP project 
administrator 
SGP Ethiopia office  
AA-03 M 45 NGO worker Field  
AA-04 M 42 NGO worker Field  
AA-05 M 32 NGO worker Field  
AA-06 M 59 NGO worker WFP Tanzania office  
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Appendix 2. Focus Group Discussion Topics of Interest 
1. Introduction  
1.1 Greetings and introduction of the researcher and the research  
(Purpose, format, duration, consent, confidentiality and rights) 
1.2 Any questions before starting the discussion 
 
2. Local environment and climate change 
2.1 Describe any differences of where you live between the past and 
now  
2.2 Describe your community 
2.3 Discuss about any problems of where you live (particularly, in 
relation to weather) that you concern 
 
3. Livelihoods 
3.1 Discuss any changes or problems of your livelihoods (maybe in 
relation to section 2.3) 
3.2 Where do you graze your animals these days? 
 
4. The CBA project  
4.1 Describe the project  
4.2 Tell us about any stories you experienced or heard about the 
project  
4.3 Discuss any changes, benefits and disadvantages made by the 
project to you, families and communities 
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Appendix 3. Interview Questions  
 
1. Introduction  
1.1 Greetings and introduction of the researcher and the research  
(Purpose, format, duration, consent, confidentiality and rights) 
1.2 Any questions before starting the interview 
 
2. Local environment and climate change 
2.1 Introduce where (the environment) you live (e.g. weather, land, 
forest, water sources, rainy and dry season, wind, temperature, 
etc.) 
2.2 Describe any differences of where you live between the past and 
now  
2.3 Describe your community 
2.4 Discuss about any problems of where you live (particularly, in 
relation to weather) that you concern 
2.5 Why do you think that problems have happened and what shall 
you prepare for that? 
 
3. Livelihoods 
3.1 Introduce your family members and their jobs (main income 
sources) 
3.2 Describe your activities of a day/season/year 
3.3 Discuss any changes or problems of your livelihoods (maybe in 
relation to section 2.4) 
3.4 Where do you graze your animals these days? 
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4. The CBA project  
4.1 Describe the project 
4.2 Tell us about any stories you experienced or heard about the 
project 
4.3 Are you a member of CBO? Who are members of CBO in your 
family? 
4.4 Describe your participation in the project 
4.5 Describe any changes, benefits and disadvantages made by the 
project to you, families and communities 
 
5. Local Communities and CBO 
5.1 Introduce your kebelle and woreda (e.g. religion, ethnic groups, 
elders, gender, local governments) 
5.2 Describe people that you are (and not) close to, usually talk to and 
do everyday activities with (e.g. other gotts or kebelles) 
5.3 Discuss about these people’s participation in the project during 
the decision-making process 
5.4 Discuss about any chances made on your relationships with other 
people after the project 
 
6. Any Other Issues 
6.1 Any other topics that you may want to discuss with us  
6.2 Any other potential interviewees that you would like to 
recommend 
6.3 How was the interview?  
 
